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ART. I. — *St. Peter and Mahomet ; or the Popes protecting
Christendom from Mahometanism.*

WHEN the Apostles were sitting at the feet of Christ for the last time before his passion, they began to dispute among themselves ; and the question was, which of them would be the greatest. Our Lord settled this dispute, and then he turned to the Apostle who was soon to become prince of the sacred college, and said to him, "Simon, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith may not fail. And thou, being converted, confirm thy brethren."

St. Peter knew not at that moment in how many ways Satan would sift the Church, — from how many quarters he would lead forth the united strength of earth and hell. He saw the Devil, not as a serpent, nor as an angel of light, but as a roaring lion. His conception of the whole matter appears in his answer : — "Lord, I am ready to follow thee to prison, and to death." And the first sifting which the Church received at the hands of Satan was precisely that which St. Peter expected. The world for three hundred years groaned beneath the tyranny of Rome, and during that long period the worship of Christ was proscribed, and his children hunted to the death ; the prisons were choked with them, the wild beasts were glutted with their flesh, the ground was red with their blood ; they were pitilessly murdered, sometimes singly, sometimes by hundreds, sometimes by thousands. This was the first great sifting ; it was a trial of the Church by fire and the sword, a determination to crush her by treating her children as convicted enemies of the Empire

and of the immortal gods. The yet uninspired fisherman was ready for all this, but he had no notion of the far more terrible storms which would issue from the womb of time, and burst upon the Church. He could not foresee the day when heresy would sit upon the throne and trample the altar, when the astonished world would find itself Arian, when the true faith would be denied by the East, and scarcely find a resting-place in the West except in the bosom of Leo the Great. He did not suspect that Scribes and Pharisees would sit again in the chair of Moses, — that some of his successors would be ambitious, cruel, and licentious men, incapable of denying the faith simply because Jesus Christ had promised the world that his Vicar should never lead the people to believe a lie. He did not see the tide of barbarism issuing from Northern Asia with resistless force, and failing to destroy civilization only because it could not destroy the parent of all true civilization, the Church of God. In the days of St. Peter the Emperors were the high-priests of paganism, and after a thousand years had rolled away, the German Cæsars bethought themselves of this fact, and straightway they claimed some of the inalienable rights of the High-Priest of Christianity. A long struggle served to evolve an undeniable right of the Holy See; the refractory Emperors were stripped of the purple, until they would consent to render to God the things which are of God. The Western schism threatened to leave the Church a dismembered corpse upon the plains of Europe; the captivity of Babylon, as the stay of the Popes in France was justly called, nearly ruined Italy, and produced the most deplorable effects in the Western Churches; and the Protestant rebellion tore whole nations from their mother's arms. St. Peter was ready for imprisonment and death, but he was not prepared to meet storms like these. What if he could have heard modern doctors proving that he had never been in Rome! What if he could have heard the wise disciples of Strauss gravely say that he never lived, that his Master was an Idea!

If the Church ever could really fear an enemy, she would have been hopelessly affrighted at Mahometanism. All her other trials were accompanied with some solace for her wounded heart. The persecutions were bitter, but she often had a little time to breathe; she felt that such a violent state of things could not endure long, and she knew that the surest way to enlarge her fold on earth was to send crowds of martyrs to heaven. No man ever sowed tares in her fields as Arius did, but in three

hundred years the heresy which had stolen the throne, the temples, the palaces, and the cities, had fallen to pieces; it was a lost Babylon, — no one could tell where it was. The awful irruptions of the Northern barbarians seemed to have thrown upon the plains of Europe a great mass of soulless human flesh, which would corrupt the air, and make the country a wild desert; but the Church took these things to her bosom, and her supernatural warmth made those bones live again; she made them Christians, and they became men. It was not so when she fought the new enemy. The powerful genius of Mahomet made him dream that he could do what Cæsar and Alexander did, — that he could enslave the world; and he matured his plans with care. The political aspect of the world was very inviting to an ambitious impostor, for the Western Empire had fallen, and the strong arm won the spoils; the Eastern was getting old and crazy, and all Asia was nearly independent of the Greek Emperors. Mahomet gave laws which were singularly adapted to please man's corrupt nature, and his laws were piously kept. He won his soldiers to his party by promising them rich booty, and by keeping his promises. The captains always shouted with Mokanna, —

“Thrones to the victors, heaven to him who falls.”

He did not give them thrones, — common soldiers would not know what to do with them; but they were always ready to exchange the promised throne for present license to unmitigated avarice and lust, and the soldier was satisfied. It is true that the slain did not ascend to heaven, but they never came back to tell their surviving comrades so.

Some say that Mahomet was a reformed drunkard; others ascribe his law against wine-drinking to the fact that he could not use it. They do him injustice; he was an ambitious captain, and he knew that he could do nothing with a drunken army. Yet he had no easy task, for the Arabs were a nation of sots. Death was as common at their dinners as drunkenness at ours. But they consoled themselves with a gluttony that made their former drunkenness ashamed. In our own times, death from excessive eating at a genuine Turkish dinner is an event too common to attract much notice. “God is great, but Mustapha was a good eater. Who will die next?”

Soldiers and slaves must not think too much, or they will become captains and members of Provisional Governments. Cæsar knew it when he looked so at the lean and hungry Cassius. The Prætorian guards had much time for making and

hearing speeches, and the end of it was, that they became auctioneers, and sold the empire to the highest bidder. The Janizaries cared not who held the sword and purse, while they held the bowstring and dagger. A few years of idleness taught them that the word Sultan, when interpreted, means a strong army. From that moment the Grand Turk sat under the Janizaries as uneasily as Damocles did under the sword, until Mahmoud eased his mind by cutting their throats. Now Mahomet made war the rule, not the exception, of his public policy, and of course it followed that his people would have little time to cultivate their minds. He knew that the breathing intervals would be given to beastly indulgence, and in order to make their ignorance profound, he gave them the Koran, and told them to read nothing else. They treated it as Native Americans treat the Bible;—they swore by it, but scarcely opened it. The views of Mahomet touching mental improvement were practically illustrated by Omar, when he burned the Alexandrian library. What a monument he would have, if every curse of the learned were a stone upon his grave!

Tell men that they can serve God and Mammon at the same time, charge them to indulge their passions freely, secure to them a heaven whose first law is sensual gratification, make ignorance the first commandment, and erect this scheme of lust and rapine into a religious system, and what remains to insure it long life? Punish apostasy with death. This stern law of the Prophet is as faithfully kept now as it was under Al Raschid. We have often seen converted Turks, whose return to their own country would be instantly followed by their assassination. It is true, that the Sublime Porte issues firmans of toleration, but secret assassins are numerous, and justice is seldom obtained in the capital, elsewhere never.*

* A striking instance occurred in the year 950, when Otho, king of Germany, sent an embassy to Abderrahman, chief of the Spanish Moors. St. John of Veidieres was chosen for the dangerous undertaking. He was instructed to give the Moor a proper answer to some attacks which he had made upon Christianity in a letter to Otho.

When it was known that the despatches contained religious matter, John was detained until the Moor could be consulted. After some weeks he was permitted to go to the capital, but he was required to suppress the religious document, as a preliminary to an audience. John refused. It was represented to him that the laws condemned even the king to death, if he should hear a Christian concerning religion without punishing the offender with instant strangulation. John was inflexible. The king liked the stern honesty of John, and swore by his beard that he should not die. A messenger was sent by Abderrahman to Otho, begging him to

So Mahomet unfurled his banner, and in a twinkling it waved over a great host. He went forth to make converts and subjects. The process was quite simple. He held his tablet of laws in one hand, and the sword in the other, and in most cases the people chose to live and believe in one God, and in his prophet, Mahomet. The Jew was not forced to abandon all his venerable observances; the renegade eased his conscience by observing that Jesus ranked next to Mahomet in the new order of things; the idolater forswore his graven images, and changed the names of his gods. But this synthesis in theology was too ostentatious to be real. The spiritual headship of a minority, with the political sovereignty of nations differing in every thing excepting in the human shape, did not suit the purposes of Mahomet. He did not want an Ireland, an India, or a Canada, in his empire. He knew that his Christian and Jewish converts would never disturb the commonwealth, but he was not so sure of his many-colored Gentiles. Their Penates would make them quarrel among themselves, and then an easy process of reasoning would lead them to quarrel with him. He knew that the pagan who has no images forgets his theology, — that he becomes an animal, with just enough of humanity to prevent him from walking on all fours. So Mahomet became an iconoclast. The worship of strange gods was an effect of man's worship of his own self. Idolatry always began at home. The Prophet wished not to destroy the cause; he simply diverted the effect into a new channel. To read his Koran one would think that the ideal formula of his system was the purest theism. So a discourse of Spinoza begins and ends with God. Cousin often speaks of the Divinity in terms that would do credit to a Father of the Church. When Hegel talks of God, his words sometimes become a hymn which might be chanted by an immortal choir. But get Spinoza, Cousin, and Hegel into a corner, force them to tell you *what* God is in the last analysis, make them speak in words which you can understand, and they will answer, God is I.

An outward profession of faith always satisfied the Prophet. The language of Caliph Vathek to the captains of the Emperor Theophilus was in substance the standing sermon of the Moslems to their captives. "Why will you die when your lives

dispense John from offering the paper to the Moor. Otho moderated some of the phrases in his letter, and John was admitted into the presence of Abderrahman.

are in your own hands? Why will you not leave the narrow way which the Son of Mary has marked for you? Enter into the broad path which the great Prophet has opened for this life and for the next. Are not his words full of wisdom, when he says, that God has given every imaginable good to his servants in this life, and paradise in the other world? God is good; he knew that his children were too weak to bear the yoke of Jesus, and he sent Mahomet to free them from the irksome burden. The faith of the true believers is enough for their salvation." The Mahometans said, *Pecca fortiter, fortiter crede*, before Luther, and they were more consistent besides. Their caprice, or the soul's involuntary tribute to virtue, made them suffer a few great saints to live quietly in their midst. But they lost no opportunity for tempting these heroes. When St. Nilus met some of them, they tried to make him a true believer; and when they saw that it was useless, they begged him to lay aside his austerities. "If you are resolved to torment yourself, wait until you are too old to enjoy the good things of this world."

The impostor ruled Arabia before he died, and he had the fortune which is commonly denied to political innovators; he left men who were equal to the task of prosecuting the work which he had begun. Under Abubekir, Omar, and Ali, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were enslaved, and although schism, which must distract and finally ruin every society not upheld by God, was even then dividing the true believers, nevertheless the cause went on and prospered. The great Caliphate, so celebrated in Eastern romance, was established at Bagdad; then Persia became Mahometan, and the religion of the Prophet was professed along the shores and in the islands of the Indian Sea. The tide rolled westward; desperate attempts were made by the enemy to obtain foothold in Europe, and they were too successful. The African shores of the Mediterranean submitted, and the piratical nests scattered along the coast from Egypt to the Straits enabled the true believers to begin a series of operations against Sicily and Spain.

Mirza governed Africa in the name of Caliph Valid. He had been plotting the conquest of Spain, when Count Julian invited him to make a descent upon the coast. The Count had a private quarrel with King Roderic, who had debauched his daughter. The Moor entered Spain with a great army, and destroyed the kingdom of the Goths, which had flourished three hundred years. The Moors made Cordova their capital;

the Goths elected a new king, and retreated to the Asturias, when Pelagius began the war, which raged eight hundred years, until Ferdinand and Isabella drove the Moors back into Africa. The enemy crossed the Pyrenees, ascended the Rhone, and pushed their conquests in France as far as Sens at the eastward, leaving behind them ruined cities, wasted plains, and thousands of martyrs. At the westward they entered Aquitaine, where they were routed by Charles Martel. Two hundred years rolled away before the Church of France recovered from this blow. In Italy, Radelgise and Siconulph fought for the duchy of Benevento. The former called in the African Moors, the latter met them with the Saracens of Spain. It was a sore day for Italy. Rome was nearly taken; the Church of St. Peter was sacked, as well as the immense monastery of Monte Cassino. The infidels were bribed to go away, and the ornaments of the altar were sacrificed, as they have been often since. In 877, Pope John VIII. wrote to Charles the Bald, begging for aid. "The blood of Christians," wrote the Holy Father, "never flowed as it does now. If they are not murdered, they are sold into slavery. Cities, abandoned by their inhabitants, are masses of shapeless ruins; bishops beg their food from city to city. Rome itself is scarcely a safe asylum for them or for me; it is sitting in the dust, awaiting the moment of its destruction. Last year we sowed and our enemies reaped; this year we cannot hope for a harvest, for we dared not go outside our walls to throw seed into the ground." The Pope was forced to purchase the peace of his states by the annual payment of twenty-five thousand silver marks to the Moors. A few years after, they were encouraged to return by Athanasius of Naples, and they did not leave Lower Italy until it was so wet with blood that the flames of what were cities could scarcely dry the ground.

The Greeks stood condemned before the world of perfidy and injustice; before Heaven, of obstinate schism. They retreated towards Constantinople slowly; so slowly, that more than six hundred years passed on before the Saracens completed their work of destruction in the East. Nothing remained but the city of Constantine; and its hour came too. So the Mahometans came into the possession of a city which was more serviceable to them than any other in Europe; and they had scarcely taken possession of it when they turned their arms against the lower Slavonic provinces, and led their forces into Hungary, threatening Vienna with destruction, and Europe with

a darker night than that which settled over her when the Northern barbarians poured from their fastnesses, bringing with them certain ruin to every institution that was not upheld by the right hand of the Almighty God.

And thus, in six hundred years after the death of the Prophet, Mahometanism had nearly fulfilled its purpose; its universal sovereignty seemed to be only a question of time. It had blasted Asia; it had destroyed Africa; it was the terror of the Mediterranean; and it was advancing slowly but surely upon the last abiding-place of Christianity, converting, like a cancer, healthy flesh into a mass of corruption and hopeless deformity. The Church of God never saw such an enemy, for Mahometanism was evidently a heresy that would live for very many ages.

It sounds like a paradox, but it is, nevertheless, certain, that Catholic truth may be something more than the teleological consequence of heresy; it may be its logical result, when the heresy is stripped of its quibbles, and reduced to an ideal formula.

This is pretty clear *a posteriori*, for it is a fact that the disciples of the ancient heretics, one or two classes excepted, returned to the Church at last. One reason why these one or two classes were always so obstinate will be given directly. Another cause may, perhaps, be assigned. Heresy has rarely been hopelessly hereditary, excepting among the Orientals. It would be curious to inquire, whether the principle which makes Eastern idolatry and heresy so lasting be not the Manichean. Manes was not an inventor; he found the worst of his ideas already current in Asia. The only Western sect which has had any thing like Oriental persistence in hereditary error is Manichean. It has had various names. Men have called its followers Albigenses, Templars, Illuminati, Freemasons. They were Red Republicans in 1848.

It is true that this return of heretics to the Church was the work of Divine grace. But this is no objection; for we must bear in mind, that, while the nature of grace and its mode of action are mysteries, its subject and its effects are open to observation. It acts immediately upon the will, mediately upon the intellect. We do not here speak of illuminative grace,—*gratia illustrationis*,—which, as St. Augustine says, is given that we may know what is right,—*facienda noverimus*,—and whose immediate subject is the intellect of man; but of co-operating grace,—*gratia inspirationis*, or *gratia coöperans*,—which is given that we may *do* what we know to be right,—*ut*

cognita faciamus, — and with which, whether it be sufficient or efficacious, the questions concerning merit and demerit are usually connected. It is plain enough that the grace which brings about the conversion of the *heretic* is coöperating grace, acting immediately upon the will, and finishing the work which was begun by the illumination of the mind, or, at least, providing sufficient means for its completion. So the mere vision of the truth is not meritorious ; we must give it free assent, and this is the doing of the will. The blessed in heaven merit nothing by seeing the Incarnate Truth ; the devils, too, believe, and tremble. This coöperating grace certainly acts upon the intellect, but it does not show it truth ; that is the work of illuminative grace ; it rather moves the will to overthrow an obstacle which man places between his intellect and the light. This is precisely what is wanting in those thrice unhappy Protestants who are invited to the feast, and who would come, were it not for a wife, a yoke of oxen, or a farm. *Diligenda credunt, sed credita non diligunt*. The one thing necessary to them is, not intellectual illumination, or sufficient coöperative grace, but the honest use of good eyes.

When a man denies a revealed truth, he takes a step as false in logic as it is in theology ; when he returns to the Church, he does it because he had opened his soul to the light that shineth upon every man that cometh into this world, but he can look back, and see a reason, a chain of antecedents and consequents which formed a logical process in his mind, as it came nearer to the whole truth. The Magi knew that the star would lead them to the Messiah, but it was not until the heavenly guide shone upon the place where the child was, that they knew the road from their home to Bethlehem.

It is true that this logical process never did, and never can, bring about a conversion, so far as it is a mere logical movement ; and if it does any thing, it is because it ceases to be purely natural. Reason and grace are in two distinct orders ; but grace can elevate reason so that it may coöperate in a supernatural work, such as conversion from heresy to the Church. Pure logic can beget nothing supernatural ; if it could, Theodore Parker would be a Christian, Dr. Pusey would be an Oratorian, the Devil would be again a morning star.

So the return of the heretic is a reasonable act, reasonable in its beginning, in its progress, and in its consummation. It cannot be otherwise, for true intellectual life is superhuman ; no one can live it outside of the Church, as the legitimate channel

of God's grace. And the grace of God is necessary to that life, because in the Church we are, in some measure, always children. A boy that obstinately refuses to hear his master will never know any thing, not because his intellect is dull, but because his will is perverse. If a man be emancipated from earthly schools, it is because in time he knows as much as his master does, perhaps more ; but this cannot be when the master is God, speaking in his Church. So the submission of the will, necessary to the boy when he is in school, is indispensable to the Christian until he dies.

The matter is equally clear, *a priori*. For pure falsehood is a metaphysical impossibility ; it cannot be an object of the intellect of God. The heretic cannot start from a postulate which is purely false. His error becomes intelligible, not of itself, but because of the intelligibility of the truth with which it is accompanied. Two things may be safely predicated of truth ; that it is essentially generative, and that it can only generate itself. All particular truths, objectively considered, have a natural affinity for one another, and they are all reducible to one formula, which shines in each of them like the sun in a million dew-drops, and by virtue of which they are one in their logical state, as they are one in their physical being in the intellect of God. This is the reason why man can abstract one particular truth, and from that alone deduce the others ; as Descartes pretended to do, when he began with the fact of personal existence, and from that drew his whole philosophy. When I hold in my hand only one link of a chain, I am in communication with every one of the others, no matter if the chain reaches to the stars. A drop of water that is absorbed from the ocean unites itself with other drops, falls upon the mountain, leaps adown the rocks, hurries along with the river, and rushes again into the bosom of its own ocean. The intellect, created to see all truth, cannot rest in one ; it is always impatient to know what comes next.

It is this affinity which makes a system of science possible. Descartes relied upon it, as we said before. So did Spinoza, when he built his pantheism upon a false definition of substance. So does a mathematician, who begins by showing you the properties of a straight line, and ends with proving to you that solar attraction is in an inverse ratio to the square of the distance. So does Gioberti, when he raises a sublime philosophical structure upon one postulate, — *L' ente crea l' esistenze*. All this holds good with truths of the natural order.

But no one of these can bring the mind to Catholic truth, because *nemo dat quod non habet*. Catholic truth is in the supernatural order. To arrive at it, two postulates are absolutely necessary. One is a point of Catholic truth to start from. The other is Divine grace, which gives that truth, and guides the soul *tanquam lucerna in caliginoso loco*. Until this be given, *Lucifer non orietur in ullo corde*. Ventura thinks that he has that starting-point, when he says that the logical basis of Catholic truth is the following postulate : — Christ was true God and true man. It may be that natural truth and the supernatural are more closely connected than is commonly imagined. No really sound philosophy can be formed without having recourse to some fact which only revelation furnishes. It may be inferred from this that merely human philosophy cannot be sound, but if so we cannot help it. The formula of Gioberti, above quoted, starts from the fact of creation. That is a fact which men knew not, but by the revelation in the first chapter of Genesis. That there is a bridge between truths of the natural and of the supernatural order is true enough ; but the soul of man needs a better guide than even an angel, or he will never pass it. His natural reason, without the positive evidence which establishes the fact of revelation, will avail him nothing. The grace of God may help him to pass by that causeway to eternal truth.

For common purposes, where exact language is not needed, it is well enough to say that error, too, is generative, and must generate itself. But this is not correct, for error has no entity ; then it has no activity, it does nothing ; it is not of itself intelligible ; then it has no predicates. Then it does not generate, neither does it generate itself. The apparent generation of error is the struggle of truth to eliminate it, and to stand alone ; a thing which truth necessarily tends to do, for its unnatural union with falsehood can do nothing but perpetuate error, which lives by it as the ivy by the solid wall. Then this struggle is a wholesome action ; as a fever is the effort of a body to throw off corrupt matter, and return to a healthy state.

The heretical formula must present a portion of truth, and it may lead to Catholic truth in two ways, — the truth which is in it may be considered alone, or the whole formula may be pushed to its ultimate consequence. The first case is that of a man who takes the article of the Incarnation, for example, considers it closely, and concludes that no church but an infal-

lible and Divinely appointed one has a right to propose such an article of belief. His difficulty, then, resolves itself into two questions of fact, namely, Is there such a Church? and if so, where is it? If he follows up the inquiry, and obeys the motions of grace, he becomes a Catholic at once.

This process is a short one, and our argument touches the other, where the whole formula of a heresy is pushed to its results.

Suppose that the formula reads thus: — The private study of the Bible gives the sum of revealed truth. It is pretty evident that two consequences must flow from the acceptance of this starting-point. There must be a variety of creeds, corresponding to the variety of the psychological phenomena in different men. Then there must be successive modifications of the creed by the same believer, to suit his altered temper, or the altered spirit of the age in which he lives. The portion of truth which was contained in his formula becomes less every year; it is accomplishing its own law; it is separating itself from the mass of falsehood with which it was unnaturally united; the formula becomes more and more false; it is hurrying towards pure falsehood. Heresy, then, inevitably leads to atheism. A little reflection upon the nature and workings of truth and falsehood proves this; and if there were a doubt, the experience of the last three hundred years would settle the matter. Then we can accept the following syllogism.

The logical result of the presence of truth and of falsehood in a formula is the gradual elimination of the truth from the said formula. But this elimination is an approximation to pure falsehood; hence, the logical consequence of the Protestant formula is an approximation to atheism.

Now, pure atheism is impossible; it is a state of the mind at which man never has arrived, never will, and never can arrive, — always supposing that he be sane. We speak not of practical atheism, — that is too common; nor of loud professions of atheism, for sane men will sometimes talk as if they were mad; but of pure, speculative atheism. No man ever succeeded in thoroughly persuading himself that there is no God. Cicero was a pagan, but he felt this truth when he said, “Many will deny God in broad daylight, when men are near to applaud their blasphemies; but at night, when they are alone, their souls are full of doubt.”

Now, if *pejorem semper sequitur conclusio partem*, the heretic must go on examining, doubting, and denying, to the end of

the chapter. John Calvin must have Theodore Parker for a successor, and Theodore must admit that the goal is not yet reached, — that there is more denying to be done; and he does in fact admit it, — he is too good a logician to doubt it. But that goal is the total elimination of the truth originally found in the formula; it is, then, pure falsehood, it is metaphysical impossibility. Metaphysical impossibility is the negation of the Intelligible; then it is the negation of the object of the intellect, created and increate. When the adequate object of a necessary power is denied, that power is included in the denial; it is itself denied. Metaphysical impossibility is the negation of the intellect. But the logical result of the Protestant formula is the approximation to metaphysical impossibility. Therefore, the logical consequence of an heretical starting-point is the negation of the intellect.

Whatever a man may deny, he cannot deny his own being. He cannot doubt it, he cannot even commence a dubitative proposition concerning it; for the subject of his proposition must be himself. His first emotion of doubt makes the would-be-doubted thing certain. The intellectual being struggles against death more fiercely than the body does, and more successfully, because it is immortal. Then the heretic who has pushed his first axiom to this result must necessarily recoil, retrace his steps, and deny the formula from which he started. This process is as logical as it is sternly necessary. When he began to deny, he took for his major the heretical formula, and the truth it contained became gradually eliminated; it withdrew, but only that it might return unmingled with falsehood. When he reached the point beyond which negation cannot go, he took that point for his major, and reasoned thus. That which necessarily leads to denial of the intellect is false. But the Protestant formula does this. Therefore, the Protestant formula is false. It is false, then, that the private study of the Bible gives the sum of revealed truth.

The principle involved in this formula is the denial of infallible Church authority. Who denies the axiom denies the suppositum, and affirms its contrary. But its contrary is the existence of an infallible teacher, and, by implication, the assertion of Catholic truth. Then, who denies that formula affirms Catholic truth.

The formula supposes metaphysical impossibility, and the logical consequence of an attempt at this supposition is the denial of what led to it; the starting-point of heresy led to it;

the denial of that starting-point follows ; that denial affirms the Church ; then the denial of the Church is led back to it ; nay, his original formula contained principles which, when evolved, were found to contain the affirmation of the thing denied. This is what some people mean when they say that Protestantism is essentially illogical. It contains its own negation. St. Thomas said once, — “ It is true that an atheist may be a geometer ; but if there were no God, there would be no geometry, for its object would be impossible.”

The Protestant can, in some sense, accept a dogma of faith, but if there were no infallible Teacher he would have no object to accept. The only life he lives, if he can be said to live any life at all, is a participated goodness, and, like every *bonitas participata*, it points steadily to the source whence it came. All that approaches life in the Protestant is derived from the Church.

The deduction of Catholic truth from an heretical formula seems paradoxical, because palingenesis in logic, as well as in the creation, is not so apparent as genesis. Besides, the principle involved in the supposed paradox seems at first sight to be this : — Truth is the logical consequence of error. This is not only a paradox, it is an absurd and unintelligible saying, because the term *error* in the proposition is universal, and pure error cannot beget truth or any thing else, not even itself, the German pantheists to the contrary notwithstanding. The truth contained in the erroneous axiom drove the heretic to a process which forced him to reject all or accept every thing. He could not do the former, so he must take the other horn of the dilemma. Another thing must be noticed. Pure falsehood, being metaphysical impossibility, cannot be predicate, subject, middle term, consequence, or form of any thing, for it is pure non-entity ; if it could have a nature, it would be infinite negation of the Infinite. Then the heretic does not arrive at this result, and afterwards reconstruct Catholicity out of pure nothing ; that would be something worse than a paradox. He sees that he is tending thitherward, he knows that it is but a step removed from him, and he sees also that it is metaphysically impossible to take that step. What then ? Is his return to truth the result of the pure falsehood from which his spirit recoils ? O, no ; it is the result of the last portion of truth which had escaped elimination, and it reads thus : — That which leads to nonentity is false. This proposition contains, by implication, the assertion of Catholic truth.

But this logical process which leads from error to truth requires several conditions ; and one is, that the mind be allowed the free use of its faculties. Heresies of much consequence never arise, grow, and disappear, unless among a civilized people. Hence it was that the great heresies which afflicted the Church, before the Dark Ages, originated from the subtle minds of the Greeks and Egyptians, and those which have afflicted her since have arisen from the scarcely less acute Germans of modern times ; and hence it is, that, while schismatic storms were frequent during the same dark period, few new heresies of consequence deepened the gloom of the Christian skies. In enlightened times, the great minds, in their pride, were sorely tempted to invent new systems ; in the Dark Ages, learned men were content to copy the writings of antiquity. The exceptions which occur only prove the general rule. Of course, the nature and intensity of that darkness are woefully misunderstood and grossly misrepresented by Protestants. But let that pass. There was light enough to make people see the value of ancient monuments, and strain every nerve to preserve them, and the nineteenth century cannot do as much.

This explains why the errors of the Nestorian, Coptic, Greek, and Armenian churches are so slow in disappearing from the world. Some of them began in times when Asia and Northern Africa had not yet lost their civilization ; but by the time that these errors had become widely spread, a deluge of barbarism burst upon the land, and stupefied the intellects of the people, so that men were content to live and think as their fathers thought and lived. No doubt, the great distance of the Holy See, the almost insane jealousy of some of the Eastern Patriarchs, and the great difference between the genius of the Western barbarians and the Mahometans, strongly tended to accelerate the eclipse of the Asiatic churches. The Saracens have always held their Christian subjects in bondage, and slaves have few means and no time for mental culture. If this stupefaction of the human intellect could be consummated, men would act in the same way always ; they would be like the swallow, that builds her nest now precisely as the swallow did that flew out of the ark ; and the nearer man approaches to the condition of an animal, the more tenaciously does he cling to established customs and modes of thought, as the children of an enlightened age are apt to be wiser than the children of light. Hence idolatry is the most enduring of all heresies ; as soon as man became idolatrous, he waxed savage ; and idolatry is so

congenial to man's fallen nature that the sun of civilization, which shone for a season upon Egypt, Greece, and Rome, failed to penetrate the horrible cloud ; and as the savage state will scarcely disappear from the world, so it is probable that idolaters will be on earth when the trumpet shall sound, summoning them to meet that God of whom their fathers had heard, but in whom they stubbornly refused to believe.

Now Mahometanism is but a step removed from idolatry. A rigid analysis of that pestilent system shows that in substance it is no better than heathenism, notwithstanding the forms with which it is bedizened. Its heaven is grossly sensual, its God is invested with attributes which are wholly repugnant to the infinite nature of the true God. So the Church, in her struggle with Mahometanism, had to meet an enemy which was very like the one that possessed the whole world when she began her career, and which seemed likely to undo the work which she had been steadily doing for so many ages, in renovating the face of the earth, and in sending an innumerable company of pure virgins, holy confessors, and heroic martyrs to their home in heaven. This was the terrible enemy who had slowly but surely increased in strength as time rolled on, and who had become at least a giant, before whom the armies of the living God wavered and fled. Was there no David ? Was there no stone, detached without hands from the mountain, to roll down, and break the great image to pieces ? Where was the Pope ? He was kneeling at the tomb of the Apostles, and pouring forth his soul in prayer. We shall see what happened while he prayed.

The first serious check to their plans for the subjugation of Europe was given in France. Their army was divided into two bodies. One ascended the Rhone without opposition, when Eblo, Archbishop of Sens, after waiting vainly for some show of resistance to the enemy, marched forth and drove him from the walls of Sens. Abderrahman led the strongest division into Aquitaine. Charles Martel met him, and routed his army, leaving the Moor dead upon the field. This was the first of a series of battles which ended in the evacuation of France by the Saracens.

The Spaniards never suffered the enemy to rest, and deeds were done that seem like those of which we read in tales of enchantment. Under Alphonsus, Sancho, and Ramirez, Talavera and Madrid were taken from the Moors, and in the latter action eighty thousand of the enemy were slain. Abderrahman

III. in one day lost the fruits of an entire campaign. The Spaniards ascribed these victories to the intercession of St. James, whose relics were in their possession; and then the name of the Saint became the war-cry of Spain.

Still later, St. Gregory VII. interposed an effectual shield between Italy and the Moors. He had long meditated a crusade against them, but his controversy with Henry IV. forced him to defer the enterprise. But he confirmed the title of Robert Guiscard to the territories which this bold adventurer had won in Lower Italy. Robert swore fealty to the Holy See, and from that day the hardy Normans formed a strong bulwark against the Saracens. Victor III., the immediate successor of Gregory VII., carried into effect the plans of his great predecessor for the ruin of the Mahometan Colossus. He gathered together all the fighting men that Italy could furnish, and sent them to Africa, where a brilliant campaign was made. An army of a hundred thousand Saracens was routed, and several cities taken. The war did not lessen the miseries of the East. But it inspired the Christians with courage. The Popes knew that the salvation of Europe could be brought about only by carrying the war into the country of the enemy; the people were delighted to see the enemy of Christ, not only driven from Europe, but bearded in his own den. Pope Urban II. restored the Church in Sicily, and conferred extraordinary favors upon Count Roger, who had driven the Saracens from the island, occupied by them for two hundred years. Then the wars of the Crusades, which poets, apologists, and fanatical anti-Popery lecturers have made almost as well known to the people as battles fought at their doorsteps, kept the Saracens at bay for two centuries. They did no more, for the kingdoms and principalities founded by Godfrey and Bohemond, and the new dynasty of Baldwin at Constantinople, yielded to the irresistible pressure from without. But their mission was fulfilled.

Some have undertaken to justify the Crusades, by representing the great benefits which accrued to Europe in consequence. But the matter was one of sheer necessity. Europe would have become what Asia is, if the Mahometans had not been checked effectually. And the only way of doing it was to empty the West upon the countries of the enemy. As a war of reprisal, it would have been just. As the only way of saving Europe, it needs no apology.

It is probable that the peace of Europe would not have been much in danger from the Mahometans after the Crusades, if

the enemy had not received a new nation into their ranks. The race of the Prophet had become degenerate ; his people had been the terror of Christendom for six hundred years, and that is a long life for a bad nation. But the Turks, originally a horde of robbers, claimed for their Sultan the privileges of the Omniades. Under Othman, this people became terrible to Christianity, and in the middle of the fifteenth century Mahomet II., as great a captain as the Prophet ever numbered among his true believers, besieged and took the capital of the Eastern Empire, after a brave defence, in which the last emperor, Constantine XII., was slain. The crazy Empire had endured upwards of eleven hundred years. The Greeks had submitted to the Church a short time before, at the Council of Florence. But they kept the treaty of union with their usual faith. Pope Nicholas V. left no means untried in order to bring them back to the fold, but to no purpose. The Holy Father foretold their ruin. " Unless you cease to rend the seamless garment of Christ," exclaimed he, " after three years you shall be treated even as the barren fig-tree." This was said in 1451, and the Empire was finally destroyed in 1453.

The fall of the imperial city filled Europe with terror. Pope Nicholas V. immediately sent preachers everywhere. Nothing less than a new crusade was resolved upon. He exhorted the kings to lead their subjects against the common enemy. All the West was aroused ; two diets were held in Germany, the Duke of Burgundy and the king of Portugal sent fleets to the Pope, and Nicholas had gathered an army in Italy, when he died, and the enterprise was abandoned.

Calixtus III. succeeded to the pontificate. He revived the Crusade. Among his warlike measures he established a small navy, consisting of sixteen galleys, the first that a Pope had ever owned. The Cardinal of Aquileia commanded it, and he harassed the Turkish coast for three years. The Pope sent legates to France and Germany to arouse the sovereigns, but to no purpose. He sent ambassadors even to Persia, Tartary, and Armenia, hoping almost against hope that their sovereigns would do the work of the indolent kings of Europe. Hassan, king of Persia, sent an army against Mahomet, and overcame him in two fearful battles. Hassan then wrote to the Pope, thanking him for having with his prayers made the Omnipotent propitious to the Persian arms.

Mahomet led a hundred and fifty thousand men to Belgrade, which was the key of Southeastern Europe. His father, Am-

urath, had failed to take it, but Mahomet believed in himself. "There is but one God in heaven," he would say, "and the earth shall have no master but Mahomet." If Belgrade fell, the Sultan would find the gates of Servia, Hungary, Germany, and Italy wide open.

The Cardinal Carvajal and Capistrano, a Franciscan monk, raised a mob of forty thousand. Huniad, the general of the Hungarian armies, brought another body of men. But the forces were in such wretched condition in point of discipline, that no general could be induced to join the Hungarians; the kings were indifferent. "Perhaps it is as well," said the monk, as he reviewed them before the attack. "It is the cause of God, and he can lead ploughmen to victory, while he lays proud armies low." Prodigies of valor were performed on both sides, but, after twenty days' incessant fighting, the Sultan was wounded, and in a few hours forty thousand Turks fell upon the field. Mahomet tried to poison himself, but failed. This victory was regarded as the salvation of Europe.

Shortly after, the Turks attacked the island of Lesbos. The enemy were scaling the innermost walls, and the Christians began to fly. A young girl named Lesbia snatched a sword from a runaway, and rushed upon the Turkish ranks, calling upon the saints, and levelling a Turk at each invocation. The appalled Mahometans gave way, the Christians rallied, and the enemy was driven to his ships with great loss.

Pius II. succeeded Calixtus, and he turned his attention to the Crusade at once. Mahomet had taken Athens, Corinth, Lesbos, in a second expedition, Trebizond, the whole of Bosnia, and a number of inferior posts. Scanderbeg defended Albania successfully against the Sultan. The supreme Pontiff called a congress of the kings at Mantua, and went thither in person. After waiting five months, he found that the kings had sent ambassadors to meet him. They were waging war against one another, and they could not abandon their quarrels. The Pope soon found that the ambassadors had caught the humor of their masters. He appealed to the people of Europe, and after declaring that he would head the expedition, he named Ancona as the place of meeting. The novelty of this proceeding drew immense crowds from every country of Europe. The Pope saw himself surrounded with the raw material of an imposing army, but while he was engaged in devising means for its support, he sickened and died.

Paul II. did not sheathe the sword. His first act was to

encourage Scanderbeg to a rupture with Mahomet. The Turk entered Albania with a great force, and Scanderbeg repaired to Rome for aid. The influence of the Pope obtained 25,000 men. The lion of Albania returned, cut an auxiliary force of 20,000 horse to pieces, and then fell upon the main body of the Turks, with such success that few lived to carry back the tale. Then the old hero died. He had won the day in twenty-two battles against the Turks. Mahomet could not contain himself when he heard the news. "Now," he cried, "I will destroy the Christians. They have lost their sword and their shield." He then swore that he would not rest until every Christian from east to west should grovel beneath his horse's hoofs. In fact he overran Albania in a few days. He attacked Lemnos, Colchis, and Negropont, by land and sea. The Venetians answered the prayers of the Pope by sending a fleet to the Egean Sea. Paul succeeded in awaking the Emperor Frederic, and a diet was convoked at Ratisbon. But the army was scarcely in marching order, when the Pope, who was the soul of the undertaking, died, and the body fell to pieces.

Sixtus IV. was the next Pope, and he was scarcely elected, when he despatched cardinal legates to Germany, Spain, and France, hoping that the sovereigns would suspend their private quarrels, and join against the common enemy. But he did not succeed. He despatched his own galleys, twenty-four in number, to Asia Minor. The Venetian and Neapolitan fleets joined in the expedition, and the Cardinal Caraffa set sail for Asia Minor, where he took Smyrna and some other cities. The king of Persia was again in the field; his most important operation was the capture of Trebizond. The Sultan was preparing a great blow, and it came in 1480. He entered Moldavia with 120,000 soldiers, and the Governor Stephen routed him with a handful of rustics, collected hastily from the fields. The Christians were as astonished as Mahomet was. But he seemed to call warriors from the earth at every stamp of his foot, and he overran Moldavia, Wallachia, and the neighbouring provinces of Poland. Then he ransacked Albania, and passed the mountains of Friuli. The enemy of the Church then stood upon Italian soil. When he retired, he promised that the next visit would be to Rome. He burned for revenge against the knights of Rhodes, who were the terror of his Asiatic governors. He assailed them as he had Constantinople and Belgrade; but after a siege of ninety days he retired, leaving his artillery and twenty

thousand men on the ground. His last enterprise was the capture of Otranto, a city in Calabria. Nearly the whole population were put to death. The Italians thought not of defending their country ; the flying cowards were deserting the cities, when the Pope made his voice heard in the general confusion. He sent twenty-four galleys to the Adriatic Sea. It was time, for the Turks had turned their faces towards Loretto. There was no earthly reason why the Turk should fly before the small force opposed to him, but he did. The Pope availed himself of the momentary quiet. He besought the kings to lay aside their petty quarrels and repair to Rome. The congress was agreed to, but God summoned Mahomet to a higher tribunal, and Europe thanked Heaven that she was not yet enslaved.

Innocent VIII. prepared vigorously for a new Crusade, which frightened Sultan Bajazet so that he sent a renegade to Rome with a poison, mixed for the Pope's especial use. The villain was arrested, and suffered the penalty of his treason. Innocent strained every nerve to encourage and assist Ferdinand and Isabella, who had hunted the beast to his last den in Spain. He was finally expelled, after a stay of eight hundred years, almost every one of which saw deeds of arms which seem fabulous to our ears. After a few years of comparative quiet, Solyman II., a fine specimen of an infidel soldier, entered Hungary. His first action there was the capture of Belgrade. In his second visit to Hungary, he routed the army of King Louis, and beheaded fifteen hundred captives. He returned to Hungary at the invitation of John of Zapolya. This man disputed the right of the Archduke Ferdinand to the crown of Hungary, and he gathered an army, which was routed after a bloody action. Then John sold himself to the Turk. Solyman was a true believer, so Christian blood was sweet to him at all times. After he had taken twelve strong cities, he marched to Vienna, and besieged it. After twenty days' hard fighting he was compelled to retire ; Solyman returned to Hungary, met the army of Ferdinand, cut it to pieces, and mortally wounded the king. Then, as his ally John was dead, he seized his wife and child, and sent them into exile ; a just punishment for having called the enemy of the Church to settle a dispute between Christian kings.

The island of Rhodes, one of the strongest outworks of Christendom, had been held by the knights of St. John for two hundred years ; and they gave the Turks no peace in Asia. Solyman besieged the island, and after a brilliant defence of

six months, during which a hundred thousand Moslems bit the dust, the island was yielded to the enemies of the cross. An action took place near Gerbi, where the Turks met the Spanish and Neapolitan fleets. The result was a total rout of the Christians.

The Knights of St. John, after their expulsion from Rhodes, encamped in the island of Malta, and Solyman sent Mustapha and Piali Pasha to dislodge them, and he already looked upon the island as won. It probably would have been, had the Sultan commanded in person. The siege lasted four months, the island was defended by a handful, and with a valor almost superhuman. The Grand Master, Valetta, was one of those generals whom God raises at times for the salvation of nations, and Europe, with her deadly enemy in full possession of her noblest city in the east, successfully assailed in the southeast, in imminent danger of losing Italy, and harassed along her southern shore, would have recited her preparation for death if the island of Malta, her best wall of defence in the south, had fallen into the hands of the infidels. Valetta and his little band disputed every inch of ground with the Turks; in the morning they prepared to die; and after they were strengthened by the Holy Sacraments, they marched to the walls, and when one Christian fell, ten unbelievers went with him to be judged. The Turks were almost past counting; — a thing that often happened, for they relied greatly upon numbers; they liked to overwhelm the enemy with a countless crowd; they were Egyptian frogs beneath a housekeeper's broom.

The Cæsar Ferdinand concluded a disgraceful truce with Solyman, paying to the Turk thirty million pieces of gold annually, that Hungary might rest in peace for eight years.

Solyman was succeeded by Selim II., and the new Sultan inherited the military genius of his father, and his determination to reduce Christendom. His first act was the storming of Cyprus. Nicosia was taken, and twenty thousand prisoners were savagely murdered, fifteen thousand sold. Famagusta capitulated after a brave defence. Mustapha made the Christians march before him, and every man was slain as he passed. After several conquests in the Archipelago, the general sent a large body against the island Curzola. This place was just then unaccountably abandoned by the men; not one was at home when the Turks appeared. But the women forgot for a time their natural timidity; they elected leaders, and made preparations for a vigorous defence. When the Turks came

near enough to distinguish objects, they were astonished to see that their opponents had no beards, and presently the word was passed that the place was defended by women, and that some serious trick was meant; so they advanced cautiously. Now it was said to be an article of the Turkish creed, that women have no souls, and that they were consequently incapable of doing any thing which requires serious thought and judgment; so they concluded that the men had placed their wives and daughters in the foreground to receive the shock of the battle, while they would annoy the besiegers from some safe hiding-place. Supposing, therefore, that they had only cowards and soulless women to meet, they raised a great shout, and rushed to the walls. But their shouts were in a twinkling changed to shrieks of pain, for the women saluted them with a storm of Greek fire, which killed many, and threw the rest into confusion. They advanced again, and the intrepid women poured upon them hot water, Greek fire, heated stones, and a well-directed discharge of all the artillery and fire-arms which could be gathered in the place. The Turks fled in the utmost terror, believing that the island was defended by evil genii just unchained. Their leaders succeeded in rallying them, and it was resolved to carry the place by storm, for they were sure that the women, if they were women, would run as soon as they could come to a close fight. But they made a fatal mistake; the same boiling and hissing shower of fire and water made them waver; the dead bodies lay in heaps under the walls; but the most intrepid pressed onward; they scaled the walls, and, ashamed of being beaten thus by women, fought desperately, and the Amazons met them like tigresses guarding their whelps. The contest was most bloody, but the women managed their knives as well as they did their kettles of boiling water, and the Turks fled, leaving a fourth of their number dead upon the field.

The hour had come, and the man. Pope Pius V. tried to arouse the sovereigns to a sense of their own danger, but his prayers were unheeded. He seemed to foresee the result of the approaching contest, and perhaps he thought that the Almighty had decreed the destruction of the infidels by a handful of Christians, as he did the downfall of the Midianites by three hundred of the children of Israel. He grew sanguine of success as its probabilities weakened; he had secured the coöperation of Spain, Genoa, and Venice, and with these he waited for victory. The fate of Christendom was decided by one naval battle. The Christian fleet was commanded by Don

John of Austria, who had for lieutenants Antonio Colonna, Barberigo, and Doria, the captains of the Roman, Venetian, and Genoese vessels. They met the enemy in the Gulf of Lepanto, and he did not hesitate to advance, for he expected an easy victory ; indeed, he believed that the Christians would not risk an action. When the hostile fleets drew near each other, the standard, solemnly blessed by the Pope, was displayed from the commander's vessel, and the Christians knelt to implore the countenance of the God of battles. "Soldiers," exclaimed the admiral, "behold your banner ! it is the cross of Christ. Remember that you are fighting for yourselves, for your homes, for your country ; above all, remember that you are the defenders of the Church of God. Onward, soldiers of Christ ! follow your banner to victory." The fleets met with a great crash, and the battle begun, and raged furiously for five hours. The wind had favored the enemy, but when the engagement commenced it changed to the opposite quarter, and blew the smoke into the faces of the Turks. Then the right wing of the enemy was broken, the Pasha Ali was killed, and his standard was taken. Don John commanded the soldiers to raise the hymn of victory, and the battle became a scene of carnage. Europe was saved. This was the most complete victory ever obtained over the Turks. More than thirty thousand perished, four thousand were taken, and fifteen thousand Christian slaves were restored to liberty. A hundred and forty vessels were taken, and the rest of the Turkish fleet was sunk or burnt. The Turks had sacked many cities, and nearly all the spoils were in these vessels, and returned to Christian hands.

It is impossible to conceive the terror which seized the Turks, when the news reached Constantinople. If the Pope had been near Lepanto, that great capital would have been retaken by the Christian army. For the Turks, expecting that the victors would immediately besiege the city, ran to the hitherto persecuted Christian residents, confided to them the greater part of their treasure, and implored them to permit the free exercise of the Mahometan worship in Constantinople, on the payment of a yearly tribute. If Don John had appeared, the city would have yielded without a struggle. But he returned to Italy, and Constantinople was lost to Christendom.

St. Pius V. seemed to know that the enterprise would succeed, but he knew that only God could give the victory, and the day and night preceding the battle were spent in prayer. While the battle was raging at Lepanto, hundreds of miles distant, the

Cardinals were assembled at Rome. Suddenly the Pope left his throne, and hastened to a window, where he stood for some time, with his eyes raised to heaven. Then he turned to his Cardinals, and said, — “Let us give thanks to God for the victory which he is giving now to his people.” God had shown him the event. The holy Pontiff declared that it was owing to the prayers of the Mother of God, and he added to the Litany the words, “Help of Christians,” and, as a further commemoration of the event, he established a feast in honor of Our Lady of Victory, which is observed throughout the Christian world. And thus the Mahometan power, which had been steadily increasing for a thousand years, received a mortal blow. The Turks have done little since to disturb the peace of Europe; their military genius disappeared by degrees, until it became a mere longing of the Janizary for plunder, of the pirate for a lonely sail, of the assassin for blood.

The war lasted five hundred years, counting from the pontificate of Hildebrand, who conceived the plan of saving Christendom by carrying the war into the countries of the enemy, to the Crusade of Pius V. Europe was soon to be shaken to her centre by rebellion clothed in religious garments, — by atheism, illuminism, and anarchy such as had never been seen before. It was necessary that the pressure from outside infidelity should not be overwhelming, for domestic confusion multiplied by successful invasion brings chaos, when the enemy is a barbarian, and the merciful God spared Europe such a wretched fate as overtook the Greek Empire. His chief instrument was the Holy See; — it has been his instrument in conferring upon Europe all the real good she enjoys. Such is Christianity, and such are its legitimate children, true civilization, civil order, and science. Children forget their parents, scholars forget their masters, whilom slaves forget their liberators; — what wonder that Europe, once a scholar, a child, and a slave, should forget its earliest and best friend? No matter. St. Peter did not look imprisonment and death in the face for the sake of an earthly reward, and his successors inherit his spirit. Pius IX. inherits it, else he would not be the first man of his age, but rather a poor, weak, ruined statesman. They say that the powers will restore him. Perhaps they may, but the surest power is that upon which the Pope is used to depend. It will be the prayers of his untold millions of children, that will ascend to heaven for him in the coming year of jubilee. God save Pius IX., as he leans upon the Rock of ages!

ART. II. — *The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany.* Boston : Crosby & Nichols. March, 1850. Art. IV.

THE number of *The Christian Examiner* — the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians — for March last contains an attempted defence of no-churchism, in reply to an Article on *The Church against No-Church*, published in our Review for April, 1845. The author of the defence is James Freeman Clarke, founder of the Church of the Disciples, formerly one of the conductors of a monthly magazine called *The Western Messenger*, and is known to our readers as the author of a remarkable discourse on *The Church, — as it was, as it is, and as it ought to be*, — reviewed at some length in this journal for July, 1848.

The defence is not very remarkable for its solidity, and, though here and there a little clever, does not appear to us worthy of the high intellectual character aimed at by *The Christian Examiner*. If it were not for the esteem in which we have been accustomed to hold that periodical, as the organ of our old associates, and the possibility that some weak-minded persons might mistake the motive of our silence, we should pass it by unnoticed. Its author is not a man we should choose for our opponent, for we always wish for an opponent one who has some powers of discrimination, and some capacity to feel the force of an argument. But we have no choice in the case, and if the Unitarians are willing to make him their champion, and to risk their cause in his hands, we must accept him, and dispose of him as best we may.

The defence consists of two parts. The first is an enumeration and philosophical explanation of the various and extraordinary changes we are said to have undergone ; the second repeats, without our answers, some of the objections we have from time to time raised against ourselves and refuted. The first part is the more racy, and appears to have been written *con amore*. It has one or two clever hits, but, unhappily, the more *piquant* portion is untrue, and the rest has been repeated so often in conversation and the public press, that it has an ancient smell, more likely to disgust than delight its readers. The story of our changes is an old story, not worth reproducing, even with variations. Who has not been told, that we were formerly in the habit of changing our views, and refuting ourselves, once

a quarter? The explanation of our changes suggested by Mr. Clarke is, no doubt, ingenious, but it reminds us of the joke which Charles the Second of England played off upon the learned members of the Royal Society, and it might be classed with D'Israeli's chapter on *The History of Events that never happened*. However, the author must be permitted to speak for himself.

"We intend to speak in this present article of Mr. Brownson, and of his argument for the Roman Church. Mr. Brownson is an active thinker, an energetic writer, and a man who has assumed an important position in American literature by years of steady labor. He has devoted himself during that time to the highest questions of philosophy, ethics, and theology, and has treated none of these subjects in a superficial or commonplace way. He has also belonged for a time, after a fashion of his own, to our communion. He has repeatedly created sensations by his ultraism on several subjects, and he finally astonished our community by going over from extreme Neology and Transcendentalism to Romanism of the most Ultramontane kind. Since then, he has occasionally addressed some arguments to his old friends, in behalf of his new Church. He has sometimes referred to our own periodical; and in April, 1845, addressed us, in a somewhat elaborate argument, inviting us to become members of the Church of Rome, or to show cause why we reject the invitation.

"For all these reasons, it would seem proper that we should take some notice of his writings. When a man of no mean abilities assumes such a position, it seems proper for a journal like ours to consider it. And, indeed, we should probably have weighed his arguments long before this time, had we not been expecting a reply from an abler hand, — namely, from Mr. Brownson himself. We thought it hardly worth while to exert our ingenuity in exposing the fallacy of arguments, which, judging by experience, Mr. Brownson would himself be ready to confute in the course of a year or two. No man has ever equalled Mr. Brownson in the ability with which he has refuted his own arguments. He has made the most elaborate and plausible plea for Eclecticism, and the most elaborate and plausible plea against it. He has said the best things in favor of Transcendentalism, and the best things against it. He has shown that no man can possibly be a Christian, except he is a Transcendentalist; and he has also proved that every Transcendentalist, whether he knows it or not, is necessarily an infidel. He has satisfactorily shown the truth of Socialism, and its necessity in order to bring about a golden age; and he has, by the most convincing arguments, demonstrated that the whole system of Socialism is from the pit, and can lead to nothing but anarchy and ruin. *He has defended the course of Mr. Dorr in Rhode Island, and argued before*

a crowd in State Street, in this city, that the people of Massachusetts should aid him in taking possession of the government by force. Afterward, he confuted the whole argument of Mr. Dorr, showing it to be hostile to all true democracy, and fatal, if it should succeed, to republican institutions. In 1841 he defended Theodore Parker, and declared him to be a Christian, in an article on Mr. Parker's Discourse at South Boston; asserting that he was guilty of no heresy, but only of defects, in his view of Jesus. But in 1845, Parkerism is infidelity, and Mr. Parker stands in the ranks of the disobedient and rebellious, among proud, conceited, and superficial infidels, and is, to all intents and purposes, a rejecter of the Gospel. But especially in relation to the Church question has Mr. Brownson's change of opinion been the most radical and extreme. He labors now with great ingenuity and extraordinary subtilty to show that there must be an infallible church with its infallible ministry, and that out of this church there can be no salvation. But formerly he labored with equal earnestness to show that there could be no such thing as a church at all, no outward priesthood or ministry. His former arguments, then, for aught that we can see, were just as acute, plausible, and effective as his present ones. In the year 1840, he wrote a long article, proving, by a subtle chain of reasoning, the exact reverse of his present propositions. He then declared that it was necessary to destroy the Church and abolish the priesthood. He said, 'We oppose the Church as an Antichristian institution'; 'because we find no Divine authority for it; because we cannot discover that Jesus ever contemplated such an institution; and because we regard it as the grave of freedom and independence, and the hot-bed of servility and hypocrisy.' 'We object to every thing like an outward, visible church; to every thing that in the remotest degree partakes of the priest.' 'Christianity is the sublimest protest against the priesthood ever uttered.' 'Jesus instituted no priesthood, and no form of religious worship. He recognized no priest but a holy life. He preached no formal religion, enjoined no creed.' 'The priest is universally a tyrant, universally the enslaver of his brethren. Priests are, in their capacity of priests, necessarily enemies to freedom and equality. The word of God never drops from the priest's lips,' &c., &c." — pp. 227 — 229.

If this were true, we ought to be looked upon as an extraordinary man, the marvel of our age and country. But we cannot claim the merit it awards us. The author cannot afford to grant us so much, for his purpose is not, by magnifying our ability, to enhance the merit of his courage in attempting to defend himself against us, but to show, from our frequent changes and alleged ability to reason on one side of a question as well as on

another, that nothing we say can deserve a moment's consideration. But if what he asserts be true, since it must be conceded that, however frequently we may have changed our views, we have never been known to return to a doctrine which we have once held and rejected, it is certain that we did not embrace Catholicity blindly, nor renounce Protestantism without knowing the best that can be said in its favor. This, instead of being a reason for not weighing, would be a good reason for weighing, any argument we might offer for the Church, not only because it would be likely to be a good argument in itself, but because urged by one who knows and has said the best that can be urged against it.

We cannot understand why Protestants should dwell with so much fondness on our alleged changeability and changes, for whatever discredit may attach to them, it attaches to Protestantism, not to Catholicity, — to the Protestant minister, not to the Catholic believer. All the changeableness and changes alleged against us were exhibited, if at all, prior to our conversion, and nobody pretends to allege any thing of the sort against us since. We have resided in this community in all about sixteen years, — the whole of our life that can be considered of any public interest. During nearly six of these years, we have been a member of the Catholic Church, and have shown no changeableness or symptom of change. If during the previous ten years, while a Protestant, a Unitarian minister even, we were, as you say, in the habit of changing our views and refuting ourselves about once in every three months, how do you account for the fact, that we have as a Catholic remained firm and steadfast for nearly six years? Here is, if you are right, the most remarkable change of all. How do you explain it? You cannot say that it is owing to our ignorance, either of Protestantism or of Catholicity, for you concede that we have said the best things that can be said in favor of, as well as against, each; it cannot be an obstinate attachment to opinions once avowed, for your very accusation implies the total absence of such attachment; it cannot be any fear as to the sort of reception Protestants would give us were we to return to them, for nobody can doubt that they would hail our return as a god-send. Whence, then, comes this remarkable change in personal character? *The Examiner* suggests the answer (p. 232), in declaring it impossible for a man to disavow what he has once seen to be true, and in asserting that, "When a man tells us that he has changed all his convictions, he tells us that he nev-

er had any convictions to change." That, when a Protestant, we had not seen, and did not see, the truth, and therefore had no real faith, or what *The Examiner* calls convictions, is undoubtedly true, and this fact explains the change. As a Protestant we lacked the truth. We were seeking it without finding it, and therefore were restless, and continually changing; but as a Catholic we have found the truth, have it, are no longer seeking it, and therefore are satisfied, at rest, and change no more. But who, except the founder of the Church of the Disciples, would ever dream of adducing this as a reason why an argument constructed by us for the Church is not worth considering?

But suppose that our past conduct as a Protestant was altogether unworthy, that we were fickle and vain, as unstable as water, changing once a quarter, or even every month, — what then? The argument of *The Examiner* is a bad one. Let it be that we have changed too often to be depended upon. It amounts to nothing; for we have never proclaimed ourselves as one who could be depended upon, and we have never asked any one to believe the Church on our personal authority. If we professed to be the founder of our Church, to be ourselves "the ground and pillar of truth," and asked people to believe the Church for the simple reason that we believe her, it would not be amiss to ask who and what we are, and to make a rigid inquiry into our personal character, and our qualifications for arrogating to ourselves the Divine prerogative. But we have ceased to be a Protestant, and therefore do nothing of the sort. The Church was not founded by us, is not ours, and does in no sense rest on our wisdom and virtue. The arguments we have urged are addressed to the common reason of mankind; they speak for themselves, and depend not at all for their conclusiveness or want of conclusiveness on our personal character or personal authority. It is less conclusive than convenient to say, Mr. Brownson has changed his opinions often; therefore the argument he adduces for the Church against no-church is worthless.

We have, however, something to say to these alleged changes themselves. Some of them are fabrications, and others are perversions or exaggerations of very harmless facts. It is not true that we ever defended the course of Mr. Dorr of Rhode Island, or that we ever argued before a crowd in State Street, in this city, that Massachusetts ought to aid him in taking possession of the government by force. We never ad-

dressed a crowd in State Street on the subject, either for or against his course. It is not true that we have shown, or ever attempted to show, that no man can be a Christian except he is a Transcendentalist. We never had the honor of being a Transcendentalist, and there never was a time when the fact, that any principle we held involved Transcendentalist consequences, would not have been of itself a sufficient reason for us to reject it as false. The chiefs of Boston Transcendentalism were from the outset Ralph Waldo Emerson and S. Margaret Fuller, and the pages of *The Christian Examiner*, as well as those of our own *Boston Quarterly Review*, prove that we always opposed their peculiar views. It is well known by the writer against us, that *The Dial*, which we ridiculed in public and in private, not our review, was their organ; that we always contended that Transcendentalism was pantheism, and that we held pantheism to be unchristian and false. That we held, as does every Protestant, principles which lead to Transcendentalism, we do not deny; but whenever we discovered such to be the fact, we rejected them as false, and for that reason alone. If we ever defended the Transcendentalists against their enemies, it was not in their peculiar views, but in what they held in common with all of us who at the time were engaged in the war against Cambridge conservatism, and the sensism of Locke. *The Examiner* knows perfectly well that its statement is not true.

With regard to Mr. Parker, we own, that, when a Unitarian minister, we defended him, and maintained that his South Boston sermon might bear a Christian sense, and on Unitarian principles we should maintain the same thing to-day. In 1845, after our conversion, we wrote an article, in which we proved that no Unitarian had the right to pronounce his doctrine, all infidel as it is, unchristian. We understand no right in any Unitarian, nay, in any Protestant, to deny Mr. Parker, or any one else, to be a Christian, so long as he professes to be one. Our views of Mr. Parker have undergone no change, but in passing from Unitarianism to Catholicity our views of what is Christianity have of course changed.

That in 1840, while still a Protestant, we maintained no-churchism, as *The Examiner* alleges, is true, and we should maintain the same to-day, if we assumed, as we did then, that the Protestant movement was a *Christian* movement. We did it avowedly on Protestant principles, and we have written article after article, since our conversion, to prove that Protestants

have, and can have, on their principles, no church, no priesthood, in the proper sense of the terms. Assume those principles to be Christian, and you must be a pitiable reasoner indeed, if you cannot draw the conclusion, that every thing like a priest or a visible church is unchristian. We did but express, in clear and energetic language, what *The Christian Examiner* itself and all Unitarians do and must maintain. We were never so dull as not to see that the Protestant movement was directly opposed to every thing like a visible church or priesthood, in the sense in which we then denied them, or now hold them, or that, if there is a visible church or priesthood to be asserted as Christian, it is the Roman Catholic. At any time during the last twenty-five years, if it had been proved to us that our Lord did found a church and institute a priesthood, we should at once have said, as we say now, they are the Roman Catholic ; for they obviously can be no other ; and prove to us now that the Protestant movement, or Reformation, as it is called, was from God, and is to be held as a Christian movement, and we will repeat the essay on *The Laboring Classes*, which *The Examiner* cites, and say again, that "the truth never drops from the priest's lips," — that "the priest is universally a tyrant, and the enslaver of his brethren." Doubtless we have changed on the Church question since 1840, but we have undergone on that question no change not necessarily involved in the conversion from Protestantism to Catholicity, and to object the change to us is only objecting, either that when a Protestant we were not a Catholic, or that now we are a Catholic we are not still a Protestant. How in the world were we to become a Catholic without changing ?

The Examiner thinks to overwhelm us, by applying to us prior to our conversion the language we have since employed in describing Protestantism.

"In fact, he has given the best possible description of his own creed before that time in the following passage : — ' It is in perpetual motion, and exemplifies, so far as itself is concerned, the old heathen doctrine that all things are in a perpetual flux. You can never count on its remaining stationary long enough for you to bring your piece to a rest and take deliberate aim. You must shoot it on the wing ; and if you are not marksman enough to hit it flying, you will have, however well charged and well aimed your shot, only your labor for your pains. It is never enough to take note either of its past or its present position ; but we must always regard the direction in which it is moving, and the celerity with

which it moves ; and if we wish our shot to tell, we must aim, not at the point where it was, or where it now is, but at the point where it will be when the ball now fired may reach it.' Mr. Brownson thinks that he is here describing Protestantism. But he must allow us to say that he has merely given us a very happy description of the working of his own individual intellect. It is an old trick of proselytes to ascribe to the party they have left all the blunders and errors which were peculiar to themselves." — pp. 229, 230.

This retort would be happy, if it were not a retort upon one of the author's own brethren. He applies it to us as a Protestant, and not to us as a Catholic, and the more ridiculous he makes us appear as a Protestant, the more does he weaken his own cause. Let it be that we sat for the picture, and drew from our own experience, it was the Protestant that sat, and a Protestant's experience that was depicted. Suppose we did draw from our own Protestant experience, it does not follow that we concluded the description must be applicable to the Protestant world, because we found it applicable to ourselves ; for it is warranted by the history of the Protestant controversies, Protestant developments and variations, any time for the last three hundred years.

"When, therefore, we find that Mr. Brownson's mind is in the habit of experiencing such extraordinary revolutions, we may perhaps be excused for not paying much attention to his position at any particular time. In a land of earthquakes, men do not build four-story houses ; neither do we spend much time in refuting the arguments of a man whom we know to be in the habit of refuting himself about once in every three months. We are inclined to say with Mr. Emerson, 'If we could have any security against moods ! If the profoundest prophet could be holden to his words, and the hearer who is ready to sell all, and join the crusade, could have any certificate that to-morrow his prophet shall not unsay his testimony ! But the Truth sits veiled there on the bench, and never interposes an adamant syllable ; and the most sincere and revolutionary doctrine, put as if the ark of God was to be carried forward some furlongs and planted there for the succour of the world, shall in a few weeks be coldly set aside by the same speaker as morbid, — "*I thought I was right, but I was not,*" — and the same immeasurable credulity demanded for new audacities.' " — pp. 230, 231.

This would have been more appropriate five years ago. The author has kept his argument too long ; it has grown musty, and unfit for use. He appears to have lost the current of events, and fallen behind the times. Has he been taking a

nap, after the example of the celebrated Rip Van Winkle? The citation from Mr. Emerson would be to the author's purpose, if we asked people to believe Catholic doctrine on our personal authority, or on any authority liable to change or to be moody; but as it is, it is very much to our purpose, and faithfully and vividly depicts the sad condition of poor Protestants, who have only a human authority for their faith, and only an arm of flesh on which to lean.

"But it may be said, 'Will you not allow a man to make progress? May he not discover and correct his errors? Shall he not honestly say, "I was wrong, but I am wiser now"? Will *you*, who profess to believe in progress, think less of a man because he changes his opinions and cares less for consistency than he does for *truth*?' " — p. 231.

There was no need either of suggesting or of refuting the plea of progress, for we do not make it. We have never pretended that our conversion to Catholicity was a progress or the result of a progress in our Protestant life. It was a change, and consisted not in being clothed upon, as Mr. Newman would say, with Catholic truth, but in throwing off Protestant heresy, and accepting Catholic truth in its place. The only progress we lay claim to is a progress, by the grace of God, not *in* Protestantism, but *out of* it. Our conversion was a change, a real change, and the only real change we have ever undergone. It did not take place instantaneously, but was a gradual process, which continued for some three years. During those years we were in a transition state, our mind was unsettled, and our old Protestant notions were continually giving way, as snow and ice before the increasing warmth of the sun as the spring advances. Doubtless this manifested itself in our writings at the time, but all the changes we successively underwent were only the changes which every genuine Protestant must undergo in being converted to the Church. They consisted simply in throwing off what we had received from Protestantism, in which we were born and bred, and in no instance was there any other change than that of throwing off the first view we had embraced on the subject. We never betrayed any of that kind of change which consists in holding a doctrine to-day, renouncing it to-morrow, and taking it up again the day after. The doctrines we have once rejected we have seldom afterwards defended.

"The misfortune of Mr. Brownson, as it seems to us, and the explanation of his whole past course, is simply this; that he has

had no such central truths, no primal convictions. Acute as a logician, able to see the sequences and dependences by which one proposition is connected with another, his mind appears to have no power of intuition. He cannot see a truth, a principle; and he has therefore no insights, but only thoughts." — pp. 231, 232.

The Examiner is nearer the truth here than usual. We have very little insight; we are mentally weak and ignorant; we feel it and deplore it. We cannot come into comparison with those great men to whom nothing is hidden, dark, or difficult, and who have mastered all the secrets of nature and all the mysteries of revelation. All we dare aspire to is to learn some little of the wisdom of others, and to repeat it in our own stammering speech for the benefit of those who know less than we, because they have had less time and opportunity for study. There can be no question of our grievous lack of insight. If we had not lacked it, we should have escaped innumerable errors, and at a much earlier day discovered the unchristian character of the Protestant movement, and begged admission into the Holy Catholic Church.

No doubt, when a Protestant, so far forth as a Protestant, we had no great "central truths"; but this was hardly our fault. How could we "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles"? We could not be expected to have what Protestantism has not to give; we had all it has, and more we could not have had, without ceasing to be a Protestant, for we always lacked the ability of our worthy opponent to maintain, that of contraries both may be true. Yet it is not true to say that we had no "primal convictions." The "primal convictions" which belong to every rational soul we certainly had, and it was those that gave us our trouble; for we never could make Protestantism harmonize with them. Had it not been for them, Protestantism, in some of its forms, might have satisfied us, and we might have settled down quietly in the sect in which we found ourselves, — perhaps have been a fellow-laborer with the founder of the Church of the Disciples. But having them, we could never persuade ourselves that all opinions are alike good, that there is no difference between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong, or that one can be safe, unless he loves and serves God in the way God himself wills; consequently we could not rest till we had found something better than Protestantism.

But after all, *The Examiner* is a little inconsistent with itself, in attributing our various changes to lack of insight, — to

the total want of intuition or apprehension of principles. It awards us a high intellectual character, says that we have devoted years of steady labor "to the highest questions of philosophy, ethics, and theology," and that we have treated none of them "in a superficial or commonplace manner." It places us in the front rank of all who have labored in defence, or in refutation, of Eclecticism, Transcendentalism, Radicalism, and Socialism, and it plainly implies that we have been surpassed by none of our contemporaries in the defence of no-churchism on the one hand, and of the Church on the other. It allows us great mental acuteness and extraordinary logical powers. We cannot understand how a man of whom this is to be said can be wholly destitute of insight, or have no intuition or apprehension of principles. How can a man who has no insight have great mental acuteness? or how can one who has no apprehension of principles reason logically? What sort of logic is that which can operate without principles?

"If our account of the working of Mr. Brownson's mind be correct, he has always, even when most a Protestant, been a Roman Catholic in principle. The main distinction between the Church of Rome and its opponents regards the final ground of our belief. The Protestant relies, in the last result, upon personal conviction; the Romanist, on outward authority. Individual faith is the principle of Protestantism; submission to an outward teacher, the principle of the Church of Rome. But Mr. Brownson, even when most a Protestant, took his first principles from some one else; and he does no more than that now. And certainly it is more satisfactory to rest on the authority of a Church claiming to teach in the name of God, than to rest on the authority of Victor Cousin or Claude Henri St. Simon. We think, indeed, that Mr. Brownson, loving fight as well as he does, must enjoy himself not a little in his present position. He there has an opportunity of fighting as much as he pleases, with all his old friends. He has not been slow in availing himself of this opportunity; and he has in turn attacked High-Churchmen and Low-Churchmen, Transcendentalists and Rationalists, Unitarians and Socialists, holding also an occasional argument with other Roman Catholics, not quite as orthodox as himself." — pp. 233, 234.

If we were always a Roman Catholic in principle, what becomes of the infinite number of changes we are said to have undergone? We can in that case have undergone no change in our principles, and a man who has never changed his principles cannot have been remarkably changeable. He can have

undergone no changes except such as relate to simple matters of fact, — changes to which every man who acquires information is liable, and which are never regarded as at all discreditable to one's constancy of character or solidity of judgment. We were, we concede, always a Roman Catholic, in the respect that we held that faith is necessary, and regarded the man who has no faith as in an abnormal condition ; that truth is something real, and not at all dependent upon or affected by our apprehension of it ; that in order to reason one must have principles, and therefore that first principles are neither obtained nor obtainable by reasoning ; that every one is bound by the legitimate consequences of his own principles ; and that one truth can never be in contradiction with another. These principles we always held, even when most a Protestant, and thus far were, no doubt, when most a Protestant, a Roman Catholic in principle.

Moreover, we were never enough of a Protestant to believe that we were ourselves the exact measure of truth and goodness, that we were personally infallible, that we had no need of being taught, or that we could spin all truth, spider-like, out from our own bowels. We were no genuine *arachnean*, and we always felt our need of masters. We had masters, — the best masters to be found out of the Catholic Church ; but, unhappily, they were very incompetent masters, who taught us more error than truth, — more ignorance than science. We made a mistake, not in having masters, but in the masters we chose. Had we known enough to seek out some humble Catholic priest, and submit ourselves to his tutelage, we should have had nothing to regret ; for he would have taught us more in five minutes than all our Protestant masters taught us in forty years.

But after all, we did not, in this matter of masters, practically differ so widely from the great body of Protestants as some may suppose. Protestant profession is one thing ; Protestant practice is another, and in general a contrary thing. All Protestants, except the founders of new sects, are the slaves of some master or masters, and the only liberty they have — and they by no means always have even that — is the liberty of choosing their masters, or of exchanging one for another. You may talk of Protestant freedom to the marines. A more servile set of mortals than the mass of Protestants it is impossible to conceive ; and what makes the matter worse is, that the poor slaves hug their chains, and fancy it freedom. The Catholic is

the only freeman, for he has no master but God. Even the self-sufficient founder of the Church of the Disciples had his masters as well as we, and has them still. The only difference between him and us in this respect was, that we could follow the teachings of our several masters only so far as we could, or thought we could, reconcile the teachings of one with those of another, while he made no reserve of the sort. He always appeared to be able to accept the grossest syncretism, and to swallow down in their crudest state the entire systems of all the masters he could light upon, however mutually contradictory they might be. As far as we could discover, he went on the principle of accepting all systems, all schools, all sects, all doctrines, and all opinions; of being an infidel with infidels, a pantheist with pantheists, a Quaker with Quakers, a Swedenborgian with Swedenborgians, a Unitarian with Unitarians, a Trinitarian with Trinitarians, an Evangelical with Evangelicals, a pagan with pagans, a conservative with conservatives, a Socialist with Socialists, and a Catholic with Catholics. We have found him fraternizing alike with those who believe Jesus of Nazareth to be the only Messiah, and with those who maintain that Wolfgang Goethe was a second Messiah, and who patronize S. Margaret Fuller and Bettine Brentano. He is a man of large sympathies, — sympathies wide as the world. Do not all these various systems, opinions, sects, and classes subsist in the world side by side? Why not, then, in the Church, especially in the Church of the Disciples? Would you have the Church narrower and less tolerant than the world?

But enough of this. If *The Examiner* had succeeded in this part of its defence, it would have availed it nothing; for the real question at issue is not our personal character, or our mental or moral constitution, but Church or no-church. We frankly admit that we are altogether unworthy to be a member of the Catholic Church, much more to write in defence of Catholic doctrine. But if the argument we have addressed to it proves her claims, *The Examiner* will in vain attempt to excuse itself for not having examined and yielded to its force, on the ground of our past instability or present unworthiness. The argument is before its conductors, and they owe it to themselves to forget who has laid it before them, and to give it all the consideration to which it is entitled by its intrinsic merits. Nothing is gained in the long run by seeking to substitute personal detraction or vulgar prejudice for solid argument. In our article against *The Examiner* we made no personal attack; we ap-

pealed to no popular prejudice against either it or its doctrine ; we reasoned fairly and conscientiously ; and it owed it to its own character, and to us, as one of its former contributors, to have met us in the same tone and manner. It has not done so ; and for its sake, for the sake of its readers, and for the sake of honorable and profitable controversy, we regret it ; but as far as we are concerned, we are prepared for all tones and all tempers, and have been too much accustomed to be publicly traduced to be disturbed. It is a little thing to speak slightly of us, after having calumniated the Church of God.

The second part of *The Examiner's* defence need not detain us long. The author has urged several objections against us, but not one which we have not heretofore ourselves raised in substance and refuted. It is, no doubt, a convenient way to refute an opponent, to take from him the objections he raises against himself, and omit his answers ; but it is not a very honorable nor a very satisfactory way ; and having once replied to the objections, we cannot be held bound to reply to them again, till the answers we have already given are shown to be insufficient. The author's objections, moreover, do not require any answer from us, because he virtually concedes, or rather contends, that they amount to nothing. He attempts to refute us by argument, and of course refutes us only on condition that the arguments he objects to us are conclusive against us, that is, make it certain that we are wrong. But this, according to him, they do not do, for he maintains (pp. 235, 236) that "the strongest argument ever made never produced any thing but a strong probability," and that "*certainty is never produced by any amount of argument.*" Then, we may add, *a fortiori*, not by such arguments as his. If no amount of argument ever produces certainty, it remains certain that his arguments have not invalidated ours, and therefore amount to nothing ; and if they amount to nothing, they require no answer.

The Examiner should remember that skepticism is a weapon as fatal to him who wields it as to him against whom it is wielded. If our arguments fail to prove the Church, on its ground that no argument is or can be conclusive, then its arguments, on the same ground, conclude nothing against ours, and therefore it has been very silly in urging them. But, remembering the controversies formerly carried on in its pages against the so-called Orthodox, we are a little surprised to find *The Christian Examiner* taking ground against all argument, and seeking refuge in skepticism. We remember the time

when it maintained a different doctrine ; when it did not decry reason ; when the Unitarians, whom it represents, boasted themselves the champions of reason against enthusiasm, and of rational piety against fanaticism ; when they were in the habit of saying, No man is against argument till argument is against him, and no one objects to reason so long as he has a good reason to give. Have they changed, turned a somerset, and undertaken to do what they accused their old Calvinistic enemies of doing, that is, to “reason against reason, use reason against the use of reason, and to give a pretty good reason why reason ought not to be used” ? Alas ! how have the mighty fallen ! Unitarians abandoning reason, rejecting argument, and seeking refuge in skepticism, or illuminism ! He who rejects reason abdicates his manhood, withdraws himself from the class of rational beings, and places himself in the category of irrational animals, as the dog, the horse, or the ass, which are manageable sometimes by our industry, but with which it is impossible to hold rational intercourse. If argument never establishes certainty, why do you attempt to argue ?

The Examiner's first objection to our argument for the Church is, that it is too subtle. “Is it possible,” he asks (p. 235), “that we are left to find the true Church of Christ by means of such a subtle chain of reasoning ?” Yes, we answer, if heretics have so obscured the truth by their errors and sophistry, learned ignorance and conceited folly, that they are incapable of being convinced by plainer or simpler arguments. But what sort of right have Protestants, or any other class of heretics, — after having turned their backs upon the truth, after having exerted all their wit, ingenuity, skill, and malice in devising objections to it, and thus compelling us to resort to close, rigid, and even subtle reasoning to meet and refute their sophistry and subtilty, — to turn upon us, and tell us that our Church cannot be the Church of God, for if she was, no such reasoning would be necessary ? If a man resolutely shuts his eyes so as not to see the sun, shall he tell us, after we have induced him by great labor and effort to open them, that the sun is not the sun, nay, that there is and can be no sun, for if there was, so much labor could not be required to enable him to see it ? Poor man ! we did not labor to enable him to see the sun, or to make the sun more obvious, but to remove the obstacles to his seeing it, which his own folly and obstinacy had interposed. But whence do Protestants obtain the right to urge charges against the Church which refute one another ? They accuse us of ignorance,

and then object to our Church, that she is the result of the most consummate human wisdom, and all but miraculous knowledge of human nature. They tell us, that we are utterly unable to reason, and as soon as we expose the falseness of their accusation, and show that we can and do reason, they turn upon us and say, they are sure our Church cannot be the true Church, because we support her by argument, and argument cannot give certainty, or because we reason, and reason altogether too well, in her defence ! A wonderful deal of consistency is to be found in Protestants, most assuredly ! They have a double set of objections, one the contrary of the other, so that, as the one set is refuted, they can bring up the other set. Very convenient !

The Examiner thinks it is not likely that our salvation is made to depend on the logical faculty and the understanding of such a piece of pure reasoning as our argument.

“ Now, according to Mr. Brownson, our *salvation* depends on our belonging to the true Church ; therefore, our *salvation* depends on our being able to investigate and understand the whole of the great question at issue between the Roman Church and its opponents. He thinks that he has reduced this question to its simplest form in the argument before us ; and he thinks that this argument is perfectly simple and intelligible. Nevertheless, it occupies some sixty pages of pure argument, making a chain of propositions and deductions, *any one of which failing, the whole must go to the ground*. Now we say, that it is not very likely, at the outset, that God has made the salvation of his creatures to depend on the logical faculty and clearness of insight necessary in order to do justice to such a piece of pure reasoning as this.” — p. 235.

There is a mistake here as to the number of pages the argument occupies. The whole essay is less than sixty pages long. One eighth of it is exhausted with other matters, before the argument begins, and at least six eighths are taken up with explanations rendered necessary by the errors of Unitarians and others, and in refuting the false theories of heretics. The argument proper occupies less than half a dozen pages, and *The Examiner* professes to have reproduced it in less than one. Then the argument is the farthest removed possible from subtilty. It consists solely in drawing from the premises known and professed by every man who calls himself a Christian their obvious and necessary consequences. To call such an argument subtile is an abuse of terms. Moreover, the argument is not presented as the only, nor as the briefest and sim-

plest argument possible, but professedly in reply to an essay on *The Church*, in *The Christian Examiner* for January, 1845, as the argument best adapted to the apprehensions of Unitarians, and to the removal of their peculiar prejudices.

The writer says the argument consists "of a chain of propositions, any one of which failing, the whole must go to the ground." Be it so. But the same may be said of any extended chain of reasoning, even of mathematical reasoning. It is no objection, that if one link fails the chain is broken, so long as no link can fail. That it is not likely that the understanding of this chain of reasoning is universally necessary to salvation is possible, but we do not recollect of ever having maintained that it is, and the argument itself is designed to prove, that, to be saved, it is necessary to believe, not it, but what God reveals and the Church proposes. It assumes, that, in order to be saved, it is necessary to be a Christian. Does *The Christian Examiner* deny this assumption? If it does, let it say so, and avow itself an infidel periodical. If it does not, we beg it to have the kindness to prove in fewer words, and in a less subtle manner than we have employed in our argument for the Church, any doctrine or precept it chooses to name was really taught or enjoined by our Lord; or, in a briefer, plainer, or simpler argument, in opposition to the mythic theory of Strauss, that there actually was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth. Leslie's *Short Method with the Deists*, which falls far short of refuting them, is longer than our essay; Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* make up a respectable octavo volume; Lardner requires nine or ten large octavo volumes to prove the credibility of the Gospel history; Norton requires three to establish the genuineness of the four Gospels; and the writer in *The Examiner* would, we doubt not, require at least forty huge folio volumes to prove that Unitarianism is identical with Christianity, or that the Church of the Disciples is identical with the Church of Christ. Suppose it does require a labored argument of sixty pages to prove the Church against the no-churchism of Protestants. What then? No one distinctively Christian fact can be proved with a shorter or less labored argument, and, what is more to the purpose, when we have once proved the Church, we have proved all, and our labor is done; but the Protestant, when he has proved one fact, even if one fact he can prove, has proved only that fact, and has the same labor to perform in the case of every single fact, doctrine, or precept of the Christian religion, a labor to which no

man's life is adequate, and which the experiments of the Protestant world for three hundred years fully prove can never be brought to a successful termination; for there is not at this moment a single fact, doctrine, or precept which all Protestants agree in regarding as Christian. Even the writer in *The Examiner* confesses that Protestants generally, and some even of his own brotherhood, do not accept the view of faith essential to his theory, and consoles himself with believing that they are tending to it, and may some centuries hence reach it. Then, after all, it is ridiculous to object to our argument that it is subtle, for if it really does establish the claims of the Church, you must believe and obey her, or lie under the sin of rebellion against God. If the argument is really inconclusive, that fact should be shown; but if really conclusive, it is conclusive, however subtle or elaborate it may be, and convicts, if it does not convince, you of warring in your non-churchism against the truth.

But the writer in *The Examiner*, for obvious reasons, objects to all arguments addressed to the understanding. He does not appear to object to our argument, that it is inconclusive for the reason, the intellect; he even seems to concede that it is strictly logical, and as conclusive as any logical argument can be; but he has a thorough dislike to all logic, properly so called, and demands arguments addressed, not to the intellect, but to the heart. Arguments to the understanding do not appear to be his *forte*, but he is great on heart arguments.

"It may be said that such a kind of proof is the only kind possible. We admit that it is the only logical proof possible. But the true Church of Christ might commend itself to us by evidence which would produce certainty in any pure mind; by arguments addressed, not to the intellect, but to the heart. If there were in the world a church so pure that not a flaw could be found in it; a church whose only weapons were the power of truth and love; which had never encouraged crusades to root out heretics with fire and sword; which had never struck medals and sung *Te Deums* to commemorate a Bartholomew massacre; which had never established an Inquisition, to produce an outward conformity by tortures and the stake, and so to make men hypocrites when it could not make converts; a church which never had a murderer for its head, and licentious priests for its ministers; a church like this, filled throughout with truth, love, and holiness, might do what the first disciples did, cause men 'to take knowledge of it, that it had been with Jesus.'" — p. 236.

Our Saviour when on earth exhibited, besides other evi-

dence, the precise kind of evidence here contended for, and yet, if we have not been misinformed, he was despised and rejected, called a "seditious fellow," a "glutton and a wine-bibber," a "devil" and "the prince of devils," — was reviled, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between two thieves. The Church has always exhibited the evidence, and all the evidence, here demanded, and yet the very man who says such evidence is sufficient to "produce certainty in any pure mind," rejects her with scorn and contumely, calumniates her, and insinuates charges against her, which, if he had a tithe of the intelligence he claims, he would know are as false as the pit. It is idle, also, to talk about what would produce certainty in "pure minds"; for, unhappily, the men who need to be convinced have not pure minds, and are not fitted to judge by their hearts instead of their heads. Their heads are wrong only because their hearts are foul, and it is necessary to address their heads to convince their understandings that the Church is God's Church, so that they may come to her and have their hearts cleansed.

The writer reasons on a false assumption, — namely, that men out of the Church have pure minds, are pure in heart, — and supposes that it is because a man is pure and holy that he comes to the Church of God. But they who are out of the Church have not pure minds or hearts, are not and cannot be pure and holy, and those who come to the Church come because they are sinners, because they know they are sinners, and must be sinners as long as they remain outside of her communion, and they come to her that they may be cleansed from sin, purified, and made holy. By the very act of seeking admission into the Church, we confess before heaven, earth, and hell that we are sinners, and deserve eternal damnation. Men who come to the Church, feeling that they are pure and holy, that they do not need her as God's medium for saving them from sin, may indeed enter her communion, but will not be *of* it. Christ came to call sinners, not the just; and it was for the ungodly, while they were yet enemies, that he died on the cross. We cannot address those out of the Church as pure and holy, as already living the Christian life; for if we could we should never address them at all, — never call upon them to become Catholics. We do and can look upon them only as sinners, all foul with sin, and festering in their iniquity; and what we must address to them are, not arguments which can be appreciated only by the pure-minded, but such as can be appreciated

by those who are not pure-minded, that is, such as convict them of sin, and instruct them as to the means of salvation.

The Examiner continues : —

“ If it were essential to our salvation to be in outward connection with the true Church, and if the true Church could not be known by its fruits, by its evident holiness, its manifest superior usefulness, — if it were so that our salvation depended on our getting into the Church which stood in the right line of descent, and not that which regenerates our soul, — if this proposition, incredible as it seems, be true, *we shall at least be told of it* by Jesus and his apostles. Jesus will, at any rate, say, ‘ It is necessary to your salvation to belong to the true Church ; and the true Church is the one which will stand in the right line of succession, and have an infallible priesthood.’ Jesus came to teach the way of salvation ; he clearly taught with his own lips what was necessary to salvation. *But he has not taught this.* How are we to explain the omission ? ” — pp. 236, 237.

It will be time enough to explain the alleged omission when it is proved to be a fact. *The Examiner* is not yet recognized as the depositary of the words of our Lord, nor has it established the fact of its Divine commission to define what our Lord did or did not say. It must produce its credentials as a Divinely commissioned teacher, before we can entertain any of its assertions as to what are or are not the contents of the Christian revelation. We will simply remind it, however, that the Church does not “ regenerate the soul ” ; — the Holy Ghost is the efficient, and she is only the instrumental, cause of regeneration. We hope *The Examiner* will find this distinction intelligible. But does the Church of the Disciples regenerate the soul ? We thought the doctrine of its founder to be, that the Church is a voluntary association of believers, formed by the regenerated, and therefore subsequent in the order of its birth to their regeneration. That is, we are regenerated without the Church, and then come together and form the Church. If this be so, what right has he to object to the Church, that it does not regenerate the soul ?

But let this pass. *The Examiner* proceeds : —

“ If an infallible Church be necessary in order to teach us certainly what are the truths of Christianity, it is even more necessary that we have an infallible guide to show us which is the infallible Church. For whether is it easier to understand the words of Christ, or to understand the merits of the argument in support of the claims of the Church of Rome ? ” — p. 237.

This objection we raised, in substance, against ourselves, in the article to which *The Examiner* professes to reply (April, 1845, pp. 174 – 179, and 187 – 191), and the writer had our answer to it under his eyes when he urged it. It was brought by *The Episcopal Observer*, and replied to by us, in our Review for July, 1845, pp. 372 – 377, and it was repeated in a private letter to us by a clever young Unitarian minister, and answered at full length in an article entitled *Liberalism and Catholicity*, July, 1846. These three several answers are ignored by *The Christian Examiner*, doubtless because it feels confident that its readers have not read and will not be likely to read them, and because it finds it easier to ignore than to refute them. It knows very well that its readers, as a general rule, examine only one side of a question, and that it can with perfect impunity omit all notice of our replies to the objections it copies from our pages. This is only a common Protestant trick, as we pointed out in our Review for April, 1847, pp. 137 – 145. There is no occasion for us to reply to this objection again, for we have in these replies, as the writer must be presumed to know, amply refuted it. If he could have shown that the answers we have already given are inconclusive, it is fair to presume that he would not have failed to do so. He cannot plead his ignorance of what we have said, for he professes to have before him our entire Review from January, 1844, to January, 1850.

We have never professed to be able to establish the claims of our Church to one who is destitute of reason ; and we do not suppose it is easy for one who is intellectually blind to distinguish the true Church from the false. We always presuppose reason and common sense, and it is only by reason and common sense, and to reason and common sense, that we undertake to prove our Church. We hold to faith with reason, not to faith without reason, nor to reason without faith. If it is conceded that our Lord founded a Church, there is no difficulty in finding out which is the true Church. It is and must be the Roman Catholic, for it obviously can be no other, as Unitarians themselves very generally concede, and as we proved in the essay to which *The Examiner* is replying, pp. 187 – 192, but in regard to which it maintains a discreet silence.

Grant that it is easier to understand the words of the Sermon on the Mount than the arguments which establish the infallibility of the Church. What then ? It is possible that the Sermon is not the whole Gospel, that it does not contain all that God

has revealed and enjoined, that something more is necessary to salvation, and that even what is revealed and enjoined in that Sermon cannot be believed and done in the sense required, without the infallible Church. What is there said is addressed to believers,—presupposes the Church and them to be already members of it; from what is practicable for such we cannot conclude what is practicable in the case of persons out of the Church, without the aid of the instruction which she alone can give, and the sacraments which she alone can lawfully administer. Moreover, the ingenious writer is not at liberty to pre-scind from Divine revelation all that he is not sure of by his own instincts, and then maintain that no infallible teacher is necessary, because none is necessary to teach what he retains. God is the judge, not man, of what it is or is not necessary to believe and to do in order to be saved, and we must be pardoned if we refuse to surrender his authority in matters of his own revelation for that of the founder of the Church of the Disciples. The writer reasons,—we beg his pardon,—*talks*, as if it was the easiest thing in the world to find out, on Protestant principles, what is or is not Christian truth. How happens it, then, that we find Protestants agreeing in no one thing except hostility to the Church, and, instead of uniting as one body in the profession of a common doctrine, maintaining as many different doctrines as they have doctors? Unitarians regard themselves as Protestants, claim to be Protestants of Protestants, the only genuine Protestants in the world, and we have yet to find two of their ministers holding the same doctrine. They agree in a few denials, but no two of them agree in the same affirmations. The writer himself concedes, in the article before us, as we have seen, that many Protestants, and perhaps some of his own brotherhood, do not accept his notion of faith, although he thinks it is that to which they are generally tending,—that is to say, the Protestant world, after three hundred years, are only tending to the true view of what faith is! Yet no infallible church is necessary, and nothing in the world is easier than to find out, by consulting one's own heart, what is and what is not Christian truth! The present state of the Protestant world, its doubt, uncertainty, divisions, sects, and mutually contradictory doctrines, are an admirable commentary on the assertion that our Church cannot be the true Church, because we have occupied some sixty pages in proving that she is!

“So far we agree with Mr. Brownson, that there is but one way of salvation, and that is through faith. But we differ from him as

to the nature of faith, and as to the nature of the object of faith. We are aware that we differ also in this respect from many Protestants; perhaps from the majority, and probably from some who are included in the same brotherhood. We therefore speak only for ourselves in this part of our argument; though we believe our view of faith to be that to which the Protestant Church is tending, and the only one which can be satisfactorily maintained.

"Faith, according to Mr. Brownson, is equivalent to belief. Its object is a formal proposition. It is, he says, 'eminently, though not exclusively, an act of the understanding.'

"Now we maintain, on the other hand, that the saving faith demanded by Christ in the New Testament is *not belief, but reliance. It is an act of trust. It is trust in the love of God, or, rather, in the God of love.* Its object is not a doctrine or proposition concerning God, but its object is God himself, as seen in Christ as a pardoning and saving God. It is not, therefore, eminently an act of the understanding, but it is eminently a moral act. It includes, no doubt, something intellectual, and something affectionate. It carries within it something of the intellect, and something of the heart; but it is itself an act of the will. It is reliance on God, seen in Christ to be Love." — p. 238.

This confirms what we have just said. As to the view of faith here given, it will be time enough to consider it when the author has succeeded in getting Protestants generally to accept it. We cannot spend time in refuting every idle notion of an individual Protestant, which is rejected by the mass of Protestants, and not received even by his own brotherhood. Moreover, we have discussed the subject *in extenso* in our *Reply to the Mercersburg Review*, in our number for April last, and had also sufficiently discussed it in the article on *Liberalism and Catholicity*, already referred to, July, 1846. We replied expressly to the view the author takes in the very article to which he is professedly answering, and we cite what we then replied, in order to save our readers the trouble of recurring to it.

"Not a few Unitarian clergymen of our acquaintance understand by faith *trust* or *confidence* (*fiducia*), and contend, that, when we are commanded to *believe* in Christ, in God, &c., the meaning is that we should *trust* or *confide* in him. To believe in the Son is to confide in him as the Son of God. But I cannot confide in him as the Son of God, unless I believe that he is the Son of God; I cannot confide in God, unless I believe that he is, and that he is a protector of them that trust him. Where there is no belief, there is and can be no confidence. Confidence always presupposes faith; for where there is no belief that the trust reposed will be responded

to, there is no trust ; and the fact, that the one trusted will preserve and not betray the trust, is necessarily a matter of faith, belief, not of knowledge. Faith begets confidence, but is not it ; confidence is the effect or concomitant of faith, but can never exist without it. So, however these may seem to deny the necessity of belief, they all in reality imply it, presuppose it.

"Moreover, all Unitarians hold, that, to be a Christian, one must be a follower of Christ. Their radical conception of Christ is that of a teacher, of a person specially raised up and commissioned by Almighty God to teach, and to teach the truth. But one cannot be said to be the follower of a teacher, unless he believes what the teacher teaches. Therefore, to be a Christian, one must be a believer.

"This, again, is evident from the Holy Scriptures. 'For without faith,' says the blessed Apostle Paul, 'it is impossible to please God.' Heb. xi. 6. So our blessed Saviour: 'He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.' St. Mark xvi. 16. 'He that believeth in the Son hath eternal life ; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life ; but the wrath of God abideth on him.' St. John iii. 36. This is sufficient to establish our first position, namely, that, in order to be a Christian, it is necessary to be a believer, that is, to believe *some* what."—*Quarterly Review*, April, 1845, p. 145.

This is not refuted by being ignored, and we leave *The Examiner* to excuse itself as best it can for not having attempted to answer it before insisting the doctrine it refutes.

The author says he disagrees with us as to the nature of faith. Very possibly he does ; but that may not be to our discredit. We do not recognize him as sent from God with authority to teach, and at the very lowest, the fact that he differs from us is as good evidence that he is not right as it is that we are wrong. He evidently does not know whether he does or does not differ from us in the respect he supposes, for it is clear that, unless he intentionally writes what is false and absurd, he does not understand our doctrine. We have never maintained, as he would have his readers believe, that the object of faith is a formal proposition, abstracted from the truth it proposes. The material object of faith is the Christian revelation, and this revelation consists in intelligible, enuntiable propositions, that is to say, is made in a form which can be proposed to the understanding for its assent. This is what we maintain in the article in question. Perhaps the author would not find it amiss on this matter of the object of faith to read

what we say of Toby's dog in *The Two Brothers*, in our Review for January, 1847, pp. 10-14.

We have no occasion to follow the writer through his proofs of his view of faith, because nobody doubts or denies that the word *faith* is sometimes used in the sense of *fiducia*, trust, or confidence. There are passages of Scripture in which it undoubtedly has this sense, but there are others in which it just as obviously means *belief*, *assent*, and even *trust* itself is only a particular form of *belief*. It is nothing to the author's purpose, then, to cite texts in which the word is taken simply as *trust*. Then, again, it is idle to say that he differs from us in our definition of "saving faith," for we were giving no definition of "saving faith." The faith we defined is necessary to salvation, but, as we stated, not of itself sufficient. We were discussing what the Schoolmen call *fides informis*, not the *fides formata*, that is, faith perfected by charity or love, — the "saving faith" the *Examiner* speaks of. We suppose faith to be distinguishable from charity, and St. Paul seems to suppose the same, for he says (1 Cor. xiii. 13.), "Now abideth faith, hope, charity, these THREE"; and St. James speaks also of a faith distinguishable from charity, for he says, "Faith without works is dead, being alone." Because faith without works, or faith unformed or perfected by charity, is not sufficient for salvation, it does not follow, either that it is not faith, or that it is not indispensable to our salvation.

But *The Examiner* proceeds: —

"Suppose that we have an infallible Church, and are able to know certainly that this is the Church of Rome. We accordingly submit ourselves to her guidance; we put ourselves under her instruction, and she teaches us certain truths, by the belief of which we are to be saved. These truths are expressed in her creeds. They are expressed, of course, in words. But the meaning of words is uncertain. How do we know that we understand them in the sense she intends? We go to our priest, and receive his explanation. How do we know that we do not misunderstand him? What we hear always takes a coloring from our own mind. Our teacher's word always means something different to us from what it means to him. We have, then, our infallible Church, but we have not yet attained to certainty. That eludes us still.

"But let us suppose, (what is impossible,) that we *can* be certain of the meaning of the proposition we are called to believe. Have we the *power* to believe it? Suppose that it seems to us incredible, ridiculous, absurd? Can we believe it while it seems so? To *believe* a thing is to have it seem *true*. Can it seem true, while it

seems false? We may try to believe it; we may think that we ought to believe it; we may think we do believe it; but we *cannot* believe it, until it commends itself to our intellect as true. It is one thing to believe that a proposition is true, and quite another to believe the truth contained in the proposition. As a confiding child of the Church of Rome, I may believe that what she tells me is true. But I do not believe what she tells me, till I can see it to be true.

“For example. The Church of Rome teaches me the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Now, there are two things here to be believed. First, we are to believe that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is true. This we believe on the authority of our teacher. Secondly, we are to believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself, and this we cannot believe, until it appears reasonable and credible.

“All this is so evident, that the Church of Rome does not pretend to require its children to believe its doctrines; though, according to Mr. Brownson, we are only saved by the belief of these very doctrines. She merely requires them to believe that the doctrines are true; that is to say, in other words, she requires of them, not belief, but obedience. She requires of them merely to submit to her authority, and not to express any outward dissent from her doctrines. In this she is very reasonable, for she knows that belief is not in our own power. All she demands, therefore, is conformity.

“We were lately conversing with a very intelligent lady, one of the recent converts to the Church of Rome. She said that she had long been interested in its ritual, had enjoyed its services, and earnestly wished to become a member and receive its sacraments. But a serious difficulty lay in her way, which, to her guileless mind, bred up in the honesty of Protestantism, seemed insuperable. The difficulty was merely this; that she did not believe the doctrines of the Romish Church, and could not believe them. But the Romish bishop, in conversation with her, at once removed this difficulty. ‘My dear lady,’ said he, ‘we do not wish you to believe our doctrines. That is not necessary. You are simply to *submit* to the Church. You are not to have any belief about it. You are to be a little child, and receive passively, as true, what the Church teaches.’ This, she said, quite satisfied her. It was so very simple, she was ashamed not to have seen it before. She was quite willing to believe, so soon as she found that she might believe with her *will*, instead of believing with her intellect.” — pp. 240–242.

The first difficulty suggested here is, that language is an uncertain medium of thought, and therefore, since the infallible Church must make her definitions in words, we can never be certain that we understand them in the sense she intends. This objection we have answered in our replies to *The Episcopal Observer*, July, 1845, pp. 364–368, and January, 1846, pp.

11 – 15. We had occasion to touch upon it in our review of Mr. Newman's *Essay on Development*, January, 1847, and we treated it at length in our criticism on Dr. Bushnell, October, 1849. What we have said on these several occasions, as our opponent had it under his eyes when he wrote, is sufficient till it is answered. Furthermore, we have in our last number, in examining Mr. Morell's *Philosophy of Religion*, stated the objection in a stronger form than it is here stated, and given the principle of its solution; namely, the intelligibility, therefore the evidence, is in the object, not in the subject. It has no applicability to the definitions of the Church, because they are always made in intelligible language. *The Examiner's* argument, moreover, proves too much. If it proves any thing, it proves that language can in no case, and under no circumstances whatever, be a vehicle of truth from mind to mind, either from God to man, or from one man to another, which denies to us the faculty of speech, and to God the ability to make a revelation of truth to man;—which even *The Examiner* dare not assert, since it holds that it can understand the Sermon on the Mount, and takes upon itself to decide authoritatively what the Scriptures do and do not mean.

The second objection is ridiculous, — we were about to say, even too ridiculous to be put forth by the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians. The difficulty imagined cannot exist. An infallible Church is infallible, and can teach only infallible truth. It is impossible that infallible truth, proposed by infallible authority, can appear to one who accepts the authority as incredible, ridiculous, or absurd. No proposition can so appear that is seen to be made on an adequate authority, and an infallible authority is an adequate authority for any proposition it can make. The credibility is in the authority, and to suppose that one can regard as incredible what he holds he has infallible authority for believing is a plain contradiction in terms, — sheer nonsense.

The Examiner, notwithstanding it charges us with being too subtle, is itself too subtle for our own understanding. It says, "It is one thing to believe that a proposition is true, and quite another to believe the truth contained in the proposition." This is news to us, and, we must say, it needs confirmation. To believe a proposition is to believe the truth it proposes; for, aside from the truth it proposes, from its contents, the proposition is an empty form, a mere nullity, that is to say, no proposition at all, for it proposes nothing. He who believes what

the Church proposes is true, believes what she proposes. To "believe that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is true," is to "believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself."

"All this is so evident, that the Church of Rome does not pretend to require its children to *believe* its doctrines." Indeed! "She merely requires them to believe that the doctrines are true; that is to say, in other words, she requires of them, not belief, but obedience." That is, the Church does not require her children to believe her doctrines, but she requires them to believe her doctrines true; that is to say, she requires not belief at all, but simply obedience! Alas! we have no heart to triumph over mental imbecility. The writer may have fancied he meant something, but he cannot have known what, and he has only talked sheer nonsense and palpable absurdity. To believe doctrines are true is certainly belief, and if the Church requires this, as the writer asserts she does, she must certainly require belief. If she commands, as she undeniably does, her children to believe what she teaches is true, she in exacting obedience also exacts belief, for the obedience cannot be rendered without believing.

The anecdote of the lady, introduced to confirm what the author asserts of our Church, is as untrue as his assertion itself. The Bishop of Boston never said what he is alleged to have said, for he is at least a man of common sense, and it is absolutely impossible that he could utter the absurdity ascribed to him. What the lady may have said, we know not, but she certainly never did say what Mr. James Freeman Clarke asserts. It is infinitely more probable that he should have invented it, than it is that an intelligent convert, instructed in the Catholic faith, should have talked so little like a Catholic, and so completely in accordance with his false and absurd theory. We, however, suppose she did say something, which he, not exactly understanding, interpreted to favor a theory he had previously excogitated. Doubtless we could conjecture what she said, but we are under no obligation to do it, and have no space for correcting every ridiculous blunder of the writer.

Yet the author should not have blamed the doctrine he ascribes to the Bishop of Boston, for it is precisely his own. He labors throughout to make it appear that faith is not belief, belongs not to the understanding at all, but is a pure affection of the heart, that is, of the will. Wherefore, then, find fault with the lady for being quite willing to "believe with her will instead of her intellect"? We protest against his right to urge one set

of objections one moment, and an opposite set the next. If a man attempts to reason at all, he must hold himself bound by the laws of logic.

One extract more, and we close this already too protracted article.

“But the Church which to-day claims most loudly to be apostolic, and whose Head claims to be in the place of Christ,—which professes to be infallible, as the Apostles did not profess,—hides its infallibility in a napkin, and, instead of showing us God’s truth, requires of us even to receive its doctrines with closed eyes. Never did such magnificent pretension end in so small a result. An infallible Church is demanded on this ground, that we can be saved only by the belief of certain supernatural truths; and, after all, the infallible Church does not pretend to show us those truths, but merely requires submission to herself.

“Finally, we say to Mr. Brownson, that our Saviour himself has given us the test by which to distinguish his prophets, and to know his Church. ‘By their fruits, ye shall know them.’ ‘Men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.’ We are not to know the fruit by the tree, but the tree by the fruit. We are not to say, ‘This church is orthodox, therefore its disciples are Christians’; or, ‘This church is in the line of apostolic succession, therefore those who belong to it are in the way of salvation.’ This method is the reverse of that of Christ. Christ teaches us to know the tree by the fruit. Mr. Brownson would have us know the fruit by the tree. Mr. Brownson virtually says, ‘These dissipated cardinals, these domineering popes, these crusading bishops, belonged to the true Church, and therefore are in the way of salvation.’ Christ says, ‘These little ones are pure, are humble, are loving, and therefore they belong to my kingdom. This man, though he follows not my Apostles, yet, because he is doing good in my name, belongs to me.’ We prefer, we confess, the method of Christ to that of Mr. Brownson. Tried by this test, we see little reason for admitting the claims of the Church of Rome to be the only channel of the Holy Ghost. We find holy men, men of God, in all churches. Wesley and Baxter, Doddridge and Jeremy Taylor, Channing and Ware, and tens of thousands of others, whose lowly piety and large philanthropy have sweetened life, were certainly holy men. And if so, the Church of Rome is not the only true Church of Christ. And if we take a wider range of observation, and compare the condition of Roman Catholic and Protestant countries, we shall find that the tone of morals in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and South America is not so much superior to that in Prussia, England, Scotland, and New England, as to convince us that these Catholic countries alone are blessed with the presence of Christ.

But if the claims of Rome are valid, and she be the only channel of the Holy Ghost, then the difference between the moral condition of Catholic and Protestant nations should be so marked that no one could mistake it. Each Catholic nation and people should be an oasis of purity, truthfulness, honesty, industry, and of every Christian virtue. Family ties should be all sacred, the sacrament of marriage never violated, female chastity touched by no stain. All should be order and peace, undisturbed by intestine dissensions, civil struggles, or domestic strife. All Protestant influences have been rooted out of Portugal, Spain, and Italy by the Inquisition, and kept out by the strong hand of law. Here, then, ought to be found the earthly paradise of purity, peace, and moral virtue. Does any one pretend that it is so? "— pp. 243, 244.

The flourish in the first paragraph must go for what it is worth. If a man obstinately shuts his eyes to the light, it is not our fault that he finds himself in darkness. The complaint, as far as it is intelligible, is, that our Church requires her doctrines to be received as matters of faith, and not as matters of science, on the veracity of God, because he has revealed them and commissioned her to propose them, and therefore on her proposition of them, not because they are intrinsically evident. This is, undoubtedly, the fact, and if any one is silly enough to urge this as an objection, he is not able to receive an answer. We do not believe the human mind is adequate to the comprehension of all things, and our Church does not pretend to make her children omniscient. The truths she teaches are mysteries, and will be mysteries to us as long as we are in the flesh.

As to the talk about the fruits, we reply that we are willing to test the Church by her fruits, and should be glad so to test her. But we must have an indorser for *The Examiner's* taste, if it is to be the judge. We are not sure that its taste is not perverted, that it is a judge of fruits, or that it will not call bitter sweet, and sweet bitter. "We are not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, for many false prophets have gone out into the world." "We," says the beloved Apostle St. John, "are of God. He that knoweth God heareth us, and he that knoweth not God heareth not us. By this we know the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error." (1 St. John iv. 1, 6.) "This Church is in the line of apostolic succession, therefore those who belong to it are in the way of salvation," is the proper method of judging, we concede; but because a man is in the way of salvation, it does not follow that he will be saved,

or that he is just before God. There are bad Catholics as well as good Catholics, and only those in the Church who obey her, believe what she teaches, and do what she commands, and persevere unto the end, will be saved. "This method is the reverse of that of Christ." How does the author know that? Who gave him authority to speak in the name of Christ? Where is his commission sealed with God's seal? He must excuse us, but we prefer the Pope of Rome as the interpreter of God's law to the pope of the chapel in Freeman Place, Boston. We are not aware that our Lord has given this latter a commission to confirm his brethren, or to feed his sheep or lambs. "Christ teaches us to know the tree by the fruit." Agreed. But the first fruit to be borne by the good tree may be to keep the commandment of our Lord to hear the Church, — may be humble submission to those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us.

"We find holy men, men of God, in all churches." How know you that? How do you know that "Wesley and Baxter, Doddridge and Jeremy Taylor, Channing and Ware," were "holy men, men of God"? How could they be such, if they separated from God's Church, or refused to believe God's word? Before you pronounce on their holiness, it would be well to be sure, either that they obeyed God, kept his revealed law, as well as the law of nature, or else to prove that one can be a holy man, a man of God, who despises God's Church, and teaches men to do the same, and who lives in habitual disobedience to God. The men you name may have had a fair outside, may have been moral in the ordinary sense of the word, but this is all you can say in their favor; and you name them, in fact, only in consequence of their talents, learning, or eloquence, and if they had been men of only ordinary intellect, you would never have named one of them as a saint, and, intellectually considered, the Devil is far superior to them all. Nay, you claim for them only natural piety and philanthropy, which, though not sinful, are not sanctity, and avail nothing to eternal life. Heresy and schism are deadly sins, and though the man guilty of them should be guiltless in all other respects, he would be damned, and justly damned; and though dissipated cardinals, &c., if such there are, cannot, unless they repent, be saved, yet the worst cardinal that ever lived, while he retains the faith, is superior to the best heretic or schismatic that ever existed. The writer should remember that there are spiritual sins as well as carnal sins, sins of pride as well as of the

flesh, and the former are as fatal to the soul as the latter, and far more dangerous, for they not unfrequently dress themselves in the livery of virtue. They are the chief sins of heretics and schismatics, in the beginning of their career, and therefore it is that these, even when appearing as angels of light unto men, are to be regarded as the most odious sinners before God.

As to what the writer insinuates with regard to Catholic countries, we have heretofore said all that is necessary. It is enough for Protestants to defend their own countries, without attacking Catholic countries. There are, no doubt, bad Catholics in the world, that will have their part in the eternal tortures which await all who die impenitent, but the Church is no more responsible for the fact, than God himself is for the existence of sinners in the world. She, as he, respects the free will of men, and cannot make them good against their will. If men obeyed her, believed what she teaches, and did what she commands, Catholic countries would be far better even than the writer supposes they ought to be.

The remaining portions of the article we pass over in silence. We do not recognize the writer as an authorized expounder of Scripture, and we have seen nothing in his attempts to set aside our arguments drawn from them, but his arrogance and his incapacity. It is no answer to us to assert on his own authority, or to say *he thinks* the contrary. He is not to us one who speaks by authority, although the founder of the Church of the Disciples.

In conclusion, we cannot help saying that it is extremely disagreeable to be obliged to follow a writer through page after page, who has no sense of what is requisite to honorable controversy, who throws out loose statements, and repeats worn-out objections, without betraying the least intimation that he is aware that they have been already answered. We have had no pleasure in following our present opponent. He, we must presume, knows perfectly well that we had anticipated all his objections, and answered them thoroughly; he knows, too, that as an honorable man he had no right to urge them, till he had set aside what we had already replied to them. If he rejoins, he must reply, not only to what we have now said, but to our previous answers, or we shall not hold ourselves bound in conscience or civility to notice him.

Of *The Christian Examiner* we have heretofore spoken favorably, but some of its recent writers have done much to degrade its character to the level of the lowest anti-Catholic

publications in the country. The present writer is far inferior to Thornwell, and is not a whit above the Brownlees, the Downings, the Sparrys, and that brotherhood. We hope it is but a temporary aberration, and that hereafter this periodical, with which we have had so many associations, will retrieve its character, and prove itself a fair and candid *Examiner*.

ART. III. — *Four Years' Experience of the Catholic Religion : with Observations on its Effects upon the Character, Intellectual, Moral, and Spiritual*. By J. M. CAPES, Esq. Philadelphia : T. K. & P. G. Collins. 1849. 8vo. pp. 72.

THIS is an American reprint, in a cheap form, of an English work, by Mr. Capes, formerly a minister of the Anglican Establishment, who was received into the Church some five or six years since. It is a sort of *compte rendu*, which the author has judged proper to furnish his former brethren who still remain in heresy, of what during four years he has found Catholicity and Catholics in Great Britain. Its author is the founder and editor of *The Rambler*, one of the best conducted and most valuable periodicals in the United Kingdom, and commends himself to us as an accomplished scholar, of a high order of ability, firm faith, and fervent zeal. His experience is written in a tone of great candor and moderation, and can hardly fail to have a happy influence on many of his "separated brethren."

While we acknowledge the ability of the work before us, and add our own experience as a convert in confirmation of its favorable report of Catholicity and Catholics, we still have some doubts about the strict propriety of such works. They seem to us in their general character to be more in consonance with Protestantism than with Catholicity. With Protestants, religion has only a psychological basis, is purely a matter of private experience, and private experience is the rule by which they are accustomed to judge of its truth or falsehood ; but with us, private experience counts for little, and we are accustomed to judge private experience by our religion, not our religion by private experience. If a man has confessions to write, and can write them like St. Augustine, let him write them by all means ; but as a general rule we think it better not to be too fond

of parading our personal experiences before the public. If such experiences interest and attract some who are without, they also minister to their present false notions as to the grounds of religion, and hinder rather than facilitate their study of the true motives of credibility. Religion has an objective validity, an objective evidence, independent of your experience or mine, and our reliance, under the grace of God, should be on that. If Protestants reject the testimony of the Church herself, how can we expect them to accept ours as individuals, when ours as individuals is worth nothing, save as corroborated by hers? It is but justice, however, to Mr. Capes to say, that his book is not precisely a narrative of his religious experience, in the Protestant sense, and that it is mainly a report of facts with regard to our religion and its followers in England, which he has picked up during four years of his Catholic life, together with his reasonings and reflections on various important topics, intellectual, moral, social, and theological.

The author seems to us to have written in a form altogether more egotistical than was desirable. He apologizes for it, indeed, on the ground that, as he was relating what he had himself seen and remarked in himself and others, he could not well avoid it. He could not avoid speaking in the first person, it is true, but he could have spared us the long account in the beginning of his competency and admirable qualifications as a witness. All he says is, no doubt, true, but what was the need of saying it? Those who knew him were already prepared to admit him as a competent witness, and those who did not know him could not be prepared by his own panegyric on himself. They who would not take his word as to his experience could hardly be expected to take his word for his own competency and credibility as a witness. It would have been amply sufficient to have told in a simple, straightforward manner what he had to say, without prefacing it with an account of his own mental habits, and without interrupting the flow of the narrative to tell us that he "honestly asserts," "honestly believes," "fully believes," &c., what he is asserting. However, this is a matter of taste, and no one suffers from it except the author himself.

As a writer, Mr. Capes may be commended for his pure idiomatic English, but he is diffuse, sometimes wordy, and not always clear, direct, and forcible. He affects to write as a man of the world, as a layman, in a popular style, free from all technical terms or forms of expression usually adopted by professional writers. In this he follows the precepts of the rheto-

ricians, but, perhaps, without considering the peculiar circumstances in which the Catholic writing in English is placed. A Protestant writing in English on Protestantism can avoid technical terms and expressions, and abandon himself to the current language of the people, because his Protestantism is itself vague and loose, and appears to far greater advantage in popular than in scientific language, and because the terms most appropriate to its expression have passed into the language of the market, and ceased to be technical, or, at least, become terms familiar to the general reader. But the Catholic writing in the same language on Catholicity cannot do this with safety, because his doctrines are definite and fixed, and because the terms which express them with clearness, exactness, and precision are not in common use. The English language has for three hundred years been usurped by heretics, and been chiefly used as a medium of one or another form of heresy. In its current use it is inadequate to the expression of orthodoxy, and consequently the Catholic writer is obliged, at the risk of appearing stiff and pedantic, to make a liberal use of technical terms and scientific forms of expression, if he does not choose to leave his meaning vague and uncertain. Our Oxford converts do not in general, as far as we have seen, appear to be sufficiently aware of this; they write on as they were accustomed to write before their conversion, in very good English, it is true, but with a choice of terms which leaves us perpetually in doubt whether their thought is sound or heretical.

There is also among others than converts a mistake as to the obligations of the layman writing on theological subjects to be exact in his language. We take up a book written by a layman, by the illustrious Count de Maistre, for instance, all bristling, perhaps, with errors, and errors which become heresies in the minds of unprofessional readers, and if we complain, we are told in excuse, that the author was a man of the world, that he was not a professional theologian, and therefore was not to be expected to write with exactness. We may need, but we cannot accept, this excuse. If the layman cannot write on theological topics with exactness, both of thought and expression, he has no business to write on them at all. He who assumes the doctor's office must be held to the doctor's responsibility; and it is peculiarly important that this rule be enforced in these days of journalism and of lay-writing, when a very considerable portion of our popular literature is proceeding from the hands of the laity. In judging the *man*, we of course look

to what he probably means ; but in judging the *author*, we must hold him to what he says, — to the plain, obvious, and natural sense of his words, whether he be cleric or laic.

The tone of Mr. Capes's work is subdued, and exceedingly moderate. The author writes as if he was afraid some prim Anglican or fastidious Puseyite should suspect him of extravagance or enthusiasm. His statements are generally under the truth, and appear to the Catholic to be weak and tame. The author's motive has been a good one ; he has believed that a calm, deliberate, and reserved statement will have more weight with Protestants than one in which he suffers his Catholic heart to speak out in its own unrestrained warmth and energy. But in this we believe he is mistaken. Heretics do not in our days doubt our ability, our learning, or our logic. What they doubt is our sincerity, — that we believe our own doctrines. They look upon the intelligent Catholic defending his religion as a lawyer speaking from his brief. In a word, they doubt our honesty. Hence, what we say coolly, deliberately, in measured terms, expressly for them, has little weight with them as a body. They all feel, *all*, with here and there an exception, that they are daily and hourly professing what they know they in reality do not believe, and, judging us by themselves, they conclude it must be the same with us. They not only have no faith, but they have ceased to believe faith possible. What they are most anxious to know is, not whether good reasons can be given for our Church or not, but whether her intelligent members, men of learning, of good sense, of whole minds, do really believe her to be what she professes to be, — do really believe what they profess to believe. Asseverations of our honesty and of the firmness of our faith weigh nothing with them, for they know by their own experience that such asseverations cost nothing, — that a man who can profess what he does not really believe, can easily asseverate that he believes what he professes. They attend not to what we say, but to the unconscious manner, the unconscious look and tone, with which we say it.

Moreover, Mr. Capes, knowing the Protestant world as he does, needs not to be told that Protestants, save individual exceptions, under the influence of grace vouchsafed to lead them back to faith and unity, always put the most unfavorable construction on the words we use or the statements we make that they will bear. Candor and fair-dealing are not to be expected from them ; otherwise we should be obliged to regard them as in good faith, and if they were really in good faith they

would not remain in their Protestant communions, but would be speedily reconciled to the Church. Candor and fair-dealing on religious matters are incompatible with the nature of Protestants, and it is always folly to look for them. What we say will always be taken by them in the worst sense it can be. Our moderation will be termed lukewarmness, our candor will be taken as "damning with faint praise," and our forbearance to state our attachment to Catholicity in terms most consonant to our own feelings will be construed into our disgust, if we are converts, at the change of religion we have made. Moderation towards heretics avails nothing to win them, and is usually a wrong to our Catholic friends. He who knows Protestants well, knows that it is idle to try to speak so as to suit them. We shall always have the most favorable effect on them when we pay little regard to them, but speak out naturally, simply, and truly from our own full Catholic hearts, according to the instincts, so to speak, of our Catholic faith and love.

We see clearly enough from Mr. Capes's book, that his faith is full and firm, that his heart is Catholic to the core, and that his real estimate of Catholic life is hardly less high than ours; but he restrains himself in the utterance of his sentiments too much, and is too much afraid of appearing extravagant or enthusiastic, of speaking from his excited feelings, rather than from his sober judgment. He speaks of Catholicity too coldly, without that glow of feeling with which the child always speaks of his tender mother, the lover of his beloved, and he submits to a dissecting of her influence on his own mind and heart, and to the running of a sort of Plutarch parallel between her and Church-of-Englandism, which are to the warmth of our feelings half profane. What if we do appear extravagant, enthusiastic, to the heretical? The Apostles on the day of Pentecost appeared to the by-standers terribly extravagant and forgetful of proprieties. Some thought them drunk, filled with new wine; but three thousand were that day added to the Church. And it is rare that any, except those who appear extravagant, drunken even, to those without, have the consolation of being the instruments of adding large numbers to the faithful. Always will Catholics, filled with the spirit of their religion, and speaking and acting according to the inspirations of grace, appear to heretics and infidels to be extravagant, enthusiastic, carried away by their feelings, drunk even; for they are drunk, inebriated with the wine of the spirit. But what then? What need we care for Anglican primness, or Puseyite fastidiousness? What to us

are the notions that heretics, the enemies of God, the children of Satan, may entertain of our sayings and doings? Are we not the children of the kingdom, and shall we not run and exult to behold the bridegroom as he cometh forth from his chamber? Command us to hold our peace, and the very stones would cry out. Does not the inspired Psalmist call upon the trees to clap their hands; upon all nature, inanimate, animate, and rational, to rejoice and exult aloud? How then shall we restrain our joy when we speak of the Church, our blessed Mother, and of the graces we receive through her from her celestial Spouse, — of the sweet repose we experience, after years of wandering, in laying our head upon her maternal bosom, or feeling ourselves locked in her affectionate embrace, lest some sneering heretic or infidel shall call us extravagant, and be led to disregard our words? Just as if the joy that gushes from our hearts, the love that beams from our eyes, and speaks in every look, tone, and gesture, were not the very thing which, of all others, must most effectually touch his soul, and disarm his face of its sneer? We mean no censure upon Mr. Capes; we only wish to express, in the most forcible manner we are able, that cool, measured statements are not those the most consonant to our feelings, nor those most likely to persuade heretics that we who are converts have found in the Church all, and far more than all, we expected, or than was promised us. There is not one of us who would not find the language of the queen of Sheba to Solomon quite too cold and weak to express how much more we have found than we looked for, when we sought admission to the Catholic communion. “The word is true which I heard in my country of thy virtues and wisdom. I did not believe them that told it, until I came, and my eyes had seen, and I had proved that scarce one half of thy wisdom had been told me: thou hast exceeded thy fame with thy virtues. Happy are thy men, and happy are thy servants, who stand always before thee, and hear thy wisdom. Blessed be the Lord thy God, who hath been pleased to set thee on his throne.” *

Nevertheless, Mr. Capes sometimes forgets the restraint he imposes upon himself. The following, which is the concluding paragraph of his work, is written with deep feeling, and is very beautiful, as well as very true.

“Truly can I say with the patriarch, ‘The Lord is in this place, and I knew it not. This is no other but the house of God, and the

* 2 Paralip. ix. 5–8.

gate of heaven.' The Catholic Church *can* be nothing less than the spiritual body of Jesus Christ. Nothing less than that adorable Presence, before which the angels veil their faces, can make her what she is, to those who are within her fold. Argument is needed no longer. The scoffings of the infidel, the objections of the Protestant, the sneers of the man of the world, pass over their heads as clouds over a mountain-peak, and leave them calm and undisturbed, with their feet resting on the Rock of Ages. They *know* in whom they have believed. They have passed from speculation to action, and found that all is real, genuine, life-giving, and enduring. Such, with all my sense of the awful mysteriousness of the world which is still invisible, of the fallaciousness of human knowledge, and of the argumentative points which controversy will ever urge against the claims of the Catholic Church, — such is the result of my experience of her aspect towards those who repose upon her bosom, in order that they may gaze upon the lineaments of her countenance. As a child that rests upon its parent's bosom, pressed to her heart with a tenderness that nothing less than a mother can bestow, and from that place of peace and security looks up into her eyes, and there reads the love which is its sweetest joy, so do I watch the aspect of her who has clasped me in her arms, and sustains me that I should not fall, and know that she is indeed the *mother* of my soul. I know only one fear, the fear that my heart may be faithless to Him who has bestowed on me this unspeakable blessing; I know only one mystery, which the more I think upon it, the more incomprehensible does it appear, — the mystery of that calling which brought *me* into this home of rest, while millions and millions are still driven to and fro in the turbulent ocean of the world, without rudder and without compass, without helmsman and without anchor, to drift before the gale upon the fatal shore." — p. 72.

The thought with which this closes is often in the mind of the convert, and is a mystery which grows upon us the more we meditate on it, because, while we see and acknowledge our guilt in remaining as we did outside of the Church, we know that it was no merit of ours, it was no virtue in us, that brought us into her communion. Not to us the glory, but to the free grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

Mr. Capes first considers the influence of Catholicity in regard to intellectual freedom. We extract a paragraph or two.

"It is commonly supposed, indeed, that a man of sense and intellectual courage *cannot* believe the dogmas of Catholicism without violating the first principles of reasoning, and enslaving his judgment at the beck of a designing priesthood. So far from this being

the case, I find myself compelled to act in the very opposite direction. I cannot *help* believing the truth of Catholicism in general, nor can I perceive the slightest violation of the laws of reasoning in any one of its separate doctrines. Granting the truth of Christianity as a Divine revelation, my reason forces me to be convinced that no one form of Protestantism can *possibly* be true. So far as argument is concerned, I can see and feel the difficulties which exist in the way of the reception of the Christian religion as Divine, and even of belief in any religion whatsoever, natural or revealed; but when once the question of the origin of Christianity is settled, though I can see and feel arguments against the Church of Rome, and admit that, so far as they go, they are difficulties which must be solved, yet I can see *nothing* in favor of any doctrinal Protestantism whatsoever; and I can no more avoid believing in the exclusive claims of the Church of Rome, than I can help believing in the deductions of physical astronomy or of electricity. The argument in favor of Rome is precisely similar to the reasonings which establish the great facts of any purely human science, which is based upon probabilities, and not on mathematical certainties. On such morally proved sciences, whether physical, domestic, social, or political, the whole course of our daily existence is conducted. We neither eat, drink, move, talk, read, buy, sell, grieve, rejoice, or, in a word, act for a moment as reasonable creatures, except on the supposition that certain general ideas are true, and must be acted upon, although not one of them can be *proved* with all the strictness of a mathematical proposition. Yet no man in his senses calls this an intellectual bondage, or wonders that people can devote their whole lives to a course of conduct against which *some* difficulties can be alleged, though the balance of probabilities is decidedly in its favor.

“And just such is my experience of the effect of a belief in the infallibility of the Catholic Church on my daily moral and spiritual existence. I grant that there are some difficulties to be urged against Christianity, and that the proof of the infallibility of Rome is not a mathematical proof; but nevertheless, I cannot help perceiving that the balance of proof is undeniably in favor of Christianity and of the Catholic Church, and therefore I cannot help acting myself in accordance with that balance, and no more believe or feel that I am intellectually a slave, than when I believe that I am at this moment awake, though it is impossible to *prove* that I am not asleep and dreaming. Many people imagine that a Catholic lives and moves with a sort of sense of intellectual discomfort, with a half-admitted consciousness that he is the victim of a delusion; that he dreads the light of criticism and argument, and is afraid of having his opinions honestly and rigorously canvassed. For my own part, I can most solemnly assert, that, from the moment I entered the Catholic Church,

I felt like a man who has just shattered the fetters which have impeded his movements from his childhood. I experienced a sensation of intellectual *relief*, to which I believe every conscientious Protestant to be an utter stranger. So far from feeling as if I had renounced the great privileges of humanity, and subjugated myself to a debasing servitude, I was conscious that now, for the first time, my faculties had fair play, that I was no longer in bondage to shams, forms of speech, pious frauds, exploded fables, youthful prejudices, or the impudent fabrications of baseless authority. Reason, like a young eagle for the first time floating forth from its mountain nest, and trusting itself with no faltering wing to the boundless expanse of ether around, above, and below, rejoiced in her new-found powers, and looked abroad upon the mighty universe of material and immaterial being, with that unflinching gaze with which the soul dares to look, when conscious that the God who made her has, at length, set her free. To tell me, at such a time, that I was enslaving my reason by that very act which enabled her to assert her supremacy, or that I was violating truth and common sense, by embracing the most *probable* of two momentous alternatives, I should have counted a folly not worthy to be refuted. And such have I felt it to this day. I am conscious that I have embraced one vast, harmonious system, which alone, of all the religions of mankind, is precisely what it pretends to be, and nothing less and nothing more. I behold before me a mighty body of doctrine and practice, self-consistent in all its parts, cohering by rigid logical deductions, and held together by certain moral laws, which are as universally applied in every conceivable contingency, as is the physical law of gravity throughout the visible universe. Complicated and varied as it is, and diverse in nature as are the many elements which go to make up its far-stretching whole, I can detect no flaw in the structure, no incompatibility of one feature with another, no tendency to decay, no token of failure in accomplishing all that it really professes to accomplish. I find every thing to charm and invigorate my intellect. If I am enthralled, it is in a bondage to truth; if I am fascinated, it is by the spell of faultless beauty." — pp. 6-8.

The Protestant, having himself no faith in his sect, concludes that we have none in the Church, and understanding very well that one is not free who is bound to believe whatever a sect, which neither is nor is believed to be infallible, teaches or commands him to believe, he concludes that we must both be and feel ourselves in mental bondage. But he falls in this into the sophism called by logicians *transitio a genere ad genus*, or concluding from one order to another, forgetting that the conclusion, to be valid, must always be in the same order with the prem-

ises. The Church is not in the sectarian order, is not simply the sect claiming infallibility and supreme authority ; and Catholics believing their Church infallible and supreme differ essentially from Protestants disbelieving their sect, and well aware that it is fallible and liable to command what is false and wicked. Supposing the Church to be what she claims to be, there is no mental bondage in being held to believe whatever she teaches, and supposing us really to believe that she is what she claims to be, we cannot feel ourselves in mental bondage in being so held. The difficulty the Protestant imagines for us grows out of his supposition that the Church is for us what his sect is for him, and that at bottom we no more believe her than he does it. But this, luckily, is his mistake. Believing with us does not mean professing to believe, and actually doubting. We believe our Church infallible, Divinely commissioned, speaking in the name of God, and therefore that in believing and obeying her we are believing and obeying God, which is not slavery, but freedom ; for God is truth and justice, our Maker, and our rightful Sovereign. Hence, Mr. Capes only asserts what reason itself asserts, when he says that one never enjoys, never knows, mental freedom till he becomes a Catholic. In becoming a Catholic we throw off the despotism of opinion, of passion, of caprice, and submit ourselves to the authority of God, and have his truth, his veracity, his word, as our authority for believing. We are freed from bondage, emancipated, and admitted as citizens into the commonwealth of Christ, and made partakers of the liberty of the children of God. On this point every convert's experience fully confirms all, and more than all, Mr. Capes has said.

But while we accept heartily all Mr. Capes says in favor of the freedom possessed and felt by the Catholic, we cannot help thinking that he has made some concessions to his former brethren which he was not required to make, and which may be turned with considerable force against him. He concedes that there are real difficulties in the way of admitting the truth of Christianity itself, and also in the way of admitting Catholicity as its true and only form. He makes the question, aside from the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, between Christianity and infidelity, and between Catholicity and Protestantism, to be a balancing of probabilities, and concedes that in becoming a Catholic he was only "embracing the most probable of two momentous alternatives." Here is evidently an admission that unbelief and heresy are probable, although, by far, less probable than Cath-

olicity. We are not prepared to make this admission, for in our judgment, and, we think we may safely say, in the judgment of the Church, heresy and unbelief are both improbable, with not the least shadow of probability in their favor, and that every argument that can be adduced in favor of either implies its falsity ; that is to say, each is self-contradictory, and is refuted by itself. Unbelief is a negative quantity, wholly unintelligible save by a positive quantity ; for pure negation, being nothing, can be no object of thought. No man can make a denial but by virtue of some affirmative principle, and every affirmative principle is opposed to unbelief. Every man who denies Christianity must affirm something in its place, and the principles he must affirm in order to affirm any thing in its place will, if he remains faithful to them in examining the motives of credibility, compel him to assent to the truth of Christianity. All heresy is self-refuted. It asserts too much to be infidel, and too little to be Christian. If it follows out its denials, it falls into total unbelief, which is refuted by the necessity of believing something as the condition of disbelieving ; if it follows out its positive affirmations, it must accept Catholicity, for Catholic truth is a unity, is one and indivisible, and, embrace what aspect of it you will, you must, in order to be self-consistent, embrace the whole of it down to the holy-water-pot and the blessing of asses, for either it is all false, or, as St. Paul says, "every creature of God may be blessed by prayer." Moreover, if the author concedes that Catholicity is, to human reason, simply the most probable of two alternatives, an acute opponent may force him to a conclusion he may find it inconvenient to adopt. There are eminent Catholic divines who, uncensured, maintain that the law to bind must be not only probably, but certainly, promulgated, and therefore, where we have not certainty, — objective certainty we mean, — we are free to follow the probable instead of the more probable. Even on principles, then, which the author cannot pronounce uncatholic, he might have innocently embraced the other alternative, refused to have become a Catholic, and have without sin remained, even after he had examined the motives of credibility, in his heresy or infidelity !

The author, no doubt, thinks that he escapes this difficulty by asserting that faith is the gift of God, and that certainty, not arrived at by reason, is attained by virtue of this supernatural gift. But he appears to us to mistake the real question involved in his remarks. Undoubtedly, faith, in the theological sense, subjectively considered, is the gift of God, and it is only by

this gift that we are able to believe with that firm adhesion of the mind which is demanded by the virtue of faith. But this is nothing to the purpose. The *donum fidei* is not an objective revelation of the truth, nor does it add any thing to the objective evidence or certainty of the faith; it is simply an infused habit of faith, giving to the mind a supernatural facility, aptitude, and strength in believing what God reveals and the Church proposes. Yet, in discussing, for those who do not believe, the motives of credibility, we can make no account of this infused habit, because those who do not believe have it not, and because we cannot expect them to believe that they can have it, till we have convinced their reason that our Church is the Church of God. God forbid that we should, in the slightest degree, overlook the fact that faith is a supernatural gift, or the necessity of grace to incline the will and to illumine the understanding to see and appreciate the evidences of the truth of our holy religion. But our question here regards the certainty of our religion *in se*, not its certainty in our intellect; its objective certainty, not as addressed to the supernaturalized intellect, but as addressed to natural reason, and as the object, not of divine, but of human faith. Certainly human faith does not of itself suffice, but human faith is all that we seek to produce by arguments, and all that any body ever pretends is produced by the motives of credibility. The real question here is, Do the motives of credibility, duly considered, establish to right reason the objective certainty of the Catholic religion, or only its probable truth, making out, as Lardner says of the credibility of the Gospel history, not certainty indeed, but very high probability? Proposed in this form, although grace is requisite to subjective certainty, to the firm adhesion of the mind to the truth, no Catholic can hesitate a moment as to the answer to be given. The evidence of our Church, taken at its just weight, presents a case, not merely of very high probability, but of absolute certainty, against which reason can bring no reasonable or logical objection; and the man who has examined that evidence is both logically and morally bound to believe what she teaches and to do what she commands. That is to say, the motives of credibility establish the truth of Catholicity, with all the certainty reason ever has or can require, and leave no room for a reasonable doubt; and where there is no room for reasonable doubt, there is not merely objective probability, but objective certainty. We must say all this, or concede that our religion does not respond to all the demands of

reason, and that the grace by virtue of which we elicit the act of faith is a dispensing with reason, instead of being its supernatural elevation, which is the radical error of modern Evangelicalism. *Gratia præsupponit naturam*. Grace retains reason and elevates it above itself; it does not supersede it, and require us to believe without or in opposition to its dictates. In believing Catholicity natural reason is fully satisfied, finds all her demands complied with, so that she never finds herself disappointed, or in any degree opposed to what through grace is believed. This the author himself shows, and it is on this ground that he asserts that the Catholic not only feels, but actually is, mentally free. But this would not be true, if the reason saw only probability, or could see room for a doubt as to the objective truth of Catholicity.

The author has been misled, most likely, by his Oxford logic, which teaches that mathematical certainty is the only genuine certainty, and that moral certainty, or certainty by virtue of extrinsic evidence, is only probability. Yet he holds that probability is sufficient in the case. So Mr. Newman, in his *Essay on Development*, concedes that the infallibility of the Church can be only probably established, and yet contends that we may be infallibly certain of the doctrines we believe on her authority; that is, we may have infallible certainty by virtue of an authority which is only probably infallible! Hence, when we tell Protestants that they have no infallible certainty in the case of the doctrines which they profess to deduce from the Holy Scriptures, because they have only probable reasons for believing that the Scriptures are inspired, and only probable reasons that they have in their doctrines rightly seized their sense, we are altogether wrong, and must concede to Protestants, after all, that, so far as concerns the truths contained in the written word, they stand on as good grounds as we, and that all the advantage we have over them by means of an infallible Church is that of an authority to preserve and define the unwritten word, and to watch over the developments of Christian doctrine, and from time to time to decide between the true developments and the false, anathematizing the latter as heresy, and taking the former up into the body of doctrine, and commanding them to be received as dogmas of faith! But, although this logic may be very convenient at Oxford, and very necessary indeed to all Protestants not confirmed rationalists, we hardly need it in the Catholic Church. As Catholics we can abide by the old rule, that the conclusion follows the

weaker premise, and maintain that the certainty by an authority can never transcend the certainty of the authority itself. We concede that the evidence which establishes to human reason the Divine authority of the Church is extrinsic, but we do not concede that probability is sufficient for belief in that authority, nor that probability is all that this sort of evidence gives. A thing may be established as certainly by extrinsic as by intrinsic evidence, and moral or historical certainty in its order is every whit as high, as infallible, as mathematical certainty. It is rendered, by the extrinsic evidence in the case, as infallibly certain that our Lord wrought miracles, as it is that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and can be doubted only on the assumption of principles which render problematical the highest form of metaphysical certainty. Mr. Capes admits, or rather contends, that we have for the Church the highest degree of certainty, except mathematical certainty, that the human reason ever has ; we must then hold him quite inexcusable for conceding that her truth is only a probability, and that in embracing her one is only choosing the more probable of two alternatives. It may be prudent to choose the more probable of two alternatives, but it is entirely to mistake the evidence in the case to suppose that we have nothing to propose to the unelevated reason but a choice between probabilities. It may seem all very wise to him to make liberal concessions to heresy, but we must look well to it that we do not make them at the expense of orthodoxy, or that, in our generosity to Protestants, we do not forget to be just to Catholics. It is not meet to rob the children of their bread and give it unto dogs. However, we do not suppose the real thought the author had in his mind is necessarily unsound, but he has not taken sufficient care to define and express it with exactness and precision.

The author, having spoken of mental freedom under Catholicity, makes some excellent remarks on the influence of Catholicity in developing and strengthening the intellect. He proceeds to give his experience and his views of its influence on modern civilization, and from this portion of his work we must be allowed to make a brief extract.

“ On the other hand, how far the course of modern civilization is impeded by the reception of Catholicism, is a question which is by no means easy of solution. From all that I can judge by experience of its effects on myself and on others, I should be disposed to say that, while it tends to the culture of the intelligence, and to

the development of all the faculties of the mind to the highest possible extent, it would lead its disciples to march with a somewhat hesitating step in what is commonly termed the civilization of the age. How far it would discourage purely intellectual cultivation *apart* from religion, is a question with which I have nothing to do, as I am speaking only of what are the effects of a sincere belief of Catholic doctrines, and an earnest practice of Catholic duties, upon the thoughts and life of man. While, then, I see every token that there is not a faculty in the soul, whether it be the pure reasoning faculty, the imagination, the taste, the love of extensive and accurate knowledge, or that which we term common sense, which Catholicism does not tend directly to stimulate in the healthiest and most effective possible manner; — while I see that its sons may be impelled by a burning enthusiasm to triumph throughout the whole domain of human studies, and to bend every acquisition of mental power to the service of God and the salvation of souls; — while the Catholic will labor with unwearying energies, and with the highest abilities, in the fields of mathematics, history, philosophy, science, poetry, or fiction, just as in former days the whole course of European civilization was directed and impelled by the devoted sons of the Church; — at the same time it is impossible to overlook the fact, that so far as our civilization depends on the pursuit of gain, and the restless strivings of ambition, so far it would suffer in the hands of devout Catholics. There exists in the Catholic faith a power to detach the affections from *every thing* on this side of the grave, which necessarily makes men take matters somewhat too easily to be in harmony with the notions of the present epoch. A pious Catholic, to a certain extent, sees no future, except that which commences after death. He lives for the present hour and for eternity. He has a greater tendency to take the affairs of life as they come, and to enjoy what he actually has in possession, without putting himself very much out of the way to add to his store, than is usually found among ardent and business-like Protestants. Taken *on the whole*, I do not believe that Catholic merchants, Catholic tradesmen, Catholic travellers, or Catholic bankers, will ever so successfully compete with men of the world of similar occupations as to make as large fortunes as their Protestant competitors, or to exercise as powerful an influence upon the economic progress of the age. We never shall, taken as a body, be the first in the nation as men of business; and I question whether we could ever be *first* (though we might be *second*) in the study of those physical sciences with whose cultivation the characteristic movement of our time is so intimately bound up. It is undeniable, that Catholics do not *care* so much as others for those objects which furrow the sober and laborious Englishman's brow, and bend him down with premature old age. Not only the general influence of

their religion, as a spiritual system, but the nature of their belief in the excellence of poverty, and of the monastic and celibate life, and in the pernicious nature of excessive carefulness, and of a melancholy, anxious spirit, tends to make them sit down contented amidst reverses, and comparatively careless about worldly success, where other men would strain every nerve to struggle against the assaults of fortune, and to provide against every possible future contingency." — pp. 11, 12.

Here, again, with what the author means we fully and heartily agree, but we can hardly accept what he says. How is it possible to regard Catholicity as likely to impede modern civilization, since modern civilization is undeniably the product of the Catholic religion? Indeed, Catholicity is the only thing that can save civilization, and prevent the modern world from lapsing into barbarism and savagism. The author himself holds and proves this, as is clear from the remarks which follow the passage extracted. Why, then, does he intimate that it will impede rather than advance our civilization? Simply because he takes the pains neither to think nor to express himself with accuracy. What he means by modern civilization is not modern civilization, but practices and tendencies in modern nations, especially Protestant nations, directly opposed to it, namely, the neglect of the higher intellectual culture, worldly-mindedness, selfishness, exclusive cultivation of the physical sciences, and excessive devotion to wealth and mere material prosperity. Mr. Capes is quite right in supposing the Catholic religion favors unworldliness, cherishes the intellectual rather than the mere physical sciences, checks the inordinate pursuit of wealth, and reconciles men to poverty; he is quite right, too, in regarding this as one of its recommendations; but by what hallucination he should have been led to regard it for this reason as less friendly than Protestantism to modern civilization, is more than we are able to divine. Certainly, he is too clear a thinker to confound with our civilization the causes in operation amongst us which tend incessantly, as he himself admits, to destroy it.

We regret that he has not expressed himself with more accuracy, for he cannot be ignorant that the question between Catholicity and Protestantism is no longer a theological or religious question. It is now in reality a purely social question. As a religion, as a medium of worshipping God and saving the soul, Protestants, throughout the world, have virtually yielded the ground to Catholicity, and no longer dispute her claims. They feel that, for men who would give their souls to

God, and live only for heaven, the Catholic is the best religion ; indeed, the only religion adapted to their purpose. They shift the question, and now oppose our religion, though excellent in regard to heaven, as abominable in regard to earth. Admirable as a religion, it is execrable as a civilization. They pretend that it enslaves the mind, crushes the spirit, and fits men only to be mere tools and drudges ; that it robs man of the nobility of his nature, forbids him to assert his manhood, and unfits him to bear a manly part in the progress of society. They institute comparisons between Protestant nations and Catholic, and tell us that in the former all is life and activity, energy and improvement ; industry and commerce flourish, wealth accumulates, social and material well-being are cared for and incessantly advanced ; while in the latter indolence prevails, a general want of thrift is manifest, enterprise sleeps, and every one is contented to remain where and what he was born. All this is false, no doubt, but nothing is more certain than that the notion is entertained by Protestants, and even by some Catholics, that Protestant nations surpass in civilization and temporal prosperity Catholic nations, and that the cause of it is to be sought in the difference between Protestantism and Catholicity. It is on the ground that their pretended religion is more favorable than the Catholic religion to civilization and temporal prosperity, that Protestants now seek to place the controversy with us. It will not do, then, in these times, for us to begin with the apparent concession that our religion is unfavorable to modern civilization. No matter how correct may be our meaning, we must not, even in words, have the least appearance of conceding it, for a candid interpretation of our language is the last thing we are to expect from Protestants. As little value as we set on the earth and things of time, we must not concede even this world to Protestants, although they may be willing to concede us heaven in exchange. They must have nothing, in this world or the next, at our hands, but what they are honestly entitled to, which is just nothing at all ; and we must be ready to maintain against them that ours is the only religion favorable to man's true interests, whether for time or for eternity.

If Protestants retained, as a body, any real reverence for spiritual things, if they were not generally ready "to jump the world to come" if they can make sure of this world, we would waive the question they raise, for a religion is not to be tested by its relations to material prosperity, but by its adapta-

tion to the end of all religion, namely, the glory of God in the redemption and sanctification of souls ; but as they can be made to feel only on the material side of their being, as much as we despise the things of the world, we hold it important for them, not for us, to meet them on their own chosen ground, — the last that remains to them, — and prove to them that, setting aside all considerations of its advantages in regard to another world, the belief and practice of our religion are the only sure means of advancing civilization, and securing and promoting man's social and material well-being. Mr. Capes has himself proved this unanswerably, and we need but refer the reader to his luminous pages on this subject. That our religion detaches its followers from the world, and tends to make them indifferent to material goods, is, no doubt, true, and it is because this is true that it is favorable to civilization and material prosperity. It checks selfishness and increases charity, and charity makes us solicitous for the welfare of others just in proportion as it renders us indifferent to our own. Hence it is that selfishness always retards, while charity advances, civilization. It checks eagerness in the pursuit of wealth, and therefore extravagance in expenditures. All the selfish passions tend to overshoot themselves, and too great eagerness in the pursuit always misses its aim. Riches are not to be estimated by the amount produced, but by the amount produced beyond consumption. No matter how many fold you increase the productions of a people ; if you increase their expenditures in the same proportion, you add nothing to their riches. Protestantism, by destroying men's faith in a future life, by depriving the people of the relish for simple spiritual pleasures, always to be had at a trifling expense, confines them to sensual pleasures, which are always expensive. Its very worldly-mindedness and craving for sensual gratification induce an expenditure for pomp and show, for feeding pampered appetites, for sustaining rivalries in houses and furniture, places and honors, which brings consumption in Protestant countries closer on the heels of production than it is ever brought in any Catholic country. Even admitting, what is doubtful, that more is actually produced by a Protestant than by a Catholic people, the latter, placing their felicity, not in sensual, but in spiritual pleasures, caring little for worldly show, and contented with a cheaper and more simple style of living, are sure to have always on hand a larger surplus beyond their wants for consumption, and therefore to be always actually richer. This is evinced by the fact, that one can live in the same grade of

society in a Catholic country at less than one half the expense that is required in England or the United States, the two most favorable Protestant instances to be selected.

If from the accumulation of wealth, which is greater under Catholicity than under Protestantism, — of course we are not speaking of a Catholic people, like the Irish, ruled and oppressed by a Protestant people, — we pass to social and political well-being, we shall find the advantage is all on the side of Catholicity. The tendency of all Protestant legislation is to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer, if we may judge from the example of England, and from our own, and the worst form of aristocracy, a moneyed aristocracy, the aristocracy of money-bags, stocks, and spindles, is its favorite. The poor are ground into the dust, the rich escape. The subordinate in villany is punished, the principal usually escapes. In Catholic countries, — really Catholic countries we mean, — the constitution of the state and society are respected; but legislation and administration, filled with an unworldly and charitable spirit, tend to protect the poor and helpless, and punishment falls with its greatest severity on the proud and lordly oppressor, on the greatest villain. Austria punishes the chiefs of the Hungarian rebellion, but spares the subordinates. Liberty does not consist in fanciful theories, in passionate declamations against monarchy or aristocracy, and the loud vociferation of the words Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, nor in well-planned and successful Jacobinical revolutions, which overturn the throne and altar, and set up the despotism of unbelief and the tyranny of the mob, but in the supremacy of law, in the maintenance of wise and just government, however constituted, and in orderly submission to its authority. That which tends to repress turbulent passions, to wean the affections from this world, to make men unambitious, indifferent to their political or social position, self-denying, disinterested, charitable, contented with spiritual occupations and pleasures, must, then, be that which will most effectually serve the cause of liberty, by drying up the source of the dangers to which it is exposed, weakening the selfishness from which the disposition to tyrannize or to rebel against legitimate authority arises, and taking from tyranny and rebellion their motive and excuse. As a matter of fact, in liberty and real temporal prosperity the Catholic nations of Europe, notwithstanding the obstacles thrown in their way for three hundred years by heretical neighbours, infidel governments, and infidel mobs, are far in advance of the Protestant nations, and have

in them a vitality, a recuperative energy, that we should in vain look for in any country where Protestantism predominates. This should be so, for it is an irreversible law that the goods of this world always fly those who pursue them for themselves, and overtake those who despise and fly them for God's sake.

Mr. Capes has some profound and excellent remarks on the social crisis that has approached or is approaching in England, and shows clearly that the great social problem of the age, pressing every day more and more urgently for a solution, can be solved only by Catholicity. The great question, which Socialists misconceive and are impotent to answer, and which they conceal under their demand of "the right to labor," is, say what we will, the great social question of our day. It is a fearful question, and cannot much longer be blinked, or left to the management of Socialists and Communists. The Protestant system of industry and economy has predominated in the modern world since the peace of Utrecht, in 1713, and it has brought the greater portion of the civilized world to the very brink of ruin. It has reduced the price of labor to the very minimum of human subsistence, and given us an immense operative class, — millions of men and women, able and willing to work for their bread, who are starving because there is no work to be had. Such is the terrible fact that stares us in the face, and affords us so sad a comment on the boasted progress of industry and material prosperity under Protestantism. This fact has to be met and disposed of, or it will dispose of the modern world. Till some practical solution is found, some effectual remedy is applied, we must expect socialist and communist movements to continue, and society to be constantly menaced with total disruption. Nothing renders men more desperate, more ready to make a revolution, than the gnawings of hunger. If you wish to be free from revolutions, take care that the people find employment, and experience no lack of provender. Mr. Capes has not gone into this question at so great a length as we wish he had, but in what he has said he shows that he understands it, has deeply pondered it, and sees whence the remedy is to come. That the Church has in her institutions, if she be cordially accepted, a sure and even a speedy remedy for the evil, he shows conclusively. We feel it necessary to add, to guard against misapprehension, that, though the institutions on which he appears to rely as the institutions of the Church are as highly esteemed by us as by him, yet it is necessary to bear in mind that the Church does not do her work

by virtue of them, but they accomplish their ends by virtue of her. In other words, the Catholic doctrine in regard to poverty, monastic establishments, and vows of celibacy on the part of the clergy and religious, if they could obtain out of the Church, would not, as parts of Protestantism, accomplish any thing good, and it is not they that give to Catholicity its power to remedy social evils, but it is it that gives to them their power and efficiency to that end. The Church is one, a unity, not a union, and its power and efficiency proceed from its centre, from the Holy Ghost who dwells in her, not from an aggregate of parts. When we say monastic establishments, vows of celibacy, &c., have this or that tendency, we must always bear in mind that it is not they that contribute so much power to the Church, but she that contributes their power for good to them.

There are several other points in Mr. Capes's work on which we should like to comment, and some few more inaccuracies of expression we should like to point out; but perhaps we have found fault enough, and have already said enough to incline many of our readers to think us far more ready to censure than to laud. Mr. Capes is an able man, a zealous Catholic, who cheerfully devotes his time, his talents, and his fortune to the cause of Catholicity. His errors arise from his retaining his Oxford philosophy, from his partiality for Mr. Newman's theory of development, his wish to write in a popular style, and from the low state of Catholic theology in Great Britain. From the latter proceeds his twaddle about conscientious Protestants, and wishy-washiness on the subject of exclusive salvation; both are uncalled for, and, if they do no harm, they do no good. We cannot understand why a Catholic writer should be exceedingly anxious to prove the worthlessness of his own religion, and give to those without assurances that they can be saved without embracing it. There is no reason in the world, that we can understand, why every popular scribbler on Catholic theology should be putting his gloss on the solemn definitions of the Church in her general councils. She has defined, that out of the Church no one can ever be saved, and why can we not be content to stop where she stops? Mr. Capes does not hesitate to call Anglicanism an absurdity, to deny it all religious character, or to assert, if he means what he says, the impossibility of faith out of the Church; how, then, can he concede the possibility of salvation out of the Church, since "without faith it is impossible to please God"? Suppose the gloss he

and others put upon the definition of the Church be allowable, it can be allowable in the case of no one who can know that it is allowable, for such a one has an opportunity to hear the Church, and cannot be in invincible ignorance. No man can be invincibly ignorant of what is necessary, *necessitate medii*, to salvation, for salvation is possible to all men. A man must have this, — and faith is always *in re*, never *in voto*, — before the plea of invincible ignorance can excuse him. But we will do Mr. Capes the justice to say, that he is on this point less latitudinarian than English Catholic writers generally, and shows evidently that he does not believe much in the alleged good faith and sanctity of Protestants. He seems to wish to drop the qualification so earnestly insisted upon by those kind souls, who are afraid that they may wound the feelings or alarm the consciences of “their separated brethren.”

We are glad to find that Mr. Capes insists earnestly on the great fact, that faith is the gift of God, but we are not quite sure that he is right in calling this gift, received in baptism, a special *faculty*. It is not a faculty, but an infused habit, and imparts no new faculty to the soul, but simply elevates or supernaturizes an existing faculty.

But enough of this. Notwithstanding the faults we have found, we place a high value on this work, and have read it with great interest and satisfaction. It will be widely read, and will have a good influence on the courage and tone of English and American Catholics. It is not as bold and energetic as we could wish it, but is far more so than the productions of English Catholics during the last century and the beginning of the present. We have, unhappily, been forced to find fault with nearly all the works that have reached us from the Oxford converts. Mr. Faber is the only one of the converts whose writings we are aware of having seen, whom we have had no occasion to criticize. What we have seen from him is written in a true Catholic spirit, is Catholic to the core. Nevertheless, we have found some noble tendencies in all these converts. They nearly all seem to be free from the common English distrust of the Papacy, and if they have any errors, they are not those of the school of Charles Butler. They do not appear to think Catholicity would be improved by being remodelled after the Anglican Establishment, nor are they afraid to say their beads, or ashamed to invoke the saints, and venerate sacred images and relics. They do not appear to think that Catholicity should be one thing for Englishmen and

another for Italians, and they appear to feel that their religion is really *Catholic*.

We have heretofore spoken of the freer and bolder tone that is beginning to be assumed by English Catholics ; there is decidedly less namby-pambyism among them, less of that truckling and servile spirit, so incompatible with the freedom and dignity of our faith, and less of that striving to conciliate and to avoid displeasing heretics, lest our goods should be confiscated or our throats cut, hardly to be expected in the members of a Church that teaches men that in dying they may conquer the world ; and we attribute this, under God, in some degree, to the accession of converts from Anglicanism, but mainly to the influx of Irish Catholics. The Church in England, as in this country, increases by emigration from Ireland, and it is from this source that English Catholicity has derived chiefly its courage to speak in bolder tones and stronger language. And this not only because a large portion of the Catholic population are Irish, but *poor* Irish. Your Catholic aristocracy, save individual exceptions, have too many worldly relations, and too many connections with the dominant heretical society, to permit the missionary to rely upon them with much confidence, and they will always, in consideration of their rank and large possessions, be disposed to temporize, and to give up all of their religion that can possibly be given up without giving up the whole. We regard it as a very great blessing to our own country, that at the present moment the great majority of our Catholic population are poor, and poor Irish. Our Catholicity will thus have a healthier tone, and rest on a far more solid basis, humanly speaking, than if it prevailed only among the native-born population, and the wealthier and more distinguished families. What might at first view seem against us is really in our favor, and we really feel more joy, other things being equal, in the conversion of a poor man or a poor woman, than in that of a rich man or a fine lady. The poor, they who have but few ties that bind them to the world, are more devoted to the truth, love their religion more for its own sake, care less for appearances, and are less afraid of having the plain truth told to their heretical neighbours. The Irish have their faults,—no man pretends to deny it,—and who has not faults ? But Almighty God seems to have reserved to them the special mission of restoring to the faith the nations that speak the English language, and they seem to us to be peculiarly fitted for its performance. If, then, we mark a decided improvement in

the tone and feelings of Catholics in England and in this country during the last half-century, let us, who are of the old English stock, not forget to give the honor where, under God, it is due, — to the piety, the zeal, and the steadfastness of the poor Irish emigrants. And let it console them in some measure for the sufferings of poor, oppressed Ireland, that they are, by Divine Providence, made the instrument of building up the Church in England and the United States, and of the salvation of millions of souls.

ART. IV. — *The Mercersburg Review*. Mercersburg, Pa. May, 1850.

IN his number for May, the Mercersburg Reviewer attempts to defend his doctrine from the charges we preferred against it in our Review for April last. He asserts that the pantheistic consequences we drew from his premises are not warranted, and repeats his main objection to what he improperly, and in very bad taste, terms *Romanism*, that is, Catholicity.

We expected as much ; for we did not flatter ourselves that he would at once submit to the Church, and we did not doubt his sincere intention to be a Christian, which, of course, he could not be, if his doctrine involved the consequences we alleged. But the simple denial of those consequences is not enough ; he must show that he can so interpret his doctrine as to escape them, and that, when he so interprets it, he is able to distinguish it from, and oppose it to, Catholic faith and theology. He himself, in his January number, reduced the whole controversy between the Church and all classes of her opponents to the question between her and his specific form of Protestantism, and virtually conceded, that, if his specific form of Protestantism is untenable, her claims as the infallible Church of God, out of which there is no salvation, must be admitted. Since the presumption is always in favor of the Church, as prior occupant, his business was to prove his doctrine, and to prove it, not only in so far as coincident with hers, but in so far as distinguished from and opposed to hers. If he has not done this, he has done nothing to his purpose, and we are free, by his own concession, to conclude the Church against him.

In our reply to the Reviewer, as our readers will remember,

we analyzed his doctrine, and found that it teaches, among other things, — 1. The supernatural object of faith is in the subject, not out of it ; 2. The supernatural does not *wholly* transcend the natural ; and, 3. Faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. If he holds these principles, we contended, — 1. He necessarily denies the object of faith, for whatever is in the subject, not out of it, is subject, not object, and therefore he denies faith itself ; for where there is no object to be believed, there can be no act of believing. 2. He denies the proper supernatural, and therefore Christianity as a supernatural revelation, and then Christianity itself ; for it is a contradiction in terms to call that supernatural which does not wholly transcend the sphere of the natural. And 3.. He denies faith itself, again, by confounding faith with science ; for the immediate apprehension of the truth of the object or intrinsic truth of a proposition is knowledge, not faith. The three principles, or rather the first two, for he is silent as to the last, the Reviewer reaffirms in his answer ; but he denies the consequences we drew from them. He might, as it seems to us, just as well deny that two and two are four.

The reasoning by which the Reviewer attempts to escape these fatal consequences is to us not very clear, or easy to comprehend. The author has apparently a great aversion to clear, distinct, and definite statements, and follows a species of logic which is more convenient than conclusive, and which allows him to conclude any proposition he chooses, if he only contrives to assert somewhere, on some subject, something which is not false. But we shall do our best to understand him, and to reply fairly and pertinently to his real thought.

The first charge against the Reviewer is, that, by placing the object in the subject, and denying it to be real, save as concreted “ in the thinking and willing of single minds,” as he expresses himself, he denies the object itself, because if in the subject, it is not object at all. To this he replies, “ We still say, however, that there is no truth or law *in the world of mind* under a purely objective form.” (p. 317.) *In the world of mind*, that is, in private thought and will, as existing in them, agreed ; but that is a mere truism, and not the question. The question is, Do you, or do you not, admit any purely objective reality, any object really existing, *a parte rei*, independent of *our* thinking and willing ? “ Intelligence and will are needed to make room for such existence, and to bring it actually to pass.” (Ibid.) Room for its existence “ in the world of mind,”

that is, in intelligence and will, certainly ; for that is a truism again, but not *ad rem*. Are human intelligence and will needed to make room for the existence of truth, as reality, as something existing *in re* ? “ Truth exists, as truth, only by being known. Blot out all knowledge, all consciousness, all thought, and you blot out all truth at the same time. Intelligence is the light in which it reveals itself, the very form in which it becomes *real*.” (Ibid.) Real as a fact of intelligence ? Agreed, again ; but that is not to the purpose, and is also a mere truism, for it is only saying that what is not known is not known. But does truth as an objective reality exist only by being known, or has it no existence *a parte rei*, till it is a fact of human intelligence ? Your meaning, if meaning you have, or if you are saying any thing to the purpose, is, that it does not so exist. Then you concede that you hold the principle, that the object is in the subject, not out of it ; therefore is subject, not object, as we have alleged. Pray, tell us, then, if truth is unreal, a pure abstraction, while unknown, how it can be an object of knowledge at all, or how there can be an act of knowledge where there is no cognizable or intelligible object ; that is, how there can be any truth at all.

“ God is at once object and subject, in the most universal sense. He is the absolute union of both.” (p. 318.) You must mean by this either that God is at once the *human* subject — the only subject in question — and its object ; or that he is, in regard to himself, at once subject and object, that is, the adequate object of his own intellect. If you mean the former, you are a pantheist ; if the latter, it is true, but not to the purpose. By subject in this controversy, the Reviewer very well knows, unless he is wholly ignorant of modern philosophy, is meant the human soul, the thinking and willing subject we ourselves are, and by object, that which is distinguished from it. Subject and object in God are identical, for he is *actus purissimus*, most pure act. But because they are identical in him, do you say therefore they are identical in us ? Whence does this follow ? Are we God, and like him the adequate object of our own intellect ? “ And so, then, in the constitution of the universe under God, object and subject can never fall absolutely asunder, but are required always to go together as joint factors in the determination of all proper *reality* in the world.” (Ibid.) If this is at all to the purpose, it asserts that, in like manner as subject and object are one in God, so are they in us. This confirms our assertion that the Reviewer

places the object in the subject, or identifies them. But if so, then we are God, and the Reviewer unwittingly reasserts the very autotheism he disclaims,—evident also from the further fact that he makes all the “proper reality in the world” the result of the joint operations of subject and object. But here is another difficulty. Reality is the result of their action as joint factors. Then they, regarded in themselves, are not real; then they are mere abstractions, mere possibilities; then they are incapable of action, and nothing can result from them; then there can be no reality, and nullism, which we before charged upon the Reviewer’s doctrine, follows as a necessary consequence. Will the Reviewer explain to us how his reasoning obviates the consequences we have before drawn from his premises?

But the Reviewer adds, that he does not mean to understand his doctrine in such sense as to subordinate truth and law to the power of individual thought and will, as though truth and law might be considered the product of men themselves. Pray, then, what is the meaning of all you have been saying, and of your objection to us, that we place the object out of the subject, and hold it to be independent of us? “Men make neither truth nor law.” Indeed! And yet you accuse us of heresy, because we hold truth exists *a parte rei*, and is proposed objectively to our apprehension, and because we do not recognize man’s autonomy in constituting the law which he is morally bound to obey! Have you not said that “truth exists, as truth,” that is, as a reality, “only by being known”? Have you not said that “the law is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects,” — that “mind thus by its very constitution is required to be *autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of the law itself*,” — and that “only as the law is willed, freely embraced, affirmed, constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, *so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act* virtually and deed, can there be any . . . morality or religion”? (p. 316.) Here is what you say, and nothing you say inconsistent with this can be entertained. If you choose to contradict yourself, that is not our business.

“Men,” says the Reviewer, “make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute *necessity* beyond their will, and *underlie* the very order from which they spring. But still truth and law *actualize* themselves in the world, become concrete, and thus *real* for men, only as they are incorporated with their life

and pass over in this way from a purely objective character to a character which is at the same time subjective and individual." (Ibid.) Concede all this, which is no more than every autotheist or pantheist says, it amounts to nothing. The Reviewer supposes it is possible to assert an objective world independent of our thinking and willing, and yet to maintain that this objective world, considered apart from our thinking and willing, is only a pure abstraction, and is real only as we think and will it, or, what is the same thing, as it is concreted "in the thinking and willing of single minds." But such an objective world is no real world at all,—has no existence *a parte rei*, and is at best only a mode or affection of the subject; for we never cease to repeat to him,—and we wish we could induce him to take notice of what we say,—that a pure abstraction is a sheer nullity. The Reviewer is misled by his German metaphysics, which teach him that the form of the object in both the intellectual world and the moral is supplied by the subject. He understands well enough, what we were not aware any body denied, that, in order to a fact of human life, subject and object must in some way come together, — that there must be a real mediation between them; but he supposes — and here is his primal error — that the mediation must come from the side of the subject, and not from the side of the object, and hence he concludes, that, if the object be conceived as out of the subject and independent of it, existing really, or *a parte rei*, there can be no real mediation between them, — that they can never come really together; for the subject obviously can never go out of itself. But to assume either that the form of the object is supplied by the subject, or that it is the subject that mediates between the subject and object, is the denial of all reality out of the subject, or distinguishable from it, and the assertion of pure autotheism, pantheism, or nullism, whichever term you choose. The true solution of the difficulty is not to be found in Cartesianism or Kantianism, either as modified, on the one hand, by Fichte, or, on the other, by Schelling and Hegel. The form of the object is itself objective, and the principle that mediates between subject and object is not the intelligence of the subject, but the intelligibility of the object. We see intellectually the object, because it is *a parte rei*, and because it is intelligible, not *by* us, but *to* us. Let the Reviewer understand this, and he will be surprised at the doctrine he has been contending for.

But we have not done with this part of the subject yet.

From the Reviewer's doctrine with regard to subject and object we drew the inference that his general doctrine is pantheistic. We never supposed for a moment that he regarded himself as a pantheist, but we felt certain that his whole scheme was pantheistic at bottom, as is all modern German thought, no matter of what philosophical or Protestant school. The Reviewer says he is no pantheist, and formally disavows the pantheistic consequences we charged upon him. This is all very well, but pantheism seems to us to lurk in the very phraseology in which he disavows it. Thus, in a passage we have just quoted:—"Men make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute *necessity* beyond their will, and *underlie* the whole order of existence from which they spring." Here the assertion is not that these have a real existence beyond the human will, but simply a *necessity*. This *necessity* of truth and law is perhaps extra-human, but the truth and law themselves are not; for we are told immediately that "they actualize themselves in the world, become concrete, and thus real for men," only as they become "subjective and individual." They actualize themselves, and become real. This can only mean that the necessity develops or pushes itself out in individual thinking and willing as truth and law, which is a purely pantheistic conception, or, if you please, atheistic, resolving God into necessity, and making him operate, not as free will, but as necessary law or force.

We are aware that the Reviewer denies this, and asserts that God is distinct from the world, and its free cause; but every pantheist says as much, and the Reviewer's conception of freedom is the Calvinistic conception, — what he calls "free necessity," — that is to say, no proper freedom at all. The freedom with which God causes creation is only the freedom with which he causes his own being. "God," he says (p. 314), "is the free cause of his own being; and much more then of all his works." The *a fortiori* is inadmissible, unless there is a parity between the sense in which God is the free cause of his own being, and that in which he is the free cause of his works. He is the free cause, or the cause at all, of his own being, only in the sense that he depends for his being on nothing beyond himself, exterior to, or distinguishable from himself, and therefore is the free cause of the universe only in the sense that nothing distinguishable from himself impels, compels, or moves him to produce it. But as in reality he is not the cause of his own being, since he is necessary being, and therefore uncaused, so the

universe is uncaused, and springs forth necessarily from the inherent necessity of the Divine nature, which we need not tell the Reviewer is pure Spinozism.

The Reviewer tells us he is no pantheist, but to prove that his doctrine is pantheistic, or worse, we need only examine "the dualism or abstract deism" which he condemns as the error immediately opposed to the error of pantheism. The essence of pantheism is in the denial of the contingency of the universe, or its proper creation, and in the assertion of the substantial identity of God and the world. The error opposed to the error of pantheism, says the Reviewer, is abstract deism. Well, what, according to him, is this abstract deism?

"Abstract deism," he says, "as distinguished from the true *theism* of Christianity, it is hardly necessary to say, is not in and of itself an exclusion absolutely of God from the world. It prides itself rather in being an acknowledgment of God, under the character of the great first cause and end of all things. In this view, however, he is taken to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life. His relation to the world is that of a mechanician to a machine. It is the product of his mind and hand; it works according to his will; it goes forward under the superintendence of his eye; while he remains himself, whether near at hand or afar off, wholly on the outside of it, abstract and independent altogether as another order of being." — p. 311.

Now let us examine this, and see what he must maintain who denies it. It takes God "to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life." But do you deny that God is out of the world, beyond, over, and above it? Then you deny the extra-mundane Divinity, which is itself pantheism, if not atheism; and how, if not out, beyond, over, and above the world, do you distinguish him, as to his substance, from the world? "In no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life." You cannot say this, because you have begun by conceding that abstract deism does not assert the absolute exclusion of God from the world; then it can hold, and does hold, him to be in some sense immanent in it. "It is the product of his mind and hand." Do you deny this? Then you deny creation. "It works according to his will." Deny this, and you deny that God is the Supreme Governor of the universe. "It goes forward under the superintendence of his eye." Do you maintain that it is not so? Then you reject Divine Prov-

idence. "While he remains himself wholly on the outside of it." This is ambiguous, and may mean *outside* under the relation of space, or *outside* in the sense of *distinction from*. In the former sense, the assertion is gratuitous; no theologian holds God to be outside of the world in that sense, for every one holds that he dwells, not in space, but in immensity. Do you deny that he is outside of the world in the second sense, *outside* inasmuch as he is distinguished from it? Then you identify him with it. "Abstract and independent altogether." *Abstract* we will pass over, for none but men of the author's school hold God, as distinguished from the world, as a pure abstraction. Do you deny, then, that God is "independent altogether" of the world? If you do, you make him dependent on it, and deny his independent existence, and therefore deny him to be God. "As another order of being." God is increate, and the world is created; he is necessary, and it is contingent. Do not necessary and contingent, increate and created, constitute two orders? Do they not belong to two distinct categories? Deny it, assert that God and the world belong to the same category, to the same order, and you identify them, and make a formal confession of pantheism. Now, supposing the Reviewer to write with any definite notions of what he writes, he does make all of the denials we here enumerate, and then, unless we assume that of contraries both may be true, he undeniably maintains atheistic, pantheistic, and nullistic doctrines, whether he knows it or not.

We accused the Reviewer of giving a pantheistic interpretation to the mystery of the Holy Incarnation. In reference to this he says, — "Christ, we are told, is the author of the new creation, but no part of it in his own person; just as he is the old creation, only *mediante actu creativo*, by the act of creating it, [we said, *in* that he creates it,] and in no more intimate way. To make him the real fountain of Christianity itself, is gravely represented as a full identification of his life with that of his people, and runs, we are told, into palpable pantheism." (p. 309.) The Reviewer disdains minute accuracy, and takes the liberty to reproduce our statements, not as we made them, but as best suits his own convenience. We admit that, in one sense, Christ is identically Christianity; but not when Christianity is taken as the new *creation*, or *created* supernatural order. Christ is then it only *mediante* his creative act. What we objected to was the assertion, that Christ not merely begets or creates the Christian life in his people, but is identically the substance of

that life itself. It was the assumption of this identity of substance that we pronounced pantheistic, and that assumption the Reviewer continues to make. He considers it ridiculous to assert that Christ is in his own *person* no part of the new *creation*, and its fountain in no more intimate sense than that of being its creator. His intimate and immanent presence in — not *by* — his creative act is not enough to satisfy our Mercersburg doctor. But, from the very nature of things, Christ cannot be the fountain of the new life of his people in a more intimate sense, without being identically it, and in his substance identified with their substance. In the first place, how can Christ in his own *person*, which is wholly Divine, be any part of the new *creation*? Is the *person* of Christ created? Is the Reviewer not only a Eutychian, as we before proved him, but also a Nestorian? In the second place, how can the Christian life be called a new *creation*, if it is the very substance of the life of Christ's *person*, which is God? And if it is the very substance of that life, how can the author deny that in the supernatural order he maintains pantheism? or, if he maintains pantheism in the supernatural, how can he deny that he also maintains it in the natural?

The Reviewer replies, "We carefully distinguish Christ from his Church." Very true, as the fountain from the stream, not as the cause from the effect. "Yet we hold them to be in a deep sense one, even as the head and members are indissolubly joined together in the living constitution of one body." (p. 310.) But you hold this oneness to be, not mystical, as we ourselves hold it, but substantial, physical, — a oneness in substance, as the substance of the stream is one with the substance of the fountain from which it emanates, or "flows forth." "The position of Christ is absolute and central, while that of his people is relative and peripheral." (Ibid.) This does not relieve the Reviewer. *Absolute* and *relative* mean, in modern philosophy, being and phenomenon, substance and accident, and are the very terms used by pantheists to express their conception of the relation between the external world and its internal origin. The very fact, that he uses these terms in the connection he does, is presumptive proof that his thought is pantheistic. "The position of Christ is central; that of his people peripheral." This does not help the matter. The periphery is simply the external termini of the rays which emanate from the centre, which implies that the Christian life is not a creation by our Lord, but an emanation from him, in the Oriental sense of

emanation. Then, again, in the circle, centre and circumference are mutually dependent, and the one is inconceivable without the other; and to suppose God in any order to be dependent on creation, or in any sense to come within the category of relation, is, if not atheism, at least pantheism. It is, of course, not easy to determine the Reviewer's exact meaning, for he gives us figures of speech instead of scientific statements, and descriptions instead of definitions; but, as far as we can determine his doctrine, it is virtually the old Oriental doctrine of emanation from, and of final absorption into, God. If so, our first charge against his doctrine, that it converts the object into subject, and denies all faith by denying all object of faith, is, of course, well founded.

The second principle we found the Reviewer to hold, namely, the supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural, he concedes and defends. The simplest way of doing him justice is to cite what he says, and we are happy to acknowledge that what he says on this point is for the most part intelligible and *ad rem*.

"We have never meant to deny the supernatural; nor yet to make it the same thing simply with the supersensible, the world of pure thought as distinguished from the world of sense. Our objection to Mr. Brownson is, not that he sets the supernatural out of nature, over it, and above it, but that this *transcendence*, in his hands, is carried to the point of such an absolute disruption of the one world from the other as amounts at last to downright dualism, and leaves no room for the accomplishment of any real conjunction between them in the life of man; which, however, at the same time is the necessary conception of all religion, and the very form especially in which the idea of Christianity becomes complete. We see not how such a real conjunction should imply any thing like a full sufficiency on the side of nature, left to itself for the actualization of the supernatural as its own product; but it does seem to us certainly to require a constitutional fitness and capability on the part of the first, for apprehending with some inward connatural grasp, the presence of this last when brought within its reach. We question not the full objectivity of the supernatural, as an order of life above nature; only we ask that a corresponding subjectivity be allowed also on the part of man, whereby he may be able to receive the object which is thus higher than himself into true union with his life, so as to be lifted by the power of it, not magically but rationally, into its own superior sphere. Such directly receptive capacity we take to be inherently at hand in the gift or faculty of faith. Faith carries in it a real, inward, living, and rational correspondence with the truth it is called to embrace; and in this view

it belongs to the proper, original nature of man, though a Divine influence is needed certainly to bring it into exercise. Such drawing out of the subjective capacity of our nature, however, by no means implies that the truth itself is drawn out in this way ; just as little as the awakening of sight in a previously blind eye would imply, that the surrounding world was brought to pass by its becoming thus an object of vision. What else does our Saviour mean when he says, No man can come to me, except the Father *draw* him ; He that is of God, heareth God's words ; If any man will do my will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God ? For the reception of Christ, all depends on a certain inward sympathy and correspondence with the truth revealed in his person, a real receptivity for the supernatural on the side of the human soul itself, such as all men ought to have, but only some men have in fact." — pp. 322, 323.

We say this is for the most part *ad rem* ; we speak relatively, and only mean that it is so in comparison with the Reviewer's statements in general. He evidently does not comprehend the precise point of the objection we urged. It is, however, clear that he holds that the supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural, and therefore, that, though it is doubtless contrary to his intention, he really denies the supernatural ; for whatever lies within the sphere or reach of the natural, no matter on what side or under what relation, is natural, not supernatural. The conjunction of subject and object, or correspondence between them, contended for, must, of course, take place, or the creditive subject and credible object must remain always apart, and no act of faith be ever elicited. The Reviewer is right in asserting the necessity of the conjunction, or correspondence ; his error lies in supposing that the conjunction is that of the natural subject and the supernatural object. No such conjunction or correspondence of the natural and supernatural is conceivable. The Reviewer is right, too, in assuming that this conjunction or correspondence is by virtue of the gift or faculty of faith ; his error is in maintaining that this gift or faculty is natural, belonging " to the proper, original nature of man," and needing only a Divine influence to call it into exercise, simply drawing out " an original capacity of our nature." For the conjunction or correspondence to take place, subject and object must be in the same order, and therefore the subject on its side must be *supernaturalized*, elevated to the plane of the supernatural. What thus elevates the subject is the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, which is not an

original capacity, or faculty, of our nature, but a supernatural gift, a supernaturally infused habit, as all Catholic theology teaches, and as we thought we had sufficiently explained in our previous answer to the Reviewer. The Reviewer has fallen into his fatal error, an error which involves the denial of the supernatural altogether, in consequence of the Protestant denial of supernaturally infused habits. All heresy is illogical, and inconsistent with itself. In consequence of rejecting, or not recognizing, the infused habit of faith, which is the supernatural elevation of the creditive subject to the level of the supernatural credible object, he is obliged to restrict the supernatural to the credible object and the Divine influence which simply excites the natural subject to activity, without elevating that activity above the order of nature ; and so restricting the supernatural, he is obliged either to bring it within the sphere of the natural, which is to deny it to be supernatural, or else to keep it always beyond the reach of the subject, and thus incur the very objection he strangely enough imagines must lie against us. The Reviewer should learn from this how dangerous it is to reject or misconceive any Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine is a unity, and you must either accept the whole or reject the whole.

The Reviewer passes over in profound silence the third principle we represented him as holding, and the objection we drew from it, namely, faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed ; therefore, faith is science, and mysteries are incredible. Consequently he leaves us free to conclude that he concedes both, since he says nothing in his answer which in any respect indicates or implies the contrary. We, then, rightly apprehended the Reviewer's doctrine on these three points, and he has failed to set aside the consequences we drew from them. Then his doctrine is Antichristian and false, and by his own concession our Church is true, — the Church of God.

Here we might stop, but there are two or three other points on which we wish to offer a few remarks, more for the Reviewer's sake than our own. The Reviewer is an able and learned man, an earnest, vigorous, and eloquent writer. He has caught some glimpses of certain important Catholic truths, not much regarded by Protestants generally, and which he wields with murderous effect against vulgar Protestantism. But he only partially apprehends these great truths, and he combines them

in his own mind with principles utterly repugnant to them, and which, taken by themselves, involve all the fatal consequences we have pointed out. But, unless we have entirely mistaken the character of his mind and heart, his real intellectual and moral wants would be much better satisfied by the Catholic doctrine on the points covered by the uncatholic principles, than by these uncatholic principles themselves. It seems to us that he values those principles for the sake of the Catholic truths in his view connected with them, and not by any means for their own sake. He clasps the errors to his bosom, because he does not see how, without them, he can hold the Catholic truths which he sees in connection with them, and which really enrapture his heart. What he wants is to see the Catholic truths discriminated from the erroneous principles, and its gaps, as existing in his mind, really filled up, as they are in Catholic minds, with Catholic doctrines.

The Reviewer's first and principal objection to Catholicity is, that it sunders subject and object in both the natural order and the supernatural. After what we have said, he must see that this objection is unfounded, and indeed it can appear only ridiculous to those who are acquainted with Catholic theology. The object is independent of the subject, but the subject is never independent of the object. God is independent of his creatures, but they are absolutely dependent on him, and exist, as we have constantly maintained, only by virtue of his intimate presence, and the immanence of his act creating them from nothing. More than this no man can say, without falling into pantheism. In the supernatural order there is no sundering of object and the subject. The supernatural object exists *a parte rei*, independent of the subject, and is as real *in se* when not apprehended or believed as when it is. But no body supposes, at least no Catholic supposes, it can be believed by a subject that has no inward correspondence with it, — only that correspondence is not natural, but must be supernatural. Grace is twofold, exterior and interior, or objective and subjective. As exterior, or objective, it constitutes and presents the supernatural object; as interior, or subjective, it raises or elevates the subject to the plane of the object, and establishes a proportion, a correspondence, between them.

The second objection of the Reviewer is, that Catholicity denies individual freedom, or, in other words, individual freedom and authority are irreconcilable on Catholic principles. The boast of the Reviewer is, that his doctrine reconciles the

two, and his objection is, that ours sacrifices liberty to authority, and, as a consequence of sacrificing liberty to authority, loses authority itself. Both the boast and the objection proceed, as it strikes us, from a total misconception of liberty and authority, as well as of Catholic theology. We are not very positive as to what is the Reviewer's precise doctrine on the subject; for what he says, in the article before us, to elucidate it, only renders it to our apprehension more obscure and indefinite; but he appears to us to resolve both authority and liberty into necessity. His conception of law seems to be that of simple force, acting, in regard to the subject, either from abroad or from within. If from abroad, the subject is not free, and belongs to the physical world as distinguished from the moral; if from within the subject, if through the subject's own intelligence and will, it is the law of freedom, and the subject is free. Slavery would seem, then, to consist, not in being held to obey an unjust law, but in being held to obey a law that comes from abroad, from a source foreign to or distinguishable from the subject; and liberty would seem to stand, not in being held to obey only just law, but in not being held to obey any law not self-imposed, or which does not proceed from the subject himself. This is what we gather from the following passage.

"It may now appear in what sense, and in what sense only, we have ever dreamed of allowing man a will or voice in the constitution of the law by which he is required to be governed. 'To assert man's authority, or right to be governed only by his own will,' according to Mr. Brownson, 'is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the Sovereign Good. Does the Reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists?' Nothing of this sort, we reply; nothing of this sort whatever. All we mean to say is, that mind is not matter; that morality is not nature; that the law of freedom, to be different from the law of blind necessity, must come to its actualization in the world, not in the way of merely outward force under any view, but through the self-moving spontaneity of its own subjects, the thinking and willing of the created minds in which it works and reigns. The planets obey a law which they have no power to accept or not accept; it is in them, but not from them or of them in any way; and for this very reason their action is blind and unfree. So throughout *Nature*, as such. Its very character is to be without autonomy in its own order of existence. The Moral, on the contrary, as distinguished from the Natural, is self-conscious, self-active, in a certain sense we may say even self-

productive, and in such form truly free. It is not made, except as it at the same time makes itself. It is not moved, save as it originates its own motion. It stands, like all created existence, in the power of law ; but the law here is not from abroad simply, as in the case of mere nature, not objective and outward only; but inward also and subjective ; it is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects. On the outside of such self-conscious life, it can have no being in the world whatever. Turn it in any way into mere blind force, simple outward compulsion, and all proper morality is at an end. The necessary medium of its revelation, the very element in which it exists and makes itself felt, is the self-moving activity of the life it is formed to bind ; which at the same time has full power to be untrue to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law, and which can be rightly bound by this in the end only as it receives the law freely into its own constitution, and so enacts it into force for its own use. Mind thus, by its very constitution, is required to be autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of law for itself ; while the law, notwithstanding, has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force whatever as the product merely of any lower intelligence. Objective and subjective here must fall absolutely together. The will without the law is false ; denies its own proper nature ; falls over to the sphere of bondage and sin. But the law, on the other hand, without the will, has no power either to accomplish its proper work. Only as the law, previously necessary by Divine constitution, is *willed*, freely embraced, affirmed and constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act virtually and deed, can there be any true escape from the idea of slavery, any true entrance into the sphere of freedom, any morality or religion in the full and right sense of these terms. It is this union of law and will, necessity and liberty, not outwardly, but inwardly, which brings the life of man emphatically to its proper form. This is what we mean by the autonomy of the human subject, the right of man to be governed by his own will, and not simply by a heteronomic force acting upon him from beyond his will, the voice that belongs to him properly in the constitution of the law which he is called to obey." — pp. 315, 316.

This, we think, sustains the view we take, especially as we are bound to interpret it in an anti-Catholic sense. What the Reviewer says about the moral subject being " self-conscious," " self-active," &c., makes nothing against our interpretation ; for it is all reconcilable with the assumption that the law is an inherent principle, operating from within the subject, and the further assumption that the subject, as his intelligence is devel-

oped, apprehends and wills it. We are inclined to believe this is the Reviewer's doctrine, for it is genuine Calvinism, and corresponds to the general pantheistic character of his speculations. Moreover, we nowhere find him recognizing, unequivocally, any freedom but that which he calls "free necessity," and his very boast is, that his doctrine reconciles *necessity* and *liberty*! The freedom with which man acts he likens to the freedom with which God creates or causes his own being, which, as we have seen, is no freedom at all, for God is *ens necessarium*, and uncaused. We therefore conclude that the Reviewer really means to teach that the law is necessity, and operates necessarily; but as it operates from within, and is apprehended and willed by the subject, it, at the same time that it is the law of necessity, is also the law of freedom. We need not tell our readers that this does not reconcile liberty and authority, for it resolves both into necessity. There is no freedom in my simply apprehending and willing the necessity to which I am subjected.

Perhaps, however, the meaning of the Reviewer is simply that the law, in order to bind, to have the obligatory force of law, must be accepted or assented to by those it is intended to govern. Much he says may be interpreted in accordance with this view. Hence he would maintain, that to require man to obey a law which he has not voluntarily assented to is tyranny, and he who is required to obey such a law is a slave, and no freeman. This view makes the legality, or binding force, of the law depend on the assent of the subject. This doctrine has been held; we find traces of it in some of our so-called Gallican authors; it lies at the bottom of all the Jacobinical and anarchical theories of the day; it is the fundamental principle of all Protestantism, that is, private reason judging public authority; and it is appealed to in justification of all rebellion in Church or state, and as sanctioning the wild and destructive revolutionary movements which have recently come so near overthrowing all European governments, abolishing all law, and dissolving society itself. Law is law only in that it binds, and therefore, according to this principle, law derives its legality, its character, its very existence as law, not from the authority which wills and promulgates it, but from the voluntary assent of the subjects it is intended to govern. It is law only by virtue of that assent or acceptance. But this makes the subject the real legislator, and the sole source and ground of the law as law. Men are then in every sense their own law-

makers. But this the Reviewer denies. He says expressly, "Men make neither truth nor law"; that the law "has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force as the product merely of any lower intelligence." It would seem, then, that the Reviewer does not, after all, mean this, and we must return to the view already given.

But pass over this; suppose the Reviewer really does mean that the law, to be actually law, must be apprehended and voluntarily assented to by the subject. This, undeniably, makes the subject the real sovereign, which is a contradiction in terms. The law regarded *in se* exists prior to the assent of the subject, as the author must concede; for if not, there would be nothing to assent to. Now has the subject a right to withhold his assent? The self-moving activity of man, the Reviewer says, "has full power to be *untrue* to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law." To refuse his assent to the law which is made "previously necessary by Divine constitution," would then be for man to be "*untrue*," that is, disobedient to his proper law. Has man, we say not the *power*, but the *right*, to be thus untrue or disobedient? If you say, yes, you utter a palpable contradiction, and deny all morality; if you say, no, you assert that the law binds prior to the voluntary assent of the subject, and then deny your thesis, for you say man "can be *rightly* bound by this [the law], only as" he "receives the law freely into" his "own constitution, and so enacts it into force for" his "own use."

The law, in the sense we are to consider it in this controversy, is not a power or force, but a simple rule or measure of action, prescribing what is to be done and what is to be avoided, or commanding good and prohibiting evil. Voluntary obedience to it is virtue, right conduct, righteousness, or justice; voluntary disobedience to it is evil conduct, vice, unrighteousness, or injustice. Now we ask the Reviewer, whether he does or does not admit the reality of a law prescribing the good and prohibiting the evil, and thus constituting a distinction between right and wrong, independent of man's assent. Is it man who prescribes the good and prohibits the evil? Is it his will that makes the distinction between right and wrong? and could man, if he chose, alter the relations between good and evil, right and wrong, by giving or withholding his assent to the law? If you say, yes, you deny the eternal law, and make the whole moral order dependent, not on the eternal and immutable will and nature of God, but on the will of man; if you say,

no, you admit a law above man, independent of his will, demanding no assent of his to be obligatory, and which convicts him of sin, of rebellion, if he does not both assent to and obey it. In the former case, you deny the whole moral order, all immutable morality, and make virtue and vice whatever man wills them to be, — nay, destroy the very conception of both, and leave man, as we before said, free to live as he lists. If the latter, you cannot make the binding force of the law depend on the assent of the subject. Law is not law unless it prescribes what the subject *ought* to will, and what he *ought* not to will, and therefore must be a law *to* the will, not a law deriving from it, and consequently must, by its very nature, derive all its force from an authority above it, from an authority which has the eternal and indefeasible right to command the will. We here repeat only the A B C of ethical science, which the Reviewer must concede, or deny ethical science altogether. To make the law derive its binding force, that is, its character as law, from the assent of those whom it is to govern, is to deny its essential character as law, — is to deny that men are under law, and therefore to deny all morality, for there is morality only where there is law, and if no law binds the assent, there is no law for man.

What the Reviewer really wants to maintain, if he did but see it distinctly, is, however, a very obvious and a very certain truth; namely, none but a rational being, capable of apprehending and voluntarily obeying the law, can be the subject of a moral law; for the simple reason that none other is by the constitution of his nature a moral being. Man must have a moral constitution, or he cannot be the subject of the moral law. No doubt of this. But we must never confound that which constitutes man a moral being with the moral law itself, or the law to which he is morally bound to conform all his thoughts, words, and deeds. Here is where the Reviewer seems to us to err. He does not keep the two distinct, but runs them one into the other, as is evident from his saying that “objective and subjective must here fall absolutely together.” The law is not constituted, or actualized, or made binding, by our moral constitution; but God, in giving us a moral constitution, has made us capable of being governed, not by a physical law, as is external nature, but by the moral law, which addresses itself to reason. We are moral not because we are not bound to obey the law till we voluntarily assent to it, but because we are morally free in obeying it, that is, are not forced against our will

to obey it, but can refuse to obey it, if we choose,—because to obey or not to obey rests always in our own free will ; we are, however, always *bound* to obey it, and the law is just as obligatory when we reject it as when we actually assent to it, and we disobey it only at our peril; we never have the *right* to refuse our obedience.

The reconciliation of authority and liberty is never a difficult question. The authority of God is absolute over all his creatures, and as his authority is will inseparable from infinite justice, and therefore always inherently just will, it is legitimate, for law is power conjoined with justice, or will regulated by reason. Subjection to God, or to any authority immediately or mediately deriving from him, is never any encroachment upon liberty, for liberty is destroyed, not in being held to obey legitimate authority, but in being subjected to an authority which is illegitimate. Liberty is intact so long as man is left in the full possession of all his rights, and no one of his rights is taken away or abridged by holding him to obedience to God ; for he never had and never can have any right to disobey God. If, then, as the Catholic maintains, the Church be really commissioned by God, authorized by him to speak in his name and by his authority, there is and can be no violation of liberty in requiring all men to believe what she teaches, and to do what she commands. If she is what she professes to be, her authority and our liberty are perfectly compatible, one with the other ; for in submitting to her authority we submit simply to the law, which we never had and never can have the *right* to disobey.

“Our objection,” says the Reviewer, “to the Roman doctrine, as we understand it to be exhibited by Mr. Brownson, is that the law objectively taken is *so far sundered* from the activity of the obeying subject, as to be in fact set over against this in the character of another nature altogether, and under a wholly outward form. Objective and subjective are made to fall apart dualistically into two distinct worlds. We do not wish to confound them, [then you must acknowledge them to be distinct,] to mix them together, or to make one absorb or destroy the other ; *we recognize their difference*; but still we object just as strenuously also to this abstract separation.” (p. 317.) This may all be very clear and distinct in the Reviewer’s mind, but is a little obscure and confused in ours. His objection is, that we sunder *too far* the law objectively considered from the activity of the obeying subject. But before bringing this objection he should point out *how far* the two may

be legitimately sundered, and where is the line beyond which it is not lawful to go. Then he should show that we do transgress, and in what respect we transgress, that line. We have to regret that he has done neither. We set the object over against the subject, it seems. But the very definition of object, taken simply as object, is that which is over against the subject, or that which stands facing the subject. The very word itself says as much. "In the character of another nature altogether." Subject and object are of the same nature, or they are of different natures. By *nature* here we must understand that which constitutes the thing what it is, and distinguishes it from every other. In this sense, it is incommunicable, and its presence always asserts identity, and excludes diversity. You cannot then assume that subject and object are, as subject and object, partly of the same nature, and partly of diverse natures. You must either assert them as one and identical, as does the pantheist, or you must assert them as differing by nature altogether. The same is the same, and things different are different, then not the same. Are then object and subject the same, one and identical? The Reviewer says, "We recognize their difference." Very good, what more do we ourselves do? We assert their difference, and maintain that they are really as well as apparently distinct. "Under a wholly *outward* form." We do not know what this means. The Reviewer is perpetually talking about "inward" and "outward." We wish he would explain himself, and tell us in what sense he uses these words; for, as the case now stands, he seems to us to be frightened by apparitions raised by his own fancy. In the sense of *distinct from one another*, we oppose subject and object to each other under an *outward* form, if you please, and so does the Reviewer; for he recognizes their difference; but we are not aware that we distinguish them in any other respect in an *outward form*. We recognize an intelligible world distinct from the sensible, and hold that the intelligible exists *a parte rei*, and is as truly objective as the sensible. The law pertains to the intelligible world, as the object of the intellect, not of the senses. But it is not for that reason any more one with the intellect that apprehends it, than a tree is one with the sense of sight by which we behold it. As the tree does not become subject by our beholding it, so the law does not become subjective, or cease to be purely objective, by our apprehending or understanding it. Here is all the "outward

form" we assert, and we are very much mistaken if our *outward* is more outward than the Reviewer's *inward*.*

"But still we object just as strenuously to this abstract separation." What *abstract* separation? The abstract separation which he understands us to make? What is that? We are sure

* The Reviewer seems to us to reason throughout as if he held that the activity of the subject transforms the object into subject, that the fact of knowledge identifies the intellectual subject and the intelligible object, and that the act of willing identifies the voluntary subject with the object willed; hence he never objects that we distinguish the subject and object, but that we assert them to be *wholly* distinct, and he never denies the objectivity of the object altogether, but simply that it is *merely* objective. So, again, he does not deny that the distinction between subject and object is outward, or that they exist as distinct under an outward form, but denies that the form is *wholly* outward. The two may be sundered, but must not be sundered *too far*. It is remarkable that throughout he never dares affirm or deny any thing absolutely. At the tail of his affirmations or denials there always comes in a qualification, which takes off at least one half of the assertion or the negation. He never makes a strictly categorical statement, and hence there is not a single definition, properly so called, in either of his articles against us. Whence comes this? It certainly comes not from his ignorance of the categories, or from his want of logical capacity or discipline; but it comes, in our judgment, from a vicious ontology, which he has been led to adopt, partly by modern philosophers, but still more from his having plunged deeply into the study of mystical theology before having devoted sufficient time to the study of speculative or dogmatic theology. He seems to mistake everywhere mystical union for substantial unity, or identity of substance; or if he does not do this, he assumes that the denial of this unity or identity, or the assertion of the distinction of substances, is a denial of the mystical union itself. The soul in the Christian life is certainly mystically united to God, and its life consists in an ineffable union with him; but there is no identification of substance. The creature remains in the category of created things, and the Christian's highest life, here or in the beatified state, is never the identical life of God, for the promise is, not that when he shall appear we shall be God, but that "we shall be *like* him, for we shall see him as he is"; and likeness always implies difference, as the Reviewer must have learned from the old controversy between the homoöusians and the homoiousians. Love makes us one with God, we concede, but mystically, not physically, for we remain always creature, and he always Creator. So in the fact of knowledge the subject and object are united, but not unified, or made identical. They remain — Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, and Schelling and Hegel, to the contrary notwithstanding — as distinctly two things in the fact of knowledge, as they are out of that fact. This the Reviewer seems to us to overlook, and hence the pantheistic character of his own statements, and his apprehension that we, in asserting the two to be distinct *a parte rei*, and also *in conceptu*, are denying, not only their union in the fact of our life, but the very possibility of such union. This apprehension is idle, for union is inconceivable without distinction and difference.

we make no *abstract* separation ; if we make any separation at all, it is real, not abstract. We do not deal in abstractions. But what separation do we make between object and subject? We distinguish them one from the other as different *a parte rei*, and so does the Reviewer ; but to distinguish is not to separate. The doctrine we have insisted on in our Review is, that the object, regarded as existing *a parte rei*, is distinct from and independent of the subject, but that the subject, though really distinct from the object, is dependent on it, and does and can live only by union with it. We deny in no sense the intimate relation of the subject to the object, but we do deny that the relation is reciprocal, that the dependence is mutual. The object is God, the only intelligible object *per se*, and all else that is object to us is so only mediately, as made intelligible to us by his intelligibility. To make the dependence mutual would be to make God as dependent on man as man is on God, and would, as we showed in our former reply, involve Buddhism, and finally nullism. God is separable from man, for he can annihilate man and be all that he now is, but man cannot be separated from God, and live ; for it is in him we live, and move, and are, and our separation from him would be our annihilation.

One more point we must consider, and then we will await the Reviewer's response. The Reviewer, after disavowing the pantheistic consequences we charged upon him, adds :—

“ But now, as we take it, the truth, in opposition to these several pantheistic consequences charged upon us by Mr. Brownson, does not stand on the other side, in their simple negation and contradiction. There is another class of conceptions in this form, and which the common understanding is always prone to lay hold of as the necessary and only alternative in the case, that go just as directly and surely in the end to exclude God from the world, and to unsettle all the foundations of religion. These are comprehended collectively in the idea of *dualism*, or abstract deism, which may be taken as the immediate reverse of what is properly pantheism in the bad and false sense. It may be said that dualism involves a great truth, the actual distinction of God and the world ; and this we are freely willing to admit ; but it is just as certain, on the other side, and just as necessary too to be affirmed always, that pantheism also involves a great truth ; such a truth indeed as may be said to meet us on almost every page of the Bible, as well as from the inmost and profoundest depths of our own religious nature. That is a poor and cheap orthodoxy, in any case, which stands barely in the rejection of error in some one direction, while it makes no ac-

count of the danger, always at hand, of falling under the power of its natural counterpart in a direction just the opposite. We are bound to do justice, in the case before us, to the truth which underlies pantheism, as well as to that which underlies dualism; and we are not more bound to fear and avoid heresy in the first shape, than we are bound to avoid and fear it also in the second shape. It has been our wish at least, and our honest endeavour, to keep clear of both extremes, as well as to acknowledge and honor the great truths out of which both grow. Mr. Brownson, we are sorry to say, in common with a large amount of what we conceive to be bad Protestantism, (the almost universal thinking, we might say, perhaps, of New England,) turns the two phases of thought into the form of a simple syllogistic dilemma, where one horn is the only resting-place from the other, and avoids and rejects thus the pantheistic extreme only in such a way as to lay himself open, in our estimation, to the charge of dualism. We distinguish, of course, as he also has done in our case, between his theory and himself, and speak of what the first is by necessary consequence, as it strikes our own mind, rather than by open and direct avowal; although at some points, the general consequence itself might seem to be not indistinctly allowed, in the particular propositions by which we find it indirectly affirmed. The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong, serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position. It shows this to be itself a dialectical extreme, whose very character it is always to condemn in a wholesale way, as its own opposite, all that is different from itself, or that carries towards it in any way the aspect of negation. No such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil." — pp. 310, 311.

The Reviewer, while conceding that we were right in condemning the pantheistic conceptions, maintains, that, since we asserted their immediate contradictories as the truth in opposition to them, we fell into an opposite error, which he calls dualism, and this because the truth in opposition to them "does not stand on the other side, in their simple negation and contradiction." That there is an error as well as a truth opposed to pantheism, we do not deny; that we asserted dualism, if he chooses so to call it, in opposition to pantheism, we concede, but not in the sense in which dualism is false. Dualism is false only when taken in the modern deistical sense, which, after acknowledging God as Creator of the world, denies him as Providence, as Conservator, and as Governor, and asserts that the world, now it is created, is sufficient for itself, and goes

“ ahead on its own hook,” — the sense common to most of our modern geologists, naturalists, or cultivators of the physical sciences, and advocates of the Baconian philosophy; or in the sense in which, as in Plato’s *Timæus*, it asserts God on one side, and the eternity of matter on the other; or, in fine, in the Oriental sense, in which it asserts the dual origin of the universe, and of two original, eternal, self-existent, and mutually independent principles, or beings, one good, the other bad,—the old Manichæan doctrine, held by the Albigenses in the Middle Ages, and perhaps, in modern times, by the great body of Protestants, who boast of being their descendants and continuators. But the Reviewer will not pretend that we assert dualism in any one of these three senses; and the only sense in which he can pretend that we assert it is in the sense in which it asserts that creation is contingent, not necessary, and that God and the world are distinguished as creator and creature, cause and effect. That the truth in opposition to pantheism does not stand in an opposite error, we of course concede; but that it does not stand on the other side, or side opposed to pantheism, we cannot concede, for if it does not, it is not the truth *in opposition* to it. There may be opposite errors, but the truth always stands between them, opposed to both, opposing one face to the one, and another face to the other.

The Reviewer is not satisfied with this. He holds that a great truth underlies pantheism, and another underlies dualism, and that our duty is to accept and harmonize the two. Neither is to be denied absolutely, but we must deny a little and affirm a little of both. This is all very well for a Protestant, who can have truth only as mixed with falsehood, and who can never make an affirmation or a denial without falling into error, but the Reviewer must excuse us for not consenting to place ourselves in his unpleasant position. Pantheism is either true or it is false, and if false it is to be denied absolutely, and no truth does or can underlie it; for if a great truth did underlie it, it would be founded in truth, and a doctrine founded in truth is true doctrine, not false. So of dualism; it is either true or it is false, or true in one sense and false in another. If true in one sense and false in another, your business is to distinguish, and define in what sense it is true and in what it is false, and then to affirm it in the former sense, and deny it in the latter. In the sense it is false, or as a false doctrine, no great truth underlies it, for it is a perversion or denial of the truth. Let us have no eclectic or syncretic twaddle on the subject.

The Reviewer says of us, "The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position." That is, we must have fallen into the *error* opposed to the pantheistic error, or we could not have so easily thrown the Reviewer into the wrong! This is not so clear to us. We should draw an opposite conclusion from the same premises, and say that the facility with which we threw him into the wrong serves to illustrate the truth of our position and the falsity of his; for we are quite sure that, without the truth on our side, we should never have been able to throw such a man as the Reviewer into the wrong. "It shows itself to be a dialectical extreme." And "no such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil." Here is the mere vulgar cant of our modern eclectics, by which they seek to rehabilitate falsehood, and consecrate every error and heresy, past, present, and to come. It rests on the assumption that error is merely a partial or incomplete truth, as Cousin and his school expressly teach. The assumption is itself a monstrous error. Error is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, but a false view, that is, a denial of truth. Every false doctrine is, in that it is false, a contradiction of the truth, and must be killed, or the truth cannot live. Pantheism, the Reviewer concedes, is an error. Its essence consists in the denial of the contingency of the universe, and the assertion that in their substance God and the world are identical. This is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, to be completed by an error from the opposite quarter; but it is a sheer, unmitigated falsehood, and is got rid of only by asserting its direct contradictory, namely, the universe is contingent, not necessary, and God and the world are of different substances, or distinct and different as to substance. It and this truth which we oppose to it are in the very nature of things irreconcilable, and one can be asserted only by the absolute, unqualified denial of the other. And what we say of pantheism, we say of every false doctrine. The Reviewer is all wrong in his eclectic twaddle, for we can in conscience call it by no name more respectable. There is no logic by which opposites, that is, contraries, can be reconciled. Truth is never opposed to truth, and of opposites one must always be false. In the power of

what higher idea than either truth or falsehood can truth and falsehood come to a true inward reconciliation with each other?

The Reviewer wishes to be able to assert the immanence of God in his works, and he thinks this immanence is the truth that underlies pantheism. With his leave, this is a great mistake, for pantheism, by his own concession, is false. Then the immanence of God cannot be asserted in a pantheistic sense; then, in the only sense in which it is permitted us to assert it, it is not pantheistic, is no part of pantheism, is not related to pantheism, neither underlies it nor overlies it, and is not denied in denying pantheism, but in fact is denied in *asserting* pantheism. In denying pantheism, the Reviewer may be in danger of denying this immanence; but no one who has an infallible guide is in danger of doing it, or has any occasion to fear that, in the plain, plump denial of error on one side, he may fall into an error on the other. Let the Reviewer define the true immanence of God, as distinguished from the pantheistic immanence, and perhaps he will find that we have not denied it, and that he, in order to maintain it, must take his stand with us.

We have now replied to the Reviewer's article, as far as we have judged it necessary. We are not conscious of having overlooked a single important point, and we have done our best to seize and reply to the real thought of the author. If we have failed, it has been unintentionally, and perhaps the Reviewer's fault more than our own; for we must tell him that, if he writes with vigor, he by no means writes with clearness and definiteness. He seems rarely to express his meaning with distinctness and precision. If he replies to us, we hope he will be more explicit, and try and accommodate himself somewhat to our dulness of apprehension. We wish to be just to him, and have no disposition to charge upon his principles consequences which they do not logically involve. We think, also, that he would find his own advantage in attempting to give his doctrines a more rigidly scientific and logical method and statement. He will find it no useless discipline, and one of the speediest ways of arriving at truth. In conclusion, we must beg him to excuse us if we have seemed now and then a little severe in our remarks. Our severity is intended for his doctrine, not for him personally, for personally we have a high esteem for him.

ART. V. — *Conversations of an Old Man and his Young Friends.* — No. III.

F. You have not satisfied me. I love and honor the Church in her place, and I yield neither to you nor to any other man in my reverence for the clergy, or my obedience to them, so long as they keep within their proper sphere. But when the Church encroaches on the civil authority, and seeks to establish a theocracy, I cease to respect her; and when the clergy leave the spiritual order, and undertake to dictate to me the political conduct I am to follow, I hold myself free to disobey them, and, if need be, to resist them with all my might. I am a man and a citizen, as well as a Christian, and no power on earth, if I can hinder it, shall wrest from me my rights as a man, or interfere with my convictions of duty as a citizen. If the Pope himself should undertake to control my conduct as an American citizen, I would laugh him to scorn, and even, if necessary, make war on him as soon as I would upon any foreign potentate.

B. Bravo! my young friend; you are not lacking in brave words and high spirit, such as it is.

O. *F.* talks very well, and if he could as a good Catholic talk as he does, it would amount to something. They who are not Catholics would then have some assurance that your Church is not incompatible with civil liberty and social progress.

G. Very true. But *F.*'s talk is all gammon, and can deceive no one. He is a poor Catholic, and he will never persuade me that he is talking in the spirit of the religion he professes. He either does not know his religion or he does not believe it, and holds on to it only because he is too proud to forsake the religion of his fathers.

F. You all seem to know my religion better than I know it myself; but I have never known one, brought up a Protestant or an unbeliever, that did not entirely mistake her character; and in no respect is she more misapprehended than in her teachings on the mutual relations of the two orders, temporal and spiritual. I know that the extravagant pretensions of bigots and Ultramontanists have led many to think that I cannot as a good Catholic say what I have just said, and I own that the conduct of such Popes as Gregory the Seventh, Alexander the Third, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth, which I dare be known not to approve, may seem to confirm the false

notion which has given rise to the unmeasured obloquy which has been showered upon the Church; but I know also that I am free to use the language I have just used, and that in doing so I only prove myself a dutiful and prudent son of the Church.

B. Rather of the synagogue of Satan, you mean, young man. The spirit with which you speak is Satanic; but what you say is partly true and partly false, though even the true becomes false in the connection and for the purpose you say it.

O. We thought so, and were sure you would get a rebuke from the Catholic side.

F. I have great regard for our venerable friend; but he is young as a Catholic, and has not yet lost the zeal and intolerance of the recent convert. I do not, he will permit me to say, recognize him as an authorized expounder of Catholic faith and theology. I was born and bred a Catholic.

B. I thought you, like the rest of us, were born an infidel and child of Satan.

F. I am not, and never was, an infidel. I have always been a Catholic, and my father and mother were Catholics before me, and so were all my ancestors, as far back as the time of St. Austin and his forty monks, sent by St. Gregory the Great to convert the Anglo-Saxons. There has never been an infidel or heretic in the family, that I have ever heard of.

B. There may, however, have been some not very good Catholics, and it is possible that the stock has degenerated. Yet you are mistaken in saying you were always a Catholic. You were born — as is every one, excepting always the Blessed Virgin, and those sanctified in the mother's womb, as was the prophet Jeremiah and St. John the Baptist — an infidel and child of Satan, and you became a Catholic only in holy baptism. We who grew up in heresy, and spent the vigor of our lives in the service of Satan, are not meet, I grant, to be called Catholics, to be treated as children; but it is hardly meet in you who have been orthodox from your infancy to tell us so; you should rather rejoice over our conversion, for you know that there is joy in heaven with the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety-and-nine just persons that need no repentance. I claim not to be an authorized teacher; I am but a simple layman, and know very little of Catholic theology. I only know what I am taught, and all that is not censurable in me is that I do not take it upon me to teach my teachers, nor to boast over those who may chance to be less instructed than myself. It is for youth to be proud and

arrogant, to fancy it knows all things, and possesses all virtues ; it is for old age, looking back upon a painful experience, to be modest and humble, — to deplore its ignorance and bewail its short-comings.

F. Forgive me. I did not mean to be assuming or disrespectful.

B. Of course not. You but spoke as it is the fashion for young men now-a-days to speak, — out from the fulness of your own self-confidence, and in utter unconsciousness of the attitude you assume, or the bearing of your speech.

F. You are severe.

B. Kindly so, if I am, as you will yourself feel, long before you are as old as I am ; for I do not think you are one of those who are incapable of profiting by experience. But enough of this. I am a convert, I grant, and you are not. You have to thank God that you had Catholic parents, who brought you up in the Church, and early instructed you in what you should believe and in what you should do ; and I have to thank him no less, nay, still more, that he has had the ineffable goodness to call me from error and sin, and make me in my old age a member of his Church. In your case and mine, all the glory is due to him, and to him alone. Neither of us has wherein to glory but his grace, and neither has wherewithal to boast over the other. The point to be considered is, not which of us is greatest, but what is the truth on the question raised which we both, as Catholics, must hold.

My young friend, if as well instructed in Catholic doctrine as he would persude us, knows that one may utter some things which are censurable as heresy, others as simply erroneous, others as rash, others as scandalous, others as ill-sounding, and others as offensive to pious ears. Now, supposing he can say all he has said without absolutely falling into heresy, he may still be obnoxious to some of the other notes of censure. What he says is disrespectful to the Church, to the Holy Father, and the clergy, and, to say the least, sounds bad and is offensive to pious ears, and, as it may well lead some to sin, it is scandalous. Aside, then, from the correctness or incorrectness of the particular propositions he utters, he has no right to say what he says ; for a man may be guilty at common law of a libel, though he utters only the truth, by uttering it in a malicious spirit for a malicious purpose, and in this sense, it is sometimes said, the greater the truth the greater the libel. So much must be said as to the *animus* of his remarks.

As to the matter itself, I agree that the Church is to be honored and obeyed only in her place ; but who, according to Catholicity, is the judge of what is her place ? And how can a Catholic, who, if a Catholic, believes without doubting that she is infallible, commissioned by Almighty God to teach us what we are to believe, and to command us what we are to do, ever make the supposition that she does or can get out of her place ? I have been taught that our Lord is himself supernaturally present with the Church all days unto the consummation of the world, and that he assumes to himself the responsibility of keeping her in her place, and preventing her from going astray or encroaching upon the rights of any individual, community, or interest. As my young friend claims to be well versed in Catholic doctrines, he will set me right if I have been wrongly taught.

F. I do not pretend that you are wrong in this. I hold the Church is infallible and holy ; but I do not therefore hold that popes, cardinals, ambitious prelates, and priests are infallible and impeccable.

B. Fair and easy, young man. Mind the categories, or you may get into a category yourself, as Captain Truck would say. That popes, cardinals, prelates, priests, are personally impeccable, nobody pretends ; so that matter we can pass over. That cardinals, prelates, and priests, teaching out of their own hearts, are not infallible, are as fallible as other men, I concede ; but that they are fallible when teaching what the Church has taught them, or commands them to teach, I deny, and so must my young friend himself, if a good Catholic. Personally they are fallible, but when teaching in the communion of the Church their teaching is infallible. As to the Holy Father, when speaking as a private doctor, he is in the condition of any other private doctor ; but when he teaches as Pope, officially, as the visible Head of the Church, and defines faith or morals for the whole Church, you cannot say he errs, for you are bound, under pain of excommunication, to believe, *ex animo*, that his definition is true, and you are no more at liberty to impugn a doctrinal definition, formally, judicially, given by a pope, than you are to impugn a doctrinal definition given by an œcumenical council. The mere speculative denial of the infallibility of the Pope is not *formal* heresy, and he who makes it may be absolved ; but the practical application of this speculative denial to any particular doctrinal definition made by the Pope, or the denial of the truth of any doctrine

the Pope defines to be Catholic doctrine, is heresy, and, if persisted in, excludes from the Catholic communion. This being so, you are not held to be a heretic because you say the Pope may err, not, indeed, because what you say is not false, but because, being obliged to believe he never does err, it is a harmless absurdity, which the Church has never considered it necessary to condemn, and which she overlooks in compassion for the logical weakness of those who make it. I do not, then, by any means concede to you that a definition of faith or morals for the whole Church by the Sovereign Pontiff can be erroneous, and the moment you select any one and pronounce it erroneous, I shall pronounce you a heretic.

F. That you may indeed do, if the definition has been accepted by all the pastors of the Church.

B. I shall make no inquiry whether it has been so accepted or not; because the definition binds me in conscience the moment that I know the Pope has made it, as is evident from the fact, that, if I should refuse to believe it *ex animo*, or dare to reclaim against it, I should incur, *ipso facto*, excommunication. You are not by any means at liberty to withhold your obedience till you have consulted all the pastors of the Church, and ascertained whether they agree that it is due or not.

F. Well, be that as it may; if the Pope should command me to make war on my country, or bid me encroach on the rights of the temporal power, I will say, what I have heard even from Catholic pulpits, — I would scorn his command; I would refuse him obedience, and resist him to the utmost of my ability.

B. Very likely you would. But there is very little Catholic piety in abusing the Pope hypothetically, and if he has been so abused from Catholic pulpits, so much the more shame. But it is for us to leave the incumbents of those pulpits to answer to those who have received authority to call them to account for their conduct. We will say nothing of them, only, if they have done what their religion does not warrant, we will take care not to imitate them. Indiscreet men, no doubt, sometimes occupy pulpits; men who, in endeavouring to throw off one charge brought against the Church by her enemies, incur another not less dangerous. When one treats disrespectfully the Vicar of our Lord, and makes use of expressions that diminish our reverence for those the Holy Ghost has placed over us, we know he has forgotten himself, and is not acting in accordance with the instructions he has received. Thus

far I own I am not bound to follow him. The supposition you make is absurd and impossible, and it is idle to say what we would or would not do in case it should happen. Wait till the supposition becomes possible, before you make up your mind what you will do.

O. But is not a man's first duty to his country ?

B. No, Sir.

C. As I thought. I always believed the Catholic religion incompatible with patriotism and the rights of the civil power ; and this is the reason why, as an American and a republican, I, who am no bigot, and respect the rights of conscience in every one, deprecate its spread amongst us.

R. The Catholic owes allegiance to a foreign potentate, and therefore can never be a good citizen or a real patriot.

F. It is to prove that you are wrong that I have taken the ground I have, and which our venerable friend here, with his Ultramontanism and old world notions, attempts to controvert. Verily, I am half inclined to think he has just been disinterred from the Dark Ages, and supposes the world is now what it was then, and that he can safely revive old, obsolete ideas. Don't believe a word he says. He has, saving his presence and begging pardon of his years, no discretion, and neglects entirely the cardinal virtue of prudence.

M. I am, nevertheless, inclined to believe that you are wrong, and that he is a better expounder of Catholicity than you are. I should despise your Church, indeed, if she were what you would make her.

F. You say that because you despise her already, and delight to have her presented in the most odious light possible. I am not willing to hang a millstone round the neck of my religion ; and he who represents her in the light to which I object I must regard as her enemy.

B. Keep cool, my young friend, and do not let your zeal for your religion, which I perceive is very ardent just now, hurry you into rash judgments. Zeal, to be commendable, must be according to knowledge. I have said, and I repeat it, that my first duty is *not* to my country, and I will add that I do not find patriotism ever mentioned as a virtue at all. Nay, as far as I have studied the history of the Church, I have found an overweening patriotism, or nationality, among the very worst enemies religion has had to struggle against. It has been the fruitful cause of all, or nearly all, the schisms which have rent the seamless robe of our Lord, and among the most active causes

of the rise and continuance of all the great heresies of ancient and modern times. Protestantism would have been stillborn, if there had been no narrow and contemptible national feeling and prejudice in Germany, Holland, and England to come to serve as its nurse. What to me are the arbitrary lines and boundaries which separate nations, and as a consequence make them enemies. I know only two classes of mankind, — those who belong to the Church of God, and those who oppose her. The Church is my country, and Catholics are my compatriots, my kinsmen, my brothers, and my sisters, wherever born, wherever they live, of whatever nation, race, or color, — white, red, yellow, or black. Those who are not Catholics, whether pagans, Mahometans, Jews, or heretics, are all of one general class, the enemies of God and children of Satan ; for whose conversion and eternal salvation I am always to pray and labor, but with whom the less strict my connection the better. I am to do them good for God's sake, to the full extent of my power ; but beyond, I have no part or lot with them. Christianity introduces a higher bond of union than that of nationality, and bids me seek a higher glory than national heroism, and a sublimer virtue than patriotism. The Church is Catholic, and would mould all nations into one vast republic, melt all into one grand brotherhood, by uniting all in the same faith, the same hope, the same charity, the same worship, under the supreme law of God. In presence of this law, which is the same for all men, of whatsoever age or nation, talk not to me of your narrow and contracted patriotism ; and before the Church of God, commissioned to teach all nations till the end of time, dare never speak of your petty nationalities, or your diversities of race, sept, clan, or family.

No: my first duty is *not* to my country ; my first and my whole duty is to God, and to God alone. I owe no other duty than my duty to him, my only Sovereign, my only Lord and Master. Whatever duty I am bound to render to my country, my parents, my children, my friends, or my neighbours, is included integrally in my duty to him, and I am bound to render it to them only because I owe it to him, and he commands me to pay it to them. I am accountable to God alone; I am rightfully no creature's subject ; no man, in his own right, is my master, and I deny the legitimacy of all authority that derives from man, or has simply a human origin. No man, no body of men, has the inherent, underived right to command me, or to bind me, either in soul or body, in thought, will, or

deed. That portion of my duty to God which he commands me to render to my country, to the civil government, to parents, children, friends, or neighbours, I am bound for his sake to render them, and I shall fail in my obedience to him if I do not, — shall be guilty of a sin against him, and deserve his eternal wrath and condemnation.

You young radicals, in your wild enthusiasm and misdirected zeal for liberty, madly deny the very principle of liberty, and under pretence of asserting liberty assert the fundamental principle of slavery. You are poor statesmen, and poorer philosophers ; for you have not yet learned that the principle of all slavery, as of all tyranny, is in the assertion of man's native, inherent right to govern man, or what is the same thing, to institute and enforce government. Government of some sort you must have ; and therefore you must assert somewhere the right to govern, and consequently the duty of obedience. As you wish to be able to resist the governing authority when you choose, you declare it to be of human origin, well knowing that what is of human origin is never in itself sacred and inviolable, and that, being human, you, as also human, must have as much right to resist it as it can have to command you. Believing yourselves cleverer than the average of the people, and therefore concluding that you have above the average chance of being leaders and governors, if you can have a democratic constitution of the state, and confounding liberty with your own liberty to govern, you suppose that you have secured freedom when you have succeeded, not only in making government derive its powers from a purely human source, but from the multitude at large. Thus far all very well. But you do not look on the other side, and you see not that your assertion of the human origin of government, in order to be able to resist it when it does not suit you, is the denial of all right on the part of government to govern, and that therefore you are reduced to the alternative, either no government, as maintain Garrison, Foster, Abby Folsom, &c., or a government that has no right to govern, that is, an illegitimate government. The former is practicable only in theory ; practically, there will always be some government, for without government there is and can be no society, and without society man cannot live, since he is essentially social in his nature. Then you must adopt the latter, and then have only illegitimate government, that is to say, only usurpation and tyranny, under which there is and can be, in principle, only slavery.

Foolish boys, you fancy that you can have freedom without legitimate authority, and legitimate authority without God. But you can no more have a state without God than you can a universe. Political atheism implies universal atheism, and that in turn implies universal negation. An atheist may be a minister of state, but if there were no God there could be no state to administer; for the moment you ask what is the foundation of the state, you must have recourse to a law anterior to the state, by virtue of which it is organized or constituted; and the moment you ask the origin of that law, you must go back of the people to a law giving them the right to organize the state, and therefore back of creation itself, up to the creator, God, who alone, in the last analysis, is sovereign, the fountain of all authority, and of all law that is law.

Deriving the law from God, who has the inherent right to govern us as he will, because he has made us, and is both our Supreme Good and the Supreme Good in itself, we get a solid foundation for freedom. We then deny the principle of tyranny and slavery, the right of man to lord it over man; we declare all men equal before the law, therefore, as to their rights and duties, equal one to another; therefore, that one has no right of his own over another, and therefore, again, one owes nothing to another. Here is freedom, full and absolute, because there is nothing due except to God, the Supreme Good, and nothing demanded except what is due to him; because there is no arbitrary will or authority, and nothing is exactable from any one but what God himself has made so, and what he has made so can be exacted only by virtue of his authority, and according to the law he prescribes.

Since God is the Sovereign Good, the Supreme Good both in itself and of all his creatures, he has taken care to command us to pay as much of what we owe him to our country, to our civil rulers, to our parents, to our children, to our neighbours, as is necessary or proper for their and our good. Ascertain, then, what portion of my duty to God he has made payable to my country and the civil authorities, and that I will acknowledge myself bound in conscience, for his sake, to pay them; but I am bound to pay them nothing more, and even this only for the reason that he bids me do so.

F. That is all I ask. But when the clergy forget that, and either refuse themselves, or forbid others, to render it —

B. They will fail in their duty to God, and incur his condemnation. No doubt of it. When the sky falls, we shall catch larks.

F. You seem to speak as if that could never happen.

B. Remember, I speak not of heretical ministers, or the so-called sectarian clergy, for I do not count them as clergymen. I speak of the Catholic clergy, to a professed Catholic, and I ask him if he is not bound to believe that these are commissioned by Almighty God to teach him his duty.

F. Of course I am.

B. Then it would seem to be the ordination of God, not that you should sit in judgment on the clergy, and see whether they do or do not properly discharge their duty, but that you should go to them to learn yours. The clergy are ordained to teach you, not you to teach them, and you receive the will of God through the Church at their hands, not they at yours. They are your pastors, not you theirs; and the Holy Ghost has placed them over you, not you over them. The shepherd leads the flock, not the flock the shepherd.

F. I admit that the clergy are my guides in all spiritual matters, and that I am bound to obey the representatives of the Church in every thing spiritual. The Church is a spiritual, not a temporal kingdom, and in the spiritual order, under God, she has plenary sovereignty. Here my obedience is due to her, and if I do not yield it I am a bad Catholic. But in the temporal order she has no right to command me, and if her ministers attempt to do it, I have the right to resist them, and by the blessing of God I will resist them. I will perform my duty, but I will also preserve my rights.

B. So you have said, and nobody doubts your readiness to resist the pastors of your Church, and to display your prowess against the clergy. But you claim to be a Catholic, and I hold you bound to be true to Catholic teaching. Who then for us, as Catholics, has received authority from God to expound and declare unto us our duty to him, and to say what part is payable to him immediately, and what part is payable to our neighbour, to our country, or to the temporal order?

F. The Church is commissioned to teach us our duty in the spiritual order, and the state is supreme in the temporal order. Church and state are two separate and coördinate powers, each supreme and independent in its own order. The state is a usurper when it interferes in spirituals; and the Church, when it interferes in temporals. The state has no spiritual jurisdiction; the Church has no temporal jurisdiction.

B. Your reply is not precisely to the point; but let that pass. To whom belongs the right to tell us where is the line

that separates the two orders, and to define the powers of each, or to say when one does or does not encroach on the jurisdiction of the other?

F. Why, — why, — it belongs to each to decide in its own case.

B. And suppose there should be disagreement, and the two orders should set up conflicting claims, who or where is the umpire to decide between them?

F. As to that, no umpire is needed ; the line between the two orders is so broad and plain, that there can be no mistake as to where it is.

B. So you may think ; but you must be aware that there has been, if not mistake, at least disagreement, and Protestants with one voice tell you, that the Church during the Middle Ages attempted perpetually to encroach upon the temporal jurisdiction of princes, while all Catholics worthy of the name maintain the contrary, that the princes were constantly usurping the rights and prerogatives of the Church, and that all she attempted was to resist their usurpation, and maintain the independence and freedom of the spiritual order. If you have not forgotten the controversies about Investitures and kindred matters between the Popes and the German Emperors, the Clarendon Constitutions, and struggles between the Archbishops of Canterbury and the kings of England. You must know that there have been grave and earnest disputes between the two orders. The Church, too, has temporal possessions, churches, convents, abbeys, lands, endowments, bestowed upon her by the piety and zeal of her children for spiritual purposes. Do these pertain to the temporal order or to the spiritual order ? Has the Church jurisdiction in regard to her own temporalities, or does the jurisdiction pertain by right and inherently to the state ? You are very ignorant of history if you know not that the Church has on this question decided one way, and the temporal order, for the most part, the other. Practically, then, the line is not so broad and obvious that no mistakes or disagreements can arise between the two powers. Where do you lodge the power to decide ? You say, virtually, nowhere. So Almighty God has left his work incomplete, and in certain cases that may and do arise, we simple believers have no means of knowing what is our duty, whether we are to obey the Church or join with the temporal order against her ; whether we are to fight for her, or against her. Suppose the two powers are in conflict ; the Church, by virtue of the obedi-

ence I owe her, calls upon me to rally to her side, and to resist what she denounces as the tyranny and sacrilege of the civil power ; and the civil power, by virtue of my allegiance to it, calls upon me to rally to its standard, and aid it in maintaining what it calls its rights against ecclesiastical usurpation. Here is a case of conscience. Which am I in conscience bound to obey ? Now, when a Catholic has a case of conscience, to whom does he go, to whom is he bound to go, for its solution ? To the minister of state, or to the priest of the Church ? Are questions of conscience spiritual or temporal ? Do they pertain to the temporal jurisdiction or to the spiritual ?

F. To the spiritual, of course.

B. Very well. I go, then, with my case of conscience to my parish priest. He either cannot or will not solve it, or does not solve it to suit me ; appeal may then be made to the bishop ; and from the Bishop to the chair of St. Peter, to the Sovereign Pontiff, the ultimate appeal in all questions of the sort. The Pope will decide, because, by the very terms of the supposition, he, as the supreme Head and Ruler of the Church, under God, has already decided, that my duty is to obey the Church, and support her against the encroaching temporal authority. He had decided the case in the outset by commanding me to resist the temporal authority. In the case, as it goes up to him by appeal, you as a Catholic cannot deny his right to decide, and therefore his decision here binds me in conscience. But his right to decide on the appeal is only the right to declare what is the law in the case, the very right he exercised when he issued his command, and if I have no right in the one case to appeal from his decision, I have none in the other. As I have no right, as must be conceded, to appeal from the decision on appeal, I had none to appeal from his command in the outset.

F. So it would seem, I grant.

B. Then the Church is herself the judge for all the faithful in the case, and it is hers to define her own powers, the extent of her jurisdiction, and, in thus defining her own jurisdiction, the extent of the spiritual order, to define the powers and extent of the temporal order. You began, my young friend, by putting the cart before the horse. You said you honored the Church in her place, and the clergy in their own sphere. You would have spoken more like a Christian, if you had said, I honor and obey the state in its own place, and I respect and obey the ministers of state so long as they keep within their own sphere ;

but when they come out of it, and intermeddle with spiritual matters, I will neither honor nor obey them ; for I must obey God rather than man.

M. I am no Catholic, but I have always maintained that a consistent Catholic must assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and, begging F's pardon, I must regard him either as insincere in his professions of temporal independence, and making them merely for Buncombe, or as wholly ignorant of the first principles of his religion, nay, of all religion, if religion. One may see what his principles lead to in the history of the German Protestant Churches, and of the Anglican Church, the handiwork of Henry the Eighth and his saintly daughter Elizabeth. One or the other order must be supreme ; and if we shrink from claiming supremacy for the spiritual order, we must concede it to the temporal, and thus subject conscience to the civil magistrate, and convert the Church into a mere police establishment, and ministers of religion into a part of the constabulary force of the state. If religion is any thing at all but mere state craft, it is the supreme law, to which men in the temporal order, as well as in the spiritual, must conform.

R. But, if we allow religion to be supreme, and identify it with the Catholic faith and worship, what security have we that the Catholic Church will not abuse her power, and bring us into a hopeless spiritual bondage ?

F. That is precisely the difficulty I foresaw, and I consequently claimed for myself and all men the right when it abused its powers to resist it ?

G. All very well ; but you as a Catholic can have no right to decide for yourself when she does or does not abuse her powers ; for that would be private judgment, which your Church does not allow. You cannot allow the state to decide, for that would be the monstrous absurdity of raising the temporal order above the spiritual, against which our Puritan fathers so earnestly protested, and which gave rise to their dissent from the Anglican Establishment. I see no way of solving the difficulty but by rejecting all distinction between the two orders, or rather, by restricting the powers of the state to a very few matters, and recognizing no Church authority at all. I am a democrat in my politics, and a liberalist in my religion.

B. Of which you have more reason to be ashamed than to boast. You gain nothing, except the exchange of faith for unbelief or indifference, and order for anarchy. And then, what

you choose to allow or disallow alters nothing of what God has established. You can deny Christianity if you choose, but that does not make it false, or you wise in denying it ; you can say there shall be no Church authority, but if God has established the Catholic Church with the authority she claims, what you say will not alter the fact, and though that authority may crush you, you will not be able to crush it. It is idle for men to talk as you do, as if they had the sovereign disposal of all things. Remember the world is not of your making, and that its government is not committed to your hands. God reigns and will reign, whether it suits you or not.

As to the difficulty you raise, it only demonstrates the folly of my very clever young friends. Never make impossible suppositions, or suppositions which are intrinsically absurd. The Church, if a human institution, may abuse her powers, and you can have no guaranty against her doing so ; but no Catholic concedes that she is a human institution, or attempts to defend her as such, unless he is a fool. The very supposition of the Church is the supposition that she is an institution specially created and protected by Almighty God to teach us what he commands us to believe and do, and his whole Divine nature is pledged that she shall do this infallibly. This pledge is guaranty enough, and there is no room to reserve to ourselves the right to resist her in case she should abuse her trust or get out of her place. She cannot abuse her trust, because God will not suffer her to do it. You deny the Catholicity you profess, if you maintain the contrary, or allow it to be supposable.

F. But this is no answer to those not Catholics.

B. I have, at present, nothing to do with them, and I have no disposition to go out of my way to attempt to satisfy those who are incapable of being satisfied. I have no means of satisfying those who believe my Church a mere human institution, except by convincing them that she is not a human institution, but the very Church of God. I cannot expect, and I shall not try, to make her acceptable to those who it is assumed are to continue to be her enemies. I cannot make the same thing be and not be at the same time.

Your whole difficulty, however, grows out of the fact, that you mistake the division line between the spiritual order and the temporal. You include in the temporal order the whole moral law, or law of God, in so far as it is the measure of our secular life. Here is your fundamental error. No man, no body of men, no community, no state, no nation, has the right

to do wrong, and every one is bound to do right. The measure of right in all orders, and the sole measure of right, is the law of God, and to teach and judge of that law is a purely spiritual function, not a function of the temporal order, and therefore it belongs universally to the spiritual authority, and not at all to the temporal. I do not claim temporal jurisdiction for the Church, and she leaves the temporal order free in all that is purely temporal ; but she does not recognize in it any spiritual competency, and therefore does not acknowledge its right to teach and judge of the law of God, that is, the moral law, in any sphere. Within the limits of that law the temporal order may do what it pleases, and the faithful are bound by their duty to God to obey it ; but the acts of the temporal order which transgress those limits trench upon the spiritual order, and are therefore illegal ; and if they require us to act in violation of the moral law, — that is, the law of God, — we are not only not bound, but even forbidden, to obey them ; for we must obey God rather than men. The Church, as the keeper and expounder of that law, does not administer temporal affairs, but she does claim and possess the right to define the moral law which must govern them and the authorities administering them. She is, under God, and by his special appointment, the teacher and supreme judge of all morality, and therefore of the morality of seculars, and of their morality in secular affairs as well as in any others. Whatever pertains to morals comes, by its nature, within the jurisdiction of the spiritual order.

What you are to remember is, that you are to be moral, that is, to obey the law of God in all your acts, to whatever department they belong, and that the state, the civil or temporal order, has no competency as a moral teacher, has no authority at all to decide what the law of God does or does not command, even in regard to secular matters. It has no spiritual function whatever, and is bound to receive the law of God from the spiritual authority, and to take care and transgress no one of its precepts. Your error is in supposing that the temporal order is itself the teacher and judge of the law of God, in so far as that law extends to secular life. This is a monstrous error ; for it completely sunders religion and morality, confines religion to the service of the temple, and subjects the whole moral order to the temporal authority, — the very thing the enemies of religion are always attempting to do, and which I am sorry to find one who calls himself a Catholic ready to aid them to do.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Speech of Hon. Daniel Webster on Mr. Clay's Resolutions in the Senate of the United States, March 7, 1850.* Washington: Gideon & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 64.
2. — *Slavery and the Union. A Lecture delivered in the Tabernacle, New York.* By the Rev. J. W. CUMMINGS, D. D. New York Freeman's Journal, May 25, 1850.
3. — *Review of Mr. Webster's Speech on Slavery.* By WENDELL PHILLIPS. Boston: American A. S. Society. 1850.
4. — *Letter of Hon. Horace Mann, M. C., to his Constituents.* Boston Atlas, May 6, 1850.

MR. WENDELL PHILLIPS'S Review of Mr. Webster's Speech we have not done ourselves the honor to read. Mr. Phillips is himself a man of very respectable talents and attainments, — a man abundantly able to distinguish himself without resorting to eccentricity of movement, or wild and savage fanaticism of conduct, — and is therefore utterly inexcusable for taking the course he does. We have introduced his pamphlet, published by the American Anti-slavery Society, solely as an occasion to assure that Society and its friends, that we make it a point of conscience never to read any of its publications, and to request it and them to spare themselves the trouble of sending us any Abolition publication whatever. We know already all we wish to know of the Abolitionists, and we should be sorry to be compelled to think more unfavorably of them than we now do. They are a class of persons who do not improve upon acquaintance, and we learned enough of them in former years to be certain that the less we know of them, the higher shall we esteem them.

Of the Hon. Horace Mann's Letter to his Constituents we have little to say. Mr. Mann is a member of Congress from the Eighth Congressional District of this Commonwealth; he bears at home the character of a philanthropist, and is said to have won some withered laurels in a controversy with the Boston schoolmasters a few years since, when he was Secretary of our Board of Education. He has some skill in the construction of sentences, is able to give passable lessons in orthography, and perhaps in the rudiments of English Grammar; but we have never understood that he was remarkable as a logician, a lawyer, or a statesman. He had some reputation as a Lyceum-lecturer, but we do not find that he has added to it by his speeches in Congress. He is a man we would not treat unkindly, nay, whom we would treat with great tenderness, and therefore we shall offer no comments on his Letter to his Constituents.

Dr. Cummings's Lecture is a bold, frank, manly production, marked by practical good sense, ready wit, good-natured ridicule, Christian feeling, and true wisdom and prudence. It is upon the whole, from the point of view of religion and morals, the best word we have heard spoken on the subject of slavery and the Union. The lecturer had no novelties to advance, no speculations of his own to bring out; he had nothing to do but to apply the great principles of his holy religion to a pressing moral, social, and political question, and he has done it with a success that leaves little to be desired. He is no advocate of slavery; he is no apologist of the slaveholder; he holds that slavery is an evil, and that we should labor to get rid of it; but in such way only as will not lead to a greater evil. Yet he does not concede that it is *malum in se*, or contend that a man by owning slaves necessarily forfeits his Christian character. The Church does not sanction slavery, nor does she command its abolition as an act of justice. She commands the slave to be obedient for God's sake, and the master to treat his slave with kindness and humanity, and then remits the whole matter to the operation of Christian charity on the hearts of both the slave and his master. Great as the evil of slavery may be, the evil of disunion, or the disruption of the Union of the States, would be incalculably greater, and consequently, however much we may be opposed to slavery, and however desirous we may be to remove it, we are forbidden to attempt its abolition by any measures incompatible with our constitutional duties, or with the peace and prosperity of the Union.

This is the true ground, and the only ground which we can take either as Christians or as American citizens. It is the ground we ourselves took in an essay on the subject in *The Boston Quarterly Review* for April, 1838, and which we have uniformly maintained ever since. Even in the days of our wildest radicalism, we never suffered ourselves to maintain that it is lawful to do evil that good may come; that it is ever permitted to break up a social or political order for the sake of getting rid of an evil which is found to exist under it. Our doctrine was even then, as it is now, that evils existing under a social or political order are to be removed by and in consonance with that order, never by its destruction, and, when not so removable, are to be patiently submitted to as the less evil of the two. We doubtless uttered in those days a great many false, a great many foolish, a great many dangerous opinions, but we were never of the no-government sect; we were never, strictly speaking, a revolutionist; we never held that it can be lawful to resist legitimate authority, or that we are permitted, for the sake of social or political amelioration, to break up an established order of things. We never dreamed of the possibility of effecting reforms in contravention of law, or held the false notion that liberty and

order are antagonistic. We were never so blinded as not to see that order is the only possible condition of freedom, or that order is impossible without government. No doubt we emitted from time to time opinions that imply the contrary, but never any which, when putting them forth, we saw or believed to imply the contrary.

We have always conceded slavery to be an evil, and an evil of which it is highly desirable to get rid; but we have always maintained that it is one of those social evils that it is lawful to remove only in accordance with fidelity to the Constitution and the Federal Union, and that in so far as it cannot be so removed we are not in any respect to meddle with it. The law which binds us to support the Union, to preserve our political order inviolate, is paramount to any law that can bind us to labor for the emancipation of the slave. This is the view we have always taken, and when we had far more influence in political matters than we now have, or are likely ever to have again, we so fully developed it that we have no occasion to add any thing in support of it now. If there are any who wish to see it developed and supported in a triumphant manner, we refer them to the *Lecture of Dr. Cummings*.

Mr. Webster, in his masterly Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions, takes up the subject as a senator, and considers it from the point of view of his constitutional duty. His speech itself, in our judgment, does the distinguished senator more credit as a man and as a statesman than any other he has ever made. It was worthy of his station and of the occasion, and, in the circumstances in which it was delivered, rises above mere intellectual greatness, and approaches the morally sublime. The orator rises to the full dignity of the American senator, above all sectional prejudices, and all party interests and personal ambition, to those high moral and constitutional principles which so many lose sight of, but which should ever animate and guide the American statesman. We have never been associated with the political party with which Mr. Webster usually acts, but we have read his speech with joy to find that public virtue has yet one champion in our country, and that the principles on which the stability of our republic rests have still one eloquent voice that fears not to proclaim them.

Mr. Webster is far more strongly opposed to domestic slavery than we are, and he has never, during his whole public life, failed to do all in his power to prevent its further extension. We know no man in the country more strongly opposed to slavery, or who would go farther, within the limits of the Constitution, to repress and even abolish it. But he is no fanatic, no revolutionist, no mad philanthropist, who, in pursuit of a particular good, is ready to trample down by the way a thousandfold more good than he can possibly gain in gaining the particular end he seeks. He is a

statesman, a moralist, and holds that he has no right to trample on the Constitution he has sworn to support, or to prove faithless to the solemn engagements formed under it. As a senator, he holds it his paramount duty to be loyal to the Union, and faithful to the Constitution. He is not the man to hold office under a constitution, to swear to support it, and, like the radical Senator from New York, to deny its binding force, and claim the right to violate it as often as it may fail to correspond to his private opinion, private caprice, or personal ambition. He is far enough behind the age, far enough behind the Hon. William H. Seward, to hold that law is sacred, and the Constitution inviolable. This may be unfavorable to his popularity with mere radical politicians, and may bring down upon him the censures of *The New York Tribune*, the organ of the American Socialists, and of *The Boston Atlas*, the organ of the men, as John Randolph termed them, of "seven principles,— five loaves and two fishes"; but we dare maintain that it is honorable to him as a statesman, and we doubt not will secure him the warm approbation of the majority of the American people, certainly of all whose approbation it would not be discreditable to have.

Every body has read Mr. Webster's speech, and we have no need of attempting its analysis. The objections we have heard to it are two, that Mr. Webster has contradicted in it the views he has heretofore maintained on the subject of slavery, and yielded too much to the slave interest. In regard to the first, it is well known that Mr. Webster early declared himself opposed to all extension of slave territory. His ground has always been that, where slavery already exists by local laws, there it must be left, and the federal government and non-slaveholding States have no right to interfere with it, and are bound to fulfil in regard to it all the stipulations of the Constitution; but the accession of new slave territory, or the extension of slavery into new territories, where it has no legal existence, is to be steadily resisted as far as it can be by constitutional and legal means. This is what we have always understood to be his doctrine on the subject. Accordingly, we find him resisting with all his might the annexation of Texas, and the acquisition of New Mexico and California. The measures which annexed Texas and the territory acquired from Mexico, he opposed to the last moment that opposition could be legal or constitutional,— but, as is well known, without success. The measures were consummated. They were no longer open questions, and consequently the question for the statesman was itself changed. Texas being annexed, California and New Mexico acquired, what is now the duty of the American senator? Evidently to carry out in good faith the obligations contracted with the new territory, by the action of the government, whether favorable or unfavorable to slavery. This is all Mr. Webster has done, or proposed to do, and this implies no change of

his views of slavery, and no action inconsistent with the principles by which he had always professed to regulate his public conduct on the subject.

The men who accuse him of having changed his views or conduct cannot be sincere in their accusation. They are disappointed and vexed that he has not taken sides with them, and given the sanction of his name and authority to their mad schemes of agitation, or to the illegal and destructive policy which they wish to pursue, and which they are aware is essential to their own distinction, or attainment to power or place. In calm, peaceful times, when none but legal and orderly measures are tolerated, there is, as they well know, no chance for them to emerge from their native insignificance, no opportunity for them to exert the slightest influence in public affairs. It is only in times of violent agitation, of revolution, of confusion, when reason has lost her empire, and passion is enthroned in her place, that little men can usurp the places of great men, and miserable demagogues the places of wise and accomplished statesmen. Settle the question on constitutional grounds, and remove all pretext for agitation, and what would become of your Greeleys, your Schoulers, your Garrisons, your Burleighs, your Fosters, and your Abby Folsoms? Who would ever hear of them again? Where would be the hopes of your Toombses, your Yulees, your Chases, your Sowards, your Manns, and your Palfreys? These men can gain notoriety only by eccentricity, and rise to importance only when the community is distracted by lawless and unprincipled agitation. The moment they fall into the ranks of the friends of order, and of straightforward legal and constitutional action, they are entirely overlooked. What they most fear is the settlement of the question. They vent their spite on Mr. Webster, because he throws the whole weight of his name, his character, his authority, and his eminent abilities into the scale of legal and constitutional policy, and because in doing so the storm is likely to be allayed, and the vexed questions quietly and peaceably disposed of. They also charge him with inconsistency, because they think it something in their favor to dare attack a great man, and something pretty sure to call forth the approbation of their followers, as the poodles all are always filled with admiration when the hound attacks the lion, although sure not to overcome him. Only think, a lion attacked! What a brave dog, not to fear to attack a lion, and contend with him!

As to the second objection, it is undoubtedly well founded, if Abolitionist fanatics are to be listened to; but if we hold to the inviolability of the Constitution, and to the faith of contracts formed under it, it is ridiculous. Mr. Webster yields to slavery just what he is bound to yield to it by the Constitution and the conditions on which Texas was admitted into the Union. Less than this he could not do, with-

out violating his oath to the Constitution, and his obligations as a senator, and more he does not propose to do. The great merit of Mr. Webster's speech is in showing in a clear, calm, and dignified manner, that all the excitement in Congress and out of Congress on the slavery question is "much ado about nothing." Really there is no question to settle. Texas is admitted into the Union as a slave State with the Missouri Compromise. This is settled, and there is no undoing it now. The contract admitting Texas authorizes the formation with her consent of four additional States out of her territory, and south of a given parallel of latitude, with or without slavery, according to the will of the new States themselves. No statesman is at liberty to violate that contract, and we are bound, whatever our views of slavery, to carry out its stipulations in good faith. Here, then, the question is also settled, and nothing remains to be done. As to California and New Mexico, slavery can never go there, for the reason that it does not come to Massachusetts. The climate, soil, and productions are such as to prevent it from being profitable. A law paramount to all laws of man excludes it, as it has excluded it from all New England, and there is no need of introducing provisos to keep it out. There is then really no question to be settled; for so long as the territory of the Union remains as it is, the whole question is already settled, and slavery has its bounds fixed, beyond which it cannot pass, any more than if hemmed in by a wall of adamant. How, then, can you say that Mr. Webster has yielded too much to slavery?

Fault is found with Mr. Webster for his support of an effective law for the recovery of fugitive slaves. But the non-slaveholding States are clearly bound by the Constitution to give up such fugitives, and Congress has the unquestionable right to pass a law for their recovery. Nobody dare deny either of these positions. But it is said the law does not provide for a jury trial. In the first place, we do not place as much confidence in jury trials as some of our countrymen do, and as a general principle we are opposed to extending it beyond its present limits. In the second place, a jury in the case would be an unheard of anomaly in our system of jurisprudence. In no instance is it demanded or provided in the case of fugitives from justice. All appear satisfied that a man accused of crime should be surrendered for trial to the authorities of the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, and nobody has as yet demanded that he should not be surrendered but upon the verdict of a jury. We can see no reason why a jury should not be demanded in the case of fugitives from justice, as well as in the case of fugitive slaves, especially since the former are far more numerous than the latter. A white man's liberty is worth as much in our eyes as a black man's, and we are by no means disposed to make the negroes a privileged class. But a jury trial in the case

of fugitives from justice would be an absurdity, because the question to be decided before giving them up is, not whether they are guilty or not, for that question can be decided only where the offence is said to have been committed, but simply whether they shall be given up to be tried. The fugitive from justice is not given up as guilty, but simply as accused by a legal authority, and no jury is needed to try the fact whether he is so accused or not. So the person claimed as a fugitive slave is not surrendered as a slave, and the question to be decided is not whether he is really a slave or not, but simply whether he is claimed as such by a legal authority or not. The legality of the claim is another question, and must be settled in the courts of the State in which it is alleged the person claimed is held to service. A jury in his case would be as great an absurdity as in the case of the fugitive from justice. Undoubtedly no one, under the Constitution, can be deprived of his liberty without a trial by jury, but not therefore may no one be detained in prison for trial, for the law does not regard one as deprived of his liberty till after trial and the judgment of the court. Then the demand for the jury is not made in the interests of justice, not for the purpose of preventing persons from being given up as fugitive slaves who are not such, but for the purpose of screening those who are, and preventing those from being given up whom the Constitution declares shall be. We have in the Constitution pledged ourselves to surrender fugitive slaves; we are bound to do it in the way provided by a law of Congress, and it is not at all to our credit to try to get a law which will practically defeat the end for which it is enacted.

The whole difficulty on the subject of slavery grows out of the fact that the antislavery party really denies the obligation of all constitutions and laws. It professes to appeal from the state to the law of humanity, or the law of God, for God and humanity are for it identical. Mr. Seward appeals to the Bible, and professes to find there a law of God which forbids him to do what he is required to do by the Constitution. The law of God is paramount to the Constitution; we must obey God rather than man. And therefore he concludes that he is justifiable in refusing to perform that duty. If this be so, he is bound to resign his seat in the Senate; for, according to him, the Constitution conflicts with the law of God. No man can lawfully hold office under, and swear to support, a constitution that is repugnant to the law of God. Mr. Seward, while he holds his seat, denies to himself the right to make the appeal from the Constitution; for if he can lawfully hold his seat, the Constitution does not conflict with the law of God; and if he continues to hold his seat, believing that it does so conflict, he practically declares that the fact of its so conflicting does not in the least derogate from its authority. In either case he only declares that

the appeal does not lie, and proves, probably, what few who know him are disposed to doubt, that he is as little to be esteemed as a lawyer as he is as a theologian.

Certainly we are not among those who deny that the law of God is in all cases supreme, and we certainly hold that no act of human legislation that conflicts with it is or can be binding; but we do not hold that Mr. Seward or any one else has a right to assume that the law of God is whatever he chooses to have it, and to plead it as he makes it as his justification for refusing to perform his constitutional duty. Every one is bound to regard the Constitution as conformable to the law of God, till he is able, on an authority paramount to that of the state, to declare the contrary. Those who wish to see the question settled, whether the Federal Constitution is incompatible with the law of God, will do well to read Dr. Cummings's Lecture. That it is not contrary to the law of God to restore a fugitive slave to his master, is pretty evident from the fact that St. Paul restored, after having converted him, the fugitive slave Onesimus to his master Philemon. St. Paul is for us a better authority for what is or is not the law of God, than the Hon. Wm. H. Seward, William L. Garrison, or Abby Folsom. If every one is free to interpret the law of God as he pleases, there is an end of all law and of all government; for every one will interpret the Divine law in a sense that will annul every human law he does not choose to obey.

We confess we do not regard the slave question as of any great intrinsic importance. Slavery is an evil in relation to the master and the state, but, aside from its abuses, it is not necessarily an evil to the slave. The negroes are far better off on our Southern plantations than they are in their native Africa, and they would, as a body, lose rather than gain by emancipation. It is all very fine to declaim in favor of liberty and against slavery; but the negroes, if emancipated, would not, with individual exceptions, be free; they would be a degraded and dependent class, with all the responsibilities of freedom and none of its advantages. We have, in order to be sure of this, only to look at the free negroes in our own Northern cities. They cannot take rank with the whites as free and independent citizens. If they were not separated from the dominant class by color, if they could become merged in the general population of the country, the case would be different; but as it now is, for the masters to emancipate them would be little less cruel than for a father to turn his sons and daughters under age out of his house, and bid them go and take care of themselves.

But be this as it may, slavery has in this country very nearly reached its limits, for the very sufficient reason that a much further extension of it would be ruinous to the slave-owners. Slave labor can sustain itself only in the production of certain staples for com-

merce, and in our country only in the production of rice, cotton, sugar, and tobacco, and these four great staples are pushed about as far as the markets of the world will admit. The demand for cotton is destined to diminish rather than increase, not only because foreign nations will be unable to take the quantities they now take, in consequence of the continually decreasing demand in our own country for their productions and manufactures, but because linen, silk, and wool will soon to a great extent take its place, as they are already beginning to do. The present commercial and industrial system, which builds up large cities, trading-houses, and corporations, while it reduces the mass of the people to abject poverty, cannot last for ever, and either the world will soon come to an end, or nations will be obliged to return to the system of really domestic, really home industry, — a system which will render *families* as well as nations comparatively independent of one another. Commerce and manufactures have nearly, if not quite, reached their maximum, and a change in the industry of all civilized nations must before long take place, and in this change slavery will be abolished, because it will be utterly unable to sustain itself in competition with free labor. It must gradually die out, and it seems to us that all we are called upon to do in regard to it is, to correct, as far as we can legally and morally, its abuses. In a Christian community slavery is no great evil, and in a community not Christian, if you have not domestic slavery, you will have other evils still worse.

The greatest evil in any country just now, after the frightful infidelity so prevalent, is fanaticism, which goes by the name of philanthropy, and our grand error has been in indulging it till it has become nearly unmanageable. In no State in the Union, we are sorry to say, is this moral pestilence more rife than in this ancient Commonwealth. It infects our whole society, and turns a large portion of our citizens into madmen. It destroys our judgments, our moral life, and is fast bringing us into a bondage to which Southern slavery is freedom. It rages in the legislature and in the halls of justice, and spits its venom from sectarian pulpit and press. The well-disposed are overawed, the sober-minded are browbeaten into silence, and even the brave wellnigh quail before it. Something must be done to stay it, or all that is dear and sacred to Christians and freemen is gone. Not a few of those who see and deplore the evil are guilty of a shameful cowardice in regard to it. Let the honest, sober, and sensible portion of the community resist it boldly, denounce it, and give it no quarter, not even a hearing, and it would soon cease to exist. But we have not dared to do this. We have tampered with it, we have courted it, hoping to turn it to the advantage of our sect or our party. It is high time to put an end to this worse than folly, and to speak and act like high-minded and moral men. Most happy are we that Mr. Webster, from his

place in the Senate of the United States, has set us an example worthy of imitation, and we hope that his timely word will rouse our courage, and inspire us with resolution to shake off the tyranny of fanaticism.

5. — *Religion in Society: or the Solution of Great Problems placed within the Reach of every Mind.* From the French of the ABBÉ MARTINET. With an Introduction by the Right Reverend JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Bishop of New York. New York: D. & J. Sadlier, 58 Gold Street. Boston, 72 Federal Street. Montreal, C. E., 179 Notre-Dame Street. 1850. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 191 and 270.

WE have already expressed our opinion of this work under its French title, *Solution des Grands Problèmes*, and it was at our suggestion and earnest request that its translation was undertaken. We need not, therefore, say that we welcome its publication in an English dress. Without pretending that it is in all respects perfect, that its language is in every instance exact, or that it always adopts the best line of argument, we regard it as one of the most brilliant, and, upon the whole, most satisfactory, popular works on the several topics it takes up that we are acquainted with. The entire work consists of four volumes, and is intended to answer three great questions; — 1. "What is it to be a man?" 2. "What is it to be a Christian?" and 3. "Can society be saved without returning to Catholicity?" These are great problems, and the volumes before us contain the answer to the first two; the remaining two volumes, which we trust the public will soon call for, are devoted to the solution of the last. Of the wit and sprightliness, as well as real depth and earnestness of the author, our readers who recollect the *Salve for the Bite of the Black Serpent*, noticed in our Review for April, 1845, may form a tolerably fair opinion, for the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole is no other, we are assured, than the learned, philosophical, and pious Abbé Martinet, the author of *Platon-Polichinelle*. The Abbé turns the laugh upon the other side, and without departing ever from the dignity of his subject or his profession, covers the enemies of religion and society with a ridicule as just as it is irresistible. We have room only for one slight specimen. The author thinks the learned men of the last century gave an undue importance to atheism by treating it as a serious malady. "All the blows inflicted by the Herculean club of the Sorbonne," he says, "are not so effectual as the box on the ear of a celebrated unbeliever, given by the hand of beauty. After having in vain preached to a circle of ladies, he attempted to revenge himself, by saying, 'Pardon my error, ladies, — I did not

imagine that, in a house where wit vies with grace, I alone should have the honor of not believing in God.' 'You are not alone, Sir,' answered the mistress of the mansion; 'my horses, my dog, my cat, share that honor with you; only these poor brutes have the good sense not to boast of it.'"

The translation has been executed with taste, spirit, and fidelity, and has the freedom, freshness, and glow of original composition. The work has suffered nothing by being translated, and we read it with more pleasure in the translation than in the original. As far as we have compared, we have found the sense of the original faithfully, and in general felicitously, rendered, and throughout expressed in pure, idiomatic English. We commend it as a model to those of our friends who are engaged in translating Catholic works from the French.

In glancing through these volumes we have found a few typographical errors, which we trust will be corrected in the second edition. We have space now to point out only one, Vol. I. p. 99, where the author is made to say of our Lord, "He assembled its awful legislation in the Sermon on the Mount, in which, exalting all that man prizes, overthrowing all that he adores," &c. It should be, "exalting all that man despises,"—*l'homme méprise*. The others we have noticed are of less moment. We return our thanks to the accomplished translator for giving to our public, Protestant as well as Catholic, a work of no ordinary interest and value, and which all who ever ask themselves, "What is it to be a man?" and "What is it to be a Christian?" will do well to read and study long and thoroughly. We cannot better close this brief notice than in the words of the distinguished prelate who has honored the work with a brief but admirable introduction. "These volumes will come to the American reader with freshness and novelty. They will take their place amongst our standard works of literature, and both the gifted and accomplished translator and the spirited publishers will have merited, and I trust will receive, the thanks of the Catholic and the literary public."

6.—*Études Critiques sur le Rationalisme Contemporain*. Par l'ABBÉ H. DE VALROGER, Chanoine Honoraire de Bayeux, et Professeur au Séminaire de Sommervieu. Paris. 1846. 8vo. pp. 612.

THIS volume is devoted to a critical examination of "Eclectisme Rationaliste et du Syncretisme; de l'Histoire de la Philosophie et de la Philosophie de l'Histoire," as set forth by Cousin, Jouffroy, Damiron, Lerminier, Pierre Leroux, and others, and is the best work on the subject that we have seen from a French author. The Abbé de Valroger, as a critic on the philosophical systems of the

day, whether French or German, is inferior only to Gioberti, — who in this respect is unrivalled, let him be what he may in others, — and we commend his *Etudes Critiques* to all who are engaged in the study of philosophy, and especially to professors of moral and intellectual philosophy in our colleges, whether Catholic or Protestant.

7. — *Lettres et Discours de M. Donoso Cortès, traduit l'Espagnol.* Paris. 1850.

THIS is a *brochure* published by the Electoral Committee of Religious Liberty at Paris. Its author is the Marquis de Valdegamas, a distinguished Spanish nobleman, and Minister of Spain at the Court of Berlin. He is the Count Montalembert of Spain, and one of the most eminent Catholic laymen in Europe. We shall endeavour to seize an early opportunity to give our readers some account of his very remarkable and most deeply interesting Letters and Discourses.

8. — *La Vérité sur la Loi de l'Enseignement.* Par MGR. PARISIS, Evêque de Langres, Membre de l'Assemblée Législative. Paris. 1850.

WE know not where one, anxious to obtain the materials for forming a correct judgment of the law on Instruction recently adopted by the French government, can better obtain them than in this pamphlet by the distinguished Bishop of Langres. We have read it with great care, and we confess, that, while the law strikes us as unnecessarily complicated, and far from perfect, we cannot but regard it upon the whole as a great gain for religion, and likely to have a salutary effect in its practical workings. Its restrictive clauses will, practically, operate only against Socialists and enemies of social order. The French bishops and clergy have been divided as to their opinions of its merits, but it appears to have been approved at Rome, and, in view of the peculiar circumstances of France at the present moment, the bishops are permitted to coöperate with the government in carrying it into effect. The Holy Father, however, exhorts them, where the result of the law would be mixed schools, to establish separate schools for Catholics. He also admonishes them "to call often to the recollection of the faithful the fundamental dogma, — Out of the Catholic Church there is no salvation." We hope that those who have abused us for insisting on this dogma, and protesting with all our might against latitudinarianism and indifferentism, will hereafter be silent, or cease to

call themselves Catholics. It perhaps would not be amiss for the publishers of *St. Vincent's Manual* to take the hint, and leave out of their future editions the impertinent note appended to the Profession of Faith, or, as it is called, the Creed of Pope Pius the Fourth. Such notes are not called for, and if they do not make heretics, they tend at least to make namby-pamby Catholics. If the qualification called for is necessary, why did not Pius the Fourth add it? Why did he leave our profession of faith to be completed by an anonymous editor? The Holy Father is continually admonishing the bishops and clergy of the importance of impressing upon the faithful themselves the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, and yet we can hardly take up a single prayer-book or manual of devotion which does not even go out of the way to assure the faithful, virtually, that the Catholic faith is not necessary except for Catholics, and we have in our possession a book in which the author, professedly a Catholic, teaches that a Catholic having become a Methodist may yet be saved, through invincible ignorance, without returning to the Church! The effect of these latitudinarian doctrines is seen in our own country, and in all Europe, and on four different occasions the present Holy Father has expressly warned the faithful against them, and we must believe it is time for us to pay some heed to his admonitions, even though by doing so we may have to confess past carelessness. It is only when we sleep that the enemy sows tares in our fields.

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9. — *Loretto, or the Choice : a Story written for the Old and the Young.* In four Parts. Baltimore: Heidan. 1850. 32mo. pp. 274.

THIS story must have been written by a man of real genius, a layman, and a man who is or has been in some sense a man of the world, — a poet, and a musician; but also by a well-instructed Catholic, who loves as well as knows his religion, and does not disdain to practise it. The author is still young, and lacks a little that serenity and repose which belong to more advanced years, but he shows all the qualities in this little work necessary to place him in the front rank of contributors to the Catholic literature of this country. We have read *Loretto* with great care and with intense interest. It is happily conceived, and well executed. It indicates on the part of the author dramatic power of a high order. The characters are original, distinct, and sustained, if we except Melville. Mr. Almy is a real character, a living man, and one with whom we do not every day meet. Gabriel is a half-allegorical character, sometimes apparently symbolizing conscience, at others our guardian angel. Clarence is a sweet boy, and we wish to hear more

of him. The Colonel must have been drawn from the life. He is the most natural and best sustained character in the book. Lel is the author's favorite, on whom he has bestowed the most pains and affection, but we prefer Agnes, "Sister Agnes," who, in defiance of the author, we maintain, is a character of a far higher order than Lel, and equally as lovely. But we have space for no further details. The story is Catholic in its tone, its morals, and in its tendency, but is not a "Catholic novel." It has no theological controversy with heretics, does not attempt to teach theology, but aims to guard youth against immorality, and to incite both old and young, without set exhortations, to the practice of their religious duties. It is a good specimen of the class of works we have repeatedly called for, and we have presented it as a birthday present to our only daughter. We trust it is but the harbinger of a series of popular works needed at the present time, and especially in this country, to counteract the evil influences on our youth of the profane literature of the day. It is not the best thing the author will do, but it is a noble beginning, and is the best popular Catholic story that has as yet been written and published in this country. As such we cordially commend it to the public, Protestant even, as well as Catholic. The author's descriptive powers are very superior, and his style is admirable, but we must caution against a too free indulgence of the former, and we notice in the latter some few verbal inaccuracies. We should know that the author was educated south of Mason and Dixon's line by his frequent use of *would* for *should*. *I would*, or *we would*, expresses a wish or desire, and *should* is the preterite of *shall*, as simply an auxiliary, as well as of *shall* in the sense of the German *sollen*.

10.—*Mohammed, the Arabian Prophet. A Tragedy, in Five Acts.*

By GEORGE H. MILES. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 167.

MR. EDWIN FORREST offered a prize of one thousand dollars for the best original tragedy in five acts. About one hundred competitors sent in their manuscripts, and the volume before us is the one to which the prize was awarded. Mr. Forrest regarded it as decidedly the best that was offered, although he does not seem to have regarded it as so well fitted to be acted as to be read,—probably because the character of Mahomet is not at all adapted to his peculiar style of acting. We have read the poem, and have no hesitation in pronouncing it the best poem of the kind ever written and published in this country. It is happily conceived and felicitously executed throughout. It is a work of rare beauty, and of great

power, of deep feeling, and of deep truth. The view it takes of the character of the Arabian prophet is philosophical and just, and the reader will get from this poem a far truer and more complete conception of his real character than from all the lives of him hitherto published in our language. We cordially commend the work to all the lovers of good poetry, and are not a little gratified that so excellent a poem should be written by an esteemed contributor to our own journal.

11. — *The Life and Religion of Mohammed, as contained in the Shecâh Traditions of the HYÂT-UL-KULOOB.* From the Persian. By Rev. JAMES L. MERRICK. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 483.

MR. MERRICK is or was an American Protestant missionary in Persia, and has given us a work on the life and religion of Mahomet, — *Mohammed*, as he writes, — from the Persian, which will, no doubt, be read with interest by many. It can hardly be called a translation, or faithful reproduction of the Persian work, which serves as its basis. Mr. Merrick tells us that he has taken some liberties with his author, omitting, condensing, paraphrasing according to his own judgment, and considering that judgment is the judgment of a Protestant missionary, it can command no great respect. Nevertheless, the work possesses great interest, and as embodying some portion of the traditions of the sect of Ali, the Mahometan Protestants, it is an important accession to our literature.

12. — *The Angel World, and other Poems.* By PHILIP JAMES BAILEY, Author of "*Festus*." Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 16mo. pp. 114.

WE could n't, or would n't, read *Festus*, and we have not succeeded in reading this new volume by the same author. One of our friends, who occasionally reads for us the poetical works sent us, tells us that she found it exceedingly hard reading, and that the several poems are far below *Festus*.